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Abstract
This thesis utilizes flow analyses of the labour market in order to examine two 
key issues. First, to asses the effectiveness of active labour market policies in Britain, 
Ireland and Poland. Secondly, it allows us to characterize and quantify movements 
between labour market states which have been occurring on an unprecedented scale in 
economies undergoing transition.
Chapters 1 and 2 investigate whether active labour market policies in Britain and 
Ireland have been instrumental in curing or preventing partial hysteresis due to long-term 
unemployment. In models of the determination of overall and duration-specific outflow 
rates from unemployment, the predictive power of active measures variables is tested.
Chapter 3 uses the ’lista 500’ panel data set to test the hypothesis that after the 
decentralizing reforms of the early eighties simple models of profit maximization can 
explain labour adjustment by large Polish enterprises.
Chapter 4 traces the build up of unemployment in Poland by characterizing the 
composition and determinants of flows between various labour market states. Traditional 
flow analysis is amended by dividing the state employment into the sub-states, private 
and state sector employment, and by emphasizing the institutional framework unique to 
the Polish labour market in its first stage of transition.
In Chapter 5 a unique panel data set is used to quantify labour market transitions 
in Eastern Germany in the first year after unification. Multinomial logit regressions are 
employed to highlight the determinants of the estimated transition rates. The applicability 
of standard models of labour market transitions to labour markets in transforming 
economies is also tested.
Chapter 6 uses Voivodship-level aggregate panel data to evaluate passive and 
active labour market policies in Poland which took shape in 1991 and 1992. We also test 
for the existence of a well behaved matching technology in the Polish labour market 
The methodology of Chapters 1 and 2 is modified to account for the panel nature of the 
data.
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Introduction
1. Overview
Flow analyses of the labour market have recently undergone a renaissance in 
mainstream macroeconomics (cf. Blanchard and Diamond (1992)). In this thesis flow 
analyses will be utilized to examine two key issues of the labour market. First, to assess 
the effectiveness of labour market policies in Britain, Ireland and Poland. Secondly, to 
characterize and quantify movements between labour market states which have been 
occurring in economies undergoing transition.
Chapters 1, 2 and 6 evaluate labour market policies. Chapter 1 develops models 
of the determination of the overall and duration-specific outflow rates from 
unemployment for Britain in order to investigate whether the Restart Programme and the 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme contributed to the lowering of equilibrium unemployment 
between 1982 and 1992. Chapter 2 looks at the impact of some Active Labour Market 
Policy (ALMP) measures on the overall and duration-by-age outflow rates from 
unemployment in Ireland in the eighties . In chapter 6 hiring functions are estimated for 
Poland, covering the years 1991 and 1992. ALMP measures are included as regressors 
and their predictive power is tested. This chapter also tries to establish whether a switch 
from an eamings-related to a flat rate benefit system at the beginning of 1992 affected 
hirings of the unemployed.
Chapter 3 examines annual net flows of employment in the largest Polish firms 
after the decentralizing reforms of the early eighties and asks whether the intended 
transformation of Polish enterprises to profit-maximizers is mirrored by their pattern of 
labour adjustment.
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Chapters 4 and 5 look at gross flows between the different labour market states 
in Poland and Eastern Germany in the early period of transition from a centrally planned 
to a market economy.
Since the early eighties, like other western European countries, Britain and Ireland 
have seen high levels of unemployment. The experiences in the labour market of the 
two countries were different in so far as in the second half of the eighties Britain’s labour 
market was characterized by the partial hysteresis of unemployment, i.e. persistent 
unemployment even in the face of an expanding economy, while Ireland had a depressed 
economy with hardly any vacancies. The rise of long-term unemployment, on the other 
hand, was an experience shared by the two countries. Both governments tried to combat 
unemployment and in particular long-term unemployment with many ALMP measures.
The first two chapters evaluate some of these measures. For Britain the Restart 
Programme, directed at people with an uninterrupted unemployment spell of more than 
six months and the Enterprise Allowance Scheme will be evaluated. In the Irish case we 
look at five employment schemes targeting various subsets of the pool of the unemployed 
(e.g. school leavers or the long-term unemployed). While not all the schemes analyzed 
in chapters 1 and 2 are directed at the long-term unemployed, the following remarks are 
confined to highlighting the differing economic functions of measures combatting long­
term unemployment in the two countries.
Assuming that long-term unemployment is the main channel of the partial 
hysteresis of unemployment in Britain, measures fighting long-term unemployment are 
meant to increase the effective labour supply such that any given level of unemployment 
exerts stronger downward wage pressure. As downward wage pressure is intensified 
equilibrium unemployment falls. The British Restart programme is such a measure which
16
tries to increase the effective labour supply by channelling people directly into jobs or, 
more likely, into search effectiveness enhancing training schemes. Chapter 1 tries to find 
out whether Restart has predictive power in the determination of overall and duration- 
specific outflow rates from unemployment, implying an important role for it in the cure 
of the partial hysteresis of unemployment.
If we look at the economic function of measures combatting long-term 
unemployment in Ireland, their preventive nature should be stressed. As the economy 
did not pick up in the eighties, reintegrating "disenfranchised" groups into the effective 
labour supply might prevent the partial hysteresis of unemployment once future demand 
for labour rises. Another point which can be learnt from the evaluation of Irish 
employment schemes deals with the definition of the disadvantaged group of the 
unemployed outside the labour force which ALMP measures are meant to reintegrate. 
In an economy with a chronically weak demand for labour many long-term unemployed 
might be considered by employers for jobs once the economy booms as employers 
understand that even "good" people can drift into long-term unemployment when the 
number of vacancies is negligible. Hence, not all long-term unemployed necessarily 
belong to the disadvantaged group whose members need help in rebuilding their human 
capital in order to reenter the effective labour supply.
The ALMP measures utilized in Poland in the years 1990 to 1992 were negligible 
relative to the stock of unemployment for most of the period. Only in the last 4 months 
of 1992 do we see a statistically significant number of participants in training schemes 
and public works. The evaluation of these measures in chapter 6, which is confined to 
1992, needs to be viewed within the general context of a weak demand for labour in the 
years 1990 to 1992, expressed in very high U/V ratios and very low outflow rates from
17
unemployment, compared not only with OECD countries but also with other economies 
in transition. Search effectiveness enhancing schemes might not be very meaningful if 
employers have only a small number of job offers for the large pool of the unemployed.
The first ’Solidarity’ government under Prime Minister Mazowiecki initiated a 
generous benefit entitlement system under political pressure from the ranks of its "own" 
trade union. Benefits in 1990 were eamings-related, open ended and did not entail a 
previous work requirement. As unemployment rose relentlessly in the first two years of 
the reform, the government adjusted the benefit system out of fiscal necessity. It 
tightened benefit eligibility criteria, limited in principal the entitlement spell to one year 
and switched from an eamings-related to a flat rate benefit system. These reforms may 
have increased the search efforts of some of the unemployed. For reasons mentioned in 
chapter 6, only the effect of the benefit regime switch on the level of hirings can be 
investigated econometrically.
For a better understanding of the Polish labour market in transition, an analysis 
of labour demand by large state own enterprises during the eighties might be useful. 
After the decentralizing reforms of the early eighties these enterprises were supposed to 
become profit-maximizers, independent from the centre in their input choices. 
Investigating their labour adjustment provides a partial answer as to whether the aims of 
the reforms were achieved. To this purpose, a simple static model of labour demand by 
a monopolistically competitive firm is utilized in chapter 3. The results of our 
investigation can also tell us whether the Polish labour market in the eighties was still 
characterized by the stylized facts of "labour markets" in centrally planned economies,
i.e. chronic excess demand for labour, a compressed intra-firm wage distribution and 
hidden unemployment, or whether it already had moved considerably towards a westem-
18
type labour market
Economic theory predicts that transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy involves the reallocation of factors of production on a large scale as prices take 
on their allocative function. As far as labour is concerned, its reallocation must generate 
open unemployment in the short and medium term. Estrin and Pissarides (1991) cite 
reasons for high and persistent levels of unemployment in economies in transition. They 
see the elimination by the price mechanism of excess labour demand and stabilisation 
policies as reasons for the rise of open unemployment in the short term. In the medium 
term high levels of labour mismatch might generate persistent open unemployment as the 
economy needs to restructure from heavy to light industry and from industry to services. 
Another source of unemployment in the medium term is the much larger employment 
share of agriculture compared with Western European countries.
Chapter 4 examines the build-up of Polish unemployment in the first 18 months 
after the introduction of stabilization and price liberalization policies in January 1990 by 
the Mazowiecki government. Data on inflows into unemployment are not available for 
this early period of transition and the flow analysis utilized in this chapter emphasizes 
the institutional features which had a strong impact on flows between labour market 
states at this time. Worker managed firms, the existence of a "parallel economy" 
(explained in chapter 4) and embryonic industrial relations are prominent examples of 
such institutional peculiarities. In the flow analysis of this chapter is implicit the idea 
that while economic theory can predict medium and long term outcomes of the transition 
process, remnants of the previous centrally planned economy are important determinants 
of this process in the short term. Without a knowledge of the recent past, labour market 
flows in the initial phase of the transformation cannot be properly explained.
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Hard evidence on transitions between labour market states and between sectors 
within employment is presented in chapter 5. From a unique panel data set of Eastern 
German workers, covering the period November 1990 to November 1991 a transition 
base is constructed. While the experiences of Eastern German workers cannot be 
generalized easily to ttie workers of other economies in transition, general trends can, 
nevertheless, be inferred from the estimated transition probabilities and the logistic 
regressions. From the transition probabilities, inferences seem possible about the 
transforming distributions of working age population and employment in economies in 
transition, while the regressions can highlight the main determinants of these transitions.
2. Methodological issues
The non-experimental evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies, like training 
and job creation measures, is dominated by two approaches.
The first approach looks at earnings of persons who have been on e.g. a training 
scheme and compares them with the earnings of a control group. Training measures 
intended to raise the productivity of participants should be mirrored, ceteris paribus, in 
higher wages relative to persons with similar characteristics who have not been given 
training. In recent studies sophisticated microeconometric techniques have been applied 
to panel data in order to ensure that unobservable individual-specific determinants of 
earnings are controlled for (cf. e.g. Ashenfelter and Card (1985)).
The second approach, known as ’transition methodology’, uses flow analysis of 
macro data to establish the overall effect of a measure on outflows or outflow rates from 
unemployment. The idea behind this approach, among others formulated by Haskel and 
Jackman (1988), is that a measure which is administered on a large scale can only be
20
considered effective if there is a statistically significant positive correlation between such 
a measure and outflows or outflow rates from unemployment. One of the strong points 
of such an approach is the ability in principal to take account of dead weight loss and 
substitution effects. For example, if we model the determination of overall outflows or 
the overall outflow rate from unemployment, a positive impact of a measure can be 
considered its net effect after all distortions have been accounted for.
Chapters 1,2 and 6 apply ’transition methodology’ to Britain, Ireland and Poland 
respectively, using aggregate time series in the first two chapters and regional panel data 
in chapter 6. Chapters 1 and 6 are in our opinion a major contribution to the further 
development of this methodology. In chapter 1 the data are carefully explored and 
’distribution free’ criteria of model selection and specification are employed to ensure 
that the estimated results reflect stable economic relationships and not just statistical 
artifacts of the given sample. In chapter 6 the conventional hiring function, normally 
applied to time series, is modified for use on regional panel data. Thus modified hiring 
functions are then used to evaluate Polish passive and active labour market policies. To 
ensure consistent and efficient estimates General Methods of Moments Estimators or 
Anderson-Hsiao Estimators are employed.
One recurrent theme in the thesis is the use of data exploration to test the validity 
of Western theories in the context of a reforming centrally planned economy (chapter 3) 
or of economies in transition (chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 3 explores the data on labour 
adjustment to see whether large Polish state owned enterprises behaved in the early 
eighties like monopolistically competitive profit-maximizers. In chapter 5 the results of 
the logistic regressions can be used to examine whether standard models of the 
determination of labour market transitions applied to Western economies can provide a
21
useful starting point for the investigation of labour market flows in a transforming 
economy. In the estimation of hiring functions, performed in chapter 6, is implicit a test 
for the existence of a well behaved matching technology between the unemployed and 
vacancies which, as most economists would argue, can be found in modem Western 
economies. The existence of such a technology in a labour market in transition cannot 
be assumed a priori and needs to be empirically investigated. In the Polish labour market 
for example where U/V ratios are very high this test is certainly necessary.
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Chapter 1
The Effectiveness of the Restart Programme and the Enterprise Allowance Scheme
I Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980’s Britain like many European countries has seen 
high levels of unemployment One of its most striking features has been its degree of 
persistence, even in the face of an expanding economy. In the eighties, many 
programmes were introduced by the British government with the aim to reduce 
unemployment and to cure its partial hysteresis. We will try to evaluate two such 
programmes, the Restart programme (Restart) conceived as a tool to combat long-term 
unemployment, defined as a continuous unemployment spell exceeding 12 months, and 
the Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS) meant to further the creation of small businesses 
and targeting all unemployed with spells longer than 8 weeks. Time series analysis will 
be employed to investigate whether these two Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) 
measures have an impact on the overall and duration-specific outflow rates from 
unemployment.
Roughly between 1984 and 1990 we have an expansionary phase in the business 
cycle and, consequently, a drop in total and long-term unemployment. As one of its 
main aims, this chapter pursues the question whether Restart has contributed to the fall 
in total, but above all long-term unemployment, i.e. whether this ALMP measure has 
been an effective tool in the cure of the partial hysteresis of unemployment.
To see why models of the determination of the overall and duration-specific 
outflow rates from unemployment are useful in the evaluation of ALMP measures, we 
first derive a flow-stock relationship for unemployment in the steady state. If A denotes
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outflows from and I inflows into unemployment during some given time unit and U the 
stock of unemployment, then in the steady state
A -  /  => U  »  —
A_
V
Steady state calculations which we undertake below show that 70% of the fall in the 
stock of total unemployment between 1984 and 1990 can be attributed to the rise in A/U, 
the overall outflow rate from unemployment So, for our sample spanning the period 
from the second quarter of 1982 to the second quarter 1992, outflow rate analysis could 
play an important role in the evaluation of ALMP.1
White and Lakey (1992), analyzing a sample of the 1989 cohort of Restart 
interviewees, found a "Restart effect", i.e. Restart interviewees seem to have shorter 
remaining durations of unemployment than members of a control group. Such a cohort 
study, while extremely useful, cannot address all issues of interest in connection with 
Restart. Only aggregate time series analysis can investigate the overall effect on 
unemployment, e.g. it can detect substitution effects, and, maybe more importantly, can 
help answer the question as to whether Restart has been instrumental in curing partial 
hysteresis over the entire expansionary phase of the business cycle.
Some work on the evaluation of Restart using time series has already been 
undertaken2. However, all these studies have the major drawback that only a few data 
points are available for the regressor variable used to capture Restart. The economic 
interpretation of the regression results is, therefore, quite difficult, and most likely all 
these studies just model the initial impact of the Restart programme.
As far as the evaluation of Restart is concerned, the study in this chapter is novel 
in three respects. First, the time series which we have for Restart covers a much longer
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period than those of previous studies and goes beyond the peak of the business cycle in
1990.3 So, our regressions might shed a clearer light on the question of how much the 
introduction of Restart contributed to the fall in unemployment while the economy 
expanded. Secondly, we explore the data very carefully to ensure that our measure of 
Restart is not just a dummy variable proxying for some other labour market policies. 
This data exploration is complemented by a model selection and specification process 
which is based on "distribution- free" statistics and on conventional statistics which are 
derived from regression residuals. Thirdly, steady state simulations allow us to quantify 
the impact of Restart on the stock of total and long-term unemployment between 1984 
and 1990.
While Restart lies at the centre of this study, the impact of the EAS on the overall 
and duration-specific outflow rates is also investigated. Two major distortive effects can 
occur with EAS, displacement of output and deadweight loss effects (cf. Stem (1988)). 
Outflow analysis can only detect the second effect, and we attempt to do this in our 
study. The other task in connection with EAS will be to quantify the possible impact of 
this scheme on the stocks of total and long-term unemployment.4
Section II gives a description of the Restart programme and the Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme. Section ID develops a simple theoretical framework for the 
determination of the overall and duration-specific outflow rates from unemployment. 
This section also discusses both the role of Restart in the cure of partial hysteresis and 
additional economic insights which can be gained from the analysis of duration-specific 
outflow rates. Section IV provides the empirical framework in which exploration of the 
data and model selection and specification takes place. Section V gives our results and 
section VI offers some conclusions.
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II Description of Restart and EAS
The Restart Programme (Restart), begun on a national scale in 1986, offers a 
counselling interview to any person with an unemployment duration exceeding six 
months.5 To fully understand the economic function of Restart and the derivation of the 
Restart variables, used in this chapter, it is essential to describe in some detail the 
interviewing process as it occurs in practice.6
A letter is sent from local job centres to all unemployed workers whose 
uninterrupted benefit spell approaches 6 months, inviting the individual to a counselling 
interview. The letter makes it clear that attending the interview is obligatory for those 
who want to retain their benefit eligibility. A short questionnaire is attached which the 
interviewee has to complete and bring to the interview. The questionnaire inquires about 
(a) job search activities currendy pursued, (b) the type of work for which the person 
considers himself/herself suitable and (c) the interviewee’s availability for work. 
Virtually all those who attend such an interview do this within 3 months of the receipt 
of the letter, i.e. all participants in the first Restart interview should in principle belong 
to the 6 - 9 months duration category of the unemployed.7 People who have a second 
or subsequent interview are the long-term unemployed, i.e. people who have an 
uninterrupted spell of unemployment exceeding 12 months.8 In White and Lakey’s 
cohort those who have a competitive disadvantage in the labour market through chronic 
illness or low levels of education are most likely to be recalled to a second Restart 
interview. In most interviews the attempt is made to either (i) refer the unemployed 
person directly to a vacancy, or (ii) find a position on a training scheme or a short 
Restart course or (iii) point to the availability of the enterprise allowance scheme. Some
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interviewees (a small minority according to White and Lakey) are not put through one 
of the three above mentioned channels. Instead, some of these persons might be put in 
contact with a Disablement Resettlement Officer, if they are chronically ill. Others, 
suspected of fraudulent take-up of benefits, are referred to a Claimant Advisor. However, 
from the available descriptive evidence it seems certain that the Restart programme is 
only marginally concerned with the detection of benefit "cheats". Its main function is 
to help those who have genuine difficulties in flowing out of unemployment by providing 
a "gateway" to a wide range of already existing programmes and services at local 
employment offices. As Jackman et al. (1986) wrote at its inception, the main aim of 
the Restart programme is "to help the long-term unemployed take advantage of the job, 
training and other opportunities open to them. It does not of itself increase those 
opportunities..." (emphasis added).
The Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS) aims at the promotion of enterprise and 
jobs. According to the Department of Employment, EAS is meant "to encourage 
unemployed people to start up a business of their own and so to help create new small 
businesses and new jobs" (Employment Gazette, October 1986). Under the scheme, a 
person is currently paid an allowance of £40 per week for 12 months if (i) he/she is 
setting up a new business and has £ 1000 or more to invest in it and (ii) has been 
unemployed and receiving unemployment benefit (or supplementary benefit) for at least 
8 weeks. EAS tries to eliminate the financial disincentive for unemployed people in 
becoming self-employed which can arise with their loss of entitlement to unemployment 
benefits.
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m  Theoretical Framework
1. A simple general model of the determination of the overall outflow 
rate from unemployment
Modifying the matching models developed by Hall (1979), Mortensen (1982), 
Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1986), and Jackman and Layard (1991), we derive a class 
of models describing the determination of the overall outflow rate from unemployment.
We measure A as the number of people leaving unemployment during a period, 
measure U as the number of unemployed and V as the number of actual vacancies at the 
beginning of the period. We define c as the average search effectiveness of the 
unemployed at a given point in time9, when employment measures meant to enhance 
search effectiveness are absent Also let
c* -  6(1 +<xM), where 0< c* < 1 , M  « Y Z i  PA and 1C ft*1 (L1)
M is the weighted sum of those employment measures, denoted by E, which do not 
directly create additional vacancies, but are meant to increase the search effectiveness of 
the unemployed. On a priori grounds we can assume that a  > 0, i.e. that these 
employment measures should not lower the average search effectiveness of the 
unemployed. Finally let
V ' -  V + y V ,  where y>0 , V" -  V  T]V/ and £ t i - 1  (1.2)
W is a weighted sum of vacancies that are generated or potentially generated by public 
employment, self-employment programmes or wage subsidies during a period.
We then postulate that the number of people leaving unemployment is mainly determined
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by V* and the search effective part of the stock of unemployment, i.e.
(1.3)
Two points need to be made about this outflow function. First, we will only 
discuss male unemployment here and can therefore be quite certain that the great majority 
of those in the male working age population who flow from the unemployment register 
flow into employment10 Hence, our outflow function is approximately equivalent to 
the aggregate matching function as presented e.g. in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). 
Secondly, matching models are often criticized on the grounds that they neglect the 
competition for jobs between the employed and unemployed (e.g. Burgess (1989)). 
While this criticism has merit, it is not very relevant in our context where we want to 
analyze the additional effects of ALMP on the outflow rate from unemployment. Casual 
evidence tells us that the unemployed (and most certainly the long-term unemployed) 
who are helped by ALMP do not compete directly with the employed.11 Essentially 
what we want to find out is whether ceteris paribus the hiring of the unemployed has 
been improved by ALMP.
The assumption that f exhibits CRS in a large labour market (see Hall (1979) and 
Pissarides (1979)), seems, for Britain at least, to be borne out by empirical evidence (cf. 
e.g. Jackman and Layard (1991) and Pissarides (1986)), hence (1.3) can be rewritten as
(1.4)
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Log-linearising this last equation we obtain
-  8,ln[JL.] + (l-8j)lnc' + ...
-  SjlntZd+Y -^)] + (1-S,)ln[f (1+aM)] + ...
(1.5)
For small values of aM and yCVW) we then get the approximation
In[A] -  S.lnA.] + S j y l l ]  + (l-S^lnu? + (l-S^oM  + ... (1.6)
Removing the restriction on the coefficients of In c and ccM and, having quarterly data, 
specifying a similar structure as in Lehmann (1990) we arrive at the general class of 
equations which we can estimate
where t/100 is a scaled time trend, 8(S+1Hi = (i=l,....,m), 5 ^ = 8 ^  and (for the time
being) e ~ (O,^).
There are many programmes in Britain which attempt to increase the average
programme, however, large enough and covering a prolonged time interval to allow for 
aggregate time series analysis is the Restart Programme (REST). Two large and 
prolonged programmes have been in force in Britain which directly generate vacancies: 
the Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS) and the Community Programme.13 Haskell and 
Jackman (1988) have analyzed the latter programme (which was terminated in 1988) 
using the same methodology. Confining, therefore, our analysis to the Enterprise
ln[—] -  const. + seasonals + 8.1n[ 1 + 5,Inc
TT  1 L T T J 2 (1.7)
search effectiveness of all or some sub-pools of the unemployed.12 The only such
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Allowance Scheme and the Restart Programme we arrive at the equation which, in 
principal, we wish to estimate
A Vln[—] -  const. + seasonals + Sjlnf—] + 82lnc
u  u  ( U )
+ 5 ,[_f_] + 5,-=2£ + 8 REST + s  
3 100 4 V 5
where as above e ~ (O,©2). Its precise specification will be developed below.
2. The function of Restart in the presence of partial hysteresis due to
long-term unemployment
In the literature, three main channels of hysteresis or partial hysteresis of 
unemployment are mentioned: capital constraints (cf. e.g. Bean (1989)), insider-outsider 
mechanisms (cf. e.g. Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1989)) 
and long-term unemployment (Layard et al. (1991) and Layard (1990b)).
Evaluation of the Restart Programme is embedded within the analysis of partial 
hysteresis as due to the third channel. An adverse aggregate shock to the economy will 
generate temporary increased inflows into unemployment. Whilst initially short-term 
unemployment will rise relative to long-term unemployment, after some lag the duration 
distribution of unemployment will have more mass in the longer duration categories than 
before the shock. Ceteris paribus this changed duration structure of unemployment will 
result in a lower average search effectiveness of the unemployed. As the proportion of 
long-term unemployment has increased, this lower average search effectiveness of the 
total stock of unemployment comes about because the long-term unemployed have a 
lower average probability of flowing into employment than the short-term unemployed 
(for evidence in Britain and Germany, cf. Disney et al., chs. 5 and 7). In the presence 
of both heterogeneity and state dependence, factual or (by employers) perceived lower 
productivity, destruction of human capital and disillusionment with the search process
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might all contribute to this lower average "escape" probability of the long-term 
unemployed.14
As long as there exists some state dependence, the data generation process 
underlying unemployment will exhibit partial hysteresis even in the absence of insider 
power and capital constraints. In the framework of e.g. the Layard-Nickell model 
(Layard and Nickell (1986,1987) and Blanchard (1988)) the reversal of the shock will not 
result in a return to the pre-shock NAIRU but in a higher NAIRU for prolonged periods. 
This is due to diminished downward wage pressure at a given level of unemployment, 
as some of the long-term unemployed have become "disenfranchised", i.e. no longer 
belonging to the effective labour supply. It may be that prospective employers use long­
term unemployment as a screening device and "weed out" persons with long 
unemployment spells. Workers’ representatives who bargain with employers over wages 
are more likely to be influenced by the stock of short-term unemployed than by the total 
stock of unemployed as the long-term unemployed cannot compete effectively for jobs 
with any of the workers they represent who may enter unemployment. Also, employees 
engaging in on-the-job-search will only see a sub-pool of the unemployed as potential 
rivals. As a consequence, the level of unemployment does not exert the amount of 
downward wage pressure necessary to return quickly to the pre-shock NAIRU. Some 
ALMP, directed at the supply side of the labour market, are meant to cure this partial 
hysteresis during the expansionary phase of the business cycle. Such policies aim at the 
re-integration of some of the "disenfranchised" unemployed into the effective labour 
supply, thus increasing the search effectiveness of the stock of the unemployed. 
Downward wage pressure becomes stronger and lower equilibrium unemployment results.
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The description of the Restart interviewing process given in section II shows the 
peculiar nature of Restart among search effectiveness enhancing measures. It helps some 
people to directly find jobs or self-employment, but it also directs others to training or 
counselling schemes which in themselves are search effectiveness enhancing programmes. 
Nevertheless, Restart can be evaluated by adapting the developed general framework to 
this specific nature of the programme.
Let us rewrite equation (1.1) as follows:
c * = c(r)[l+oc/tas£] ( 1 9 )
= c ( x )  + a c ( x ) R e s t
where c \  c and a  have the same meaning as before and the number of Restart interviews 
is denoted by Rest. The vector x has as its elements, determinants of the average search 
effectiveness of the unemployed. The benefit system and duration structure, but also 
training and counselling services (apart from Restart) are among others such elements. 
The formulation of (1.9) then has two implications. First, ceteris paribus, i.e. for a given 
x we can measure the effect of Restart on the overall search effectiveness c \ Secondly, 
occ(x)Rest, the expression for this effect, approximates the impact of Restart well: for a 
given positive a  this impact is greater, the larger c and Rest.
Why should c enter the formulation of the Restart effect multiplicatively? If e.g. 
there are low replacement ratios and benefit coverage is limited in time, the unemployed 
in general and Restart interviewees more readily take the unfilled jobs for which they 
qualify. The greater the variety of training, retraining and counselling schemes (we 
exclude Restart here) from which the unemployed benefit and the larger the number of 
slots on these measures, the greater is the average search effectiveness of the 
unemployed. But this greater variety and larger number of slots also imply that it is
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easier to direct the Restart interviewee to that measure which is most appropriate for 
him/her.
These two examples seem to show the correctness of our multiplicative 
formulation of the Restart effect. With this formulation we assume that the more 
conducive the environment is to search efforts by the unemployed in general, the greater 
is the impact of the Restart programme.
3. The relationship between overall outflow rate and duration-specific outflow rates 
To derive the overall outflow rate algebraically, we take advantage of the identity, 
that the change in the total stock of the unemployed during a period (AUt+1) must equal 
the inflow into unemployment Ot) minus the outflow from it (AJ in that period:
/, -  A, 2  A UM, hence (1-10)
[ i .] ,  = I '"V^ +U‘ (1.11)
V  U,
We define the duration-specific outflow rate, i.e. the proportion of those leaving 
unemployment in period t+1, after having been unemployed at t for d periods, as
-  Pdl -  far  (1.12)
U  U d,t
where D is the number of duration categories, and the outflow rate of those who enter 
unemployment and leave it before the first count (cf. Layard et al. (1991)) as
Pu  -  2(/,~/^ l) ; (1-13)
We finally construct the outflow rate of those with unemployment durations longer than
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D-1 periods as
[A ]., -  P -  /o r d -D -1, (1.14)
1/ 41 4' (Ud +UM )
We can then express the overall outflow rate as a linear combination of D duration
specific outflow rates.
To demonstrate this with a concrete example let us assume that the stock of the
unemployed has 6 duration categories (set D=6):
Uu  = number of people who have been continuously unemployed between 0 and
1 quarter;
U2>t = number of people who have been continuously unemployed between 1 and
2 quarters;
U5t = number of people who have been continuously unemployed between 4 and 
5 quarters;
U61 = number of people who have been continuously unemployed for more than 
5 quarters.
Now let us use the fact that
U, -  Zt UdJ (1.15)
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Then,
r A ,  a m
u1' u.
So,
r A /, 1 ,- U ^  ^ Uu Uu -Uw
V  V, I, U, uu
+ V y  Uh - U z m  + ^ 3., ^ 3, ,- ^ .M
t /( L/’2i £/( {/3,
{/, [/, -£/, , (I/. +{/ ) (£/< +U, )-l/„ ,4,t 4,f 5,r+l v 5,t 6 ,r  v 5,/ 6 ,f' 6,t+l
(1.17)
U UA U (U< +U, )t 4,t t v 5,t 6,1'
Therefore,
[A], -  e;jp/,+eup I ,+e2/p2j +0 3jp 3 ,+0 , ^ + 0 ^ , ,  
A t / , , i / , ,where 0 . -  fl/wf 0, - —— , 0, - —— etc.
^ 2U u  U u  Ut t t
(1.18)
Equation (1.18) says that the overall outflow rate is a weighted sum of the duration 
specific outflow rates, the weights, apart from 0j, being the proportions of the specific 
duration stock in relation to the total stock of the unemployed.15
This relationship can certainly imply that regressors which have no power in 
predicting the overall outflow rate may well be important in the prediction of some or 
all of the duration specific outflow rates. The model which "performs best" in the 
estimation of (1.8) should, therefore, not necessarily be chosen to estimate duration 
specific outflow rates.
In general, though, we shall estimate duration-specific outflow rates by a class of
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equations similar to (i.8)
A VAln[—]d = const. + seasonals + 8jln[—] + 521tl^
u  u  (1.19)
+ S J _ L ] + + 8.REST + 5.1n[—L , + e .
3 100 4 V 5 6 I/ 4 ' 1 4
where d=l,...,5 and the error terms ed are assumed to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated 
over time, but contemporaneously correlated.
The main difference between (1.19) and (1.8) is that we replace c with sd, the "probability 
to survive" to duration category d.
The terms c and sd serve essentially the same purpose, i.e. to control for 
differences in search effectiveness amongst the unemployed. As already mentioned, such 
differences may arise from two causes, heterogeneity or state dependence. Let us recall 
what these two different hypotheses imply for the interpretation of c and sd.
If there were no heterogeneity and the differences in the search effectiveness of 
the unemployed were explained purely by the length of time for which people had been 
unemployed (pure state dependence), then there would be no role for sd in the duration 
specific outflow equations, while in the aggregate outflow equation c would depend only 
on the duration structure of the unemployment stock. If, at the opposite extreme, there 
were no state dependence, and the differences in the search effectiveness of the 
unemployed were explained entirely by heterogeneity, then sd would have a positive 
effect on the duration specific outflow equations while, at least in the steady state, there 
would be no role for c in the aggregate equation. The first of these effects arises 
because, with heterogeneity, the "better" people leave unemployment first, so the greater 
proportion of the original entry cohort surviving to a given duration, the better their 
average quality. The second of these effects arises because in a steady state and in the
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absence of state dependence the average quality of the stock of the unemployed people
is, on reasonable assumptions, invariant with regard to the aggregate unemployment rate 
(Jackman and Layard (1991)).
If, as one would expect in practice, there exists both heterogeneity and state 
dependence we would expect to see both a role for c in explaining the overall outflow 
rate and a role for sd in explaining duration specific outflow rates. The former reflecting 
the effect of state dependence and the latter the effect of heterogeneity.
The analysis of duration-specific outflow rates can give important additional 
insights when evaluating ALMP.
The effectiveness of a measure against long-term unemployment can be assessed 
not only by looking at its impact on outflows from long-term unemployment, but also by 
investigating its capacity to slow down inflows into long-term unemployment. Note that 
in the steady state
where we have adapted the steady state equation of section I to long-term unemployment 
Also note that, employing our duration structure,
it becomes clear that, given an initial stock U31, p31 and p41+1 determine the inflow into
(1.21)
Under the assumption, used by Haskell and Jackman (1988), that
(1.22)
long-term unemployment at time t+1.
A policy measure which encompasses all the unemployed with spells longer than 
six months might be more effective in reducing the stock of long-term unemployment 
than a measure which only targets the long-term unemployed. In the presence of pure 
heterogeneity, low outflow rates for groups with longer spells are a function of the 
composition of the unemployed, while when we have pure state dependence, such low 
rates are caused entirely by the unemployment experience. A measure targetted at only 
the long-term unemployed will in the former case exclude many of those that are still in 
shorter duration categories, but should be targetted, while in the latter case such a 
measure will have found the ideal target group (cf. Pissarides and Haskel (1987)). 
Therefore, when both, heterogeneity and state dependence, are causes of lower average 
search effectiveness of those with longer unemployment spells, a measure also targetting 
lower duration categories can, ceteris paribus, lower inflows into long-term 
unemployment and thus more rapidly reduce the stock of the long-term unemployed. In 
this context, Restart might be an especially potent measure of average search 
effectiveness enhancement as it targets not only the long-term unemployed but also 
shorter duration categories.
The analysis of duration-specific outflow rates can also be used to discuss 
distortive effects of ALMP. For heuristic purposes assume there are two duration 
categories, short-term and long-term unemployment, let as and aL be the outflow rates 
from short-term and long-term unemployment, ML a measure targeted at long-term 
unemployment and I equal inflows into unemployment. Ceteris paribus, the following 
partials describe the usual distortive effects of ALMP:
(a) substitution effect -» 5as/3ML < 0;
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(b) deadweight loss -» daJdMh = 0;
(c) displacement of output effect —» 3l/9ML > 0.
The last effect, which in the case of EAS is of the first order according to Stem 
(1988) cannot be assessed with the help of outflow analysis, while dead weight loss and 
substitution effects can in principle be detected by it. For example, in those equations 
which estimate outflow rates for targeted duration groups, insignificant coefficients on 
the EAS variable might imply dead weight loss. The Restart programme, on the other 
hand, not generating actual vacancies, can only exhibit substitution effects. A significant 
negative coefficient on the Restart variable in equations connected with short spells of 
unemployment might point to such effects. There are strong a priori reasons why the 
Restart programme might generate substitution effects. Restart interviewees are not 
directly placed into a job or put on training schemes, instead they are advised how to 
apply for possible vacancies and training schemes. They will then compete with some 
of the very short-term unemployed, i.e. individuals in U„ for vacancies and training 
scheme slots. Thus a partial "crowding out" of the very short-term unemployed by 
Restart interviewees is plausible.
In the evaluation literature which uses time series analysis, one important issue 
of contention is whether a variable representing a specific measure is actually a proxy for 
something which has nothing to do with this measure. In the case of Restart e.g., Dicks 
and Hatch (1989) find that their Restart variable might well be a proxy for the tighter 
benefit eligibility criteria which were gradually introduced between 1986 and 1988, since 
in a regression determining the level of short-term unemployment (in their case defined 
as an uninterrupted spell of less than six months) the coefficient on the Restart variable 
is negative and significant
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In our analysis of duration-specific outflow rates we are able to test whether our 
Restart variable proxies for tighter benefit eligibility criteria or whether it truly measures 
the Restart effect. When estimating a system of equations like (19) significant positive 
coefficients on a Restart variable for both the two shortest outflow rates pj and p2 would 
be a strong indication that this variable carries information not directly linked with the 
Restart process.16
IV Empirical Framework
1. The econometric implementation of the evaluation of labour market policies in 
Britain using transition methodology
For the model of the overall outflow rate from unemployment, write the vector 
of N quarterly observations on In (A/U) as y, the matrix of k covariates as X, the k 
parameters and N error terms as the vectors \  and e. The most general model (equation
(1.7)) is therefore in matrix form
y  -  + e, e~(0,<r2/ )  (1-23)
To evaluate labour market policies we perform the following relevant partition of (1.23)
y  ■= [ X1 X1 ] [ ?  ] + s, e-(0,a2/)  (1-24)
Here X2 is the matrix of regressors of the Jackman-Layard model (Jackman and Layard
(1991), X2 the matrix of employment measure variables, with and £2 the corresponding 
parameter vectors. For £2 = 0 we get the Jackman-Layard model
y  -  X1 + e, e-(0,o2/) , (1-25)
which we call Model 0. The evaluation of active labour market policies using transition
methodology then simply consists of an attempt to investigate, whether some regressors
in X2 are essential to the determination of In (A/U) and whether, for the sample in 
question, some augmented model supersedes Model 0 under clearly defined statistical 
criteria.
Consider a general econometric model of the determination of duration-specific 
outflow rates. Assume that the set of regression equations given by (1.19) has the 
following underlying error structure: for eit and ejs E(eit,ejs)=aij for s=t, and E(eit,ejs)=0 for 
s#t (i,j = 1,..,5). This assumption of contemporaneous correlation of the disturbances 
is reasonable: at the same point in time the duration-specific rates are exposed to the 
same random shocks or have similar unobserved determinants. We can write the 
disturbance related set of regressions by stacking the 5 y vectors and error vectors and 
by constructing a block diagonal regression matrix, where the diagonal blocks are the 
regression matrices of the individual equations. For N quarterly observations and k
regressors, we then get the following model (cf. Judge et al. (1985), ch. 12):
y  -  X  C + e, where E[e£] -  <1> -  2  ®  /  U-26)
and the dimensions of y,X,£ and e are (5N x 1), (5N x 5k), (5k x 1) and (5N x 1)
respectively. Furthermore
X =
Finally, assume that X is positive definite and hence nonsingular.
The estimator of £, based on this model when X is unknown, is referred to as Zellner’s
<*11 <*12 <*13 <*14 <*15
<*12 <*22 <*23 <*24 <*25
<*13 <*23 <*33 <*34 <*35
<*14 <*24 <*34 <*44 <*45
<*15 <*25 <*35 <*45 <*55
(1.27)
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"seemingly unrelated regression" (SUR) estimator and given by
- [*'(£■' ® / ) * ] 'V ( f ‘ ® I)y  
with X being based on the OLS residuals €; -  y ; (1.28)
having elements fr. -  -Le7 i j  -
2. The data and econometric issues
Figure 1.1 shows moving averages of A/U, c and V/U for the period 1982 - 1992. 
We have excluded the first 2 years of the eighties when the levels of A/U and V/U fell 
dramatically. Since we are interested in the effect of the introduction of the labour 
market measures EAS and Restart, with the former begun in 1982 and the latter in 1986, 
it seems legitimate to impose the above time limits on our sample. More importantly, 
if we include data points previous to 1982 it becomes unclear whether A/U and V/U are 
for the given sample stationary variables or whether they are 1(1). For longer quarterly 
time series of A/U and V/U (covering the period from 1967 to 1990), where the 
performed tests are quite powerful, Ardeni and Lehmann (1992) find some evidence that 
these variables are not stationary and that the estimation of outflow rate models in levels 
might be inappropriate. Inspection of Figure 1.1, on the other hand, leads to the 
conclusion that for the chosen sample period the variables in question are 1(0).17
In Figure 1.2 moving averages of duration-specific unemployment outflow rates 
are plotted. As expected the longer the uninterrupted spell of unemployment the lower 
the outflow rate. Furthermore, the data appear to be stationary.
Comparing Figures 1.1 and 1.2, for many data points the overall outflow rate 
(note: a weighted sum of duration-specific outflow rates) is at least as large as the 
shortest duration-specific outflow rate which we can observe. This relationship between 
the two rates is sensible, though, since for most data points the estimate of the outflow
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rate P2, which cannot be directly observed, happens to be much higher than Pj. With the 
weights of the former outflow rate (I/2U) somewhat smaller than the weights of the latter 
(Uj/U) throughout the sample, the level of Pz must be very high (or certainly higher than 
that of PA) for most data points to explain the similar levels of Pj and A/U.18 Also 
during the period when the overall outflow rate shows a substantial rise (between 1986 
and 1990), two of the duration-specific outflow rates which are potentially affected by 
Restart, i.e. P3 and P5 show a much greater percentage increase than the other rates, while 
P4 has only a very slight upward trend.
In the appendix we discuss the quarterly series for total unemployment, duration- 
specific levels of unemployment, vacancies and inflows into unemployment on which 
A/U, V/U and Pd (d=l,..,5) are based. There are no simultaneity problems with the latter 
variables, since, as already mentioned, A and Ad represent flows during a quarter while 
the stocks of unemployment and vacancies are measured at the beginning of the quarter. 
An extended description of the construction of c can be found in the appendix of 
Jackman and Layard (1991). However, in order to show that c does not create a 
simultaneity bias we briefly touch upon its construction here. Let 1985q2 be the steady 
state quarter; c is then constructed as the weighted sum of steady state duration-specific 
outflow rates, where the weights are analogous to those in (1.18), i.e. if <t>i=Pi,85(2) is the 
steady state outflow rate for those who leave the register within 3 months of entering 
unemployment and if (|)d=Pd,85(2) (d=l,...,D) is the steady state outflow rate for the d-th 
duration category of unemployment,then
<t>,+ E , — d- 29)1 2 U d Ui t
The <|)’s are constants here. Since we multiply these constants with stocks measured at
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the beginning of the period (apart from I/2U), the inclusion of c into the regression 
should not pose simultaneity problems.19 The construction of the "survival probabilities", 
sd (d=l,..,5), uses lagged inflow into unemployment data and contemporaneous and 
lagged stock data20, so again no simultaneity bias can occur because of these variables. 
To be able to estimate (1.8) with OLS and (1.19) with SUR we need to finally investigate 
the exogeneity of the labour market measures.
The EAS measure is plotted in Figure 1.3. This measure is given by EAS slots 
filled per period for both men and women divided by total number of vacancies. As can 
be seen, this measure is very small, i.e. filled EAS slots are tiny relative to vacancies. 
As the number of eligible unemployed comprises all duration categories with the 
exception of the shortest and the level of vacancies is for all data points smaller than the 
stock of male unemployment, the EAS flows are negligible relative to the eligible stock 
of unemployment This measure can therefore for all practical purposes be treated as 
exogenous.
In the case of Restart, which is a large programme the endogeneity problem 
cannot be dismissed that easily. In principal every person approaching an unemployment 
duration of six months has to attend a Restart interview. Also, the larger the stock of 
long-term unemployment the more follow-up Restart interviews we might expect per 
quarter. An endogeneity problem might arise, because the more mass there is in the 
higher duration categories of the unemployment distribution the lower the outflow rate 
from unemployment Thus the number of Restart interviews might depend on the overall 
outflow rate from unemployment.
We deal with this problem not by trying to instrument the Restart variables, but 
rather by "normalizing" the number of Restart interviews by the stock of eligible
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participants. Let the number of imputed Restart interviews for males during quarter t for 
people with uninterrupted unemployment spells longer than 6 but less than 9 months be 
Rest^ p the corresponding number for males with continuous unemployment spells longer 
than 12 months be Rest12+,t and denote long-term unemployment as Uu =U5t+U6t. We, 
then, define three participation categories of Restart with respect to the unemployment 
duration stocks, Restart-Short, Restart-Long and Restart-Total as follows:
Rest, , Rest.„t
RestK.   l ;  Rest.   l ;
V»  Vu  (1.30)
Re _ (R est^R estnJ
(UXI+ULJ)
These measures21, which can be treated as exogenous22, are shown in Figure 1.4. 
RestL and Restj. start in the third quarter of 1986, and Rests in the second quarter of 
1987. Since a very high percentage of all male unemployed with a spell between 6 and 
9 months are participating in a Restart interview before the 9 months threshold (White 
and Lakey (1992), Rests should take on values less than but close to one. However, it 
can, of course, only be an estimate of the proportion of the eligible male unemployment 
population participating in a first Restart interview. There are various reasons why this 
estimate might be imprecise. First, the partition of the number of Restart interviewees 
into Rest^ and Rest12+ is only available on an annual basis and we assume that within 
the annual intervals given in footnote 8 the partition remains the same. Secondly, we 
would, ideally, need the duration structure of unemployment at bi-weekly intervals, as 
lists of potential Restart participants are compiled every two weeks. The duration 
structure is accessible on a quarterly basis, so if we "normalize" by U3 we cannot take 
account of a possibly shifting duration structure during the quarter which will affect 
Rest**. Thirdly, from the available evidence one cannot conclude with certainty that all
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those who participate in a first Restart interview fall into the duration category U3. Even 
though one might think it unlikely, it may be that for some quarters there is a small, but 
nevertheless statistically significant group of first Restart interviewees who fall into the 
duration category U4. Finally, for the cohort of 1989 White and Lakey detect a 
statistically significant "Early Restart Effect" for females but not males. Some women 
upon receipt of the invitation to a first Restart interview seem to exit the labour force. 
The number of men participating in a first Restart interview during a quarter is imputed 
on the basis of the partition of U3 by gender. So, if there indeed exists an "Early Restart 
Effect" for women but not men, we understate Rest^ and thus Rests.
While the first two sources of imprecision generate a bias in the measurement of 
Rests whose direction cannot be determined, the third source implies an upward and the 
fourth source a downward bias.
The variable Res^ is measured imprecisely only because of the first two sources, 
while there might be measurement problems with Restj because of sources two, three and 
four. Inspection of Figure 1.4 seems to indicate that Rest? is almost perfectly collinear 
with RestL. This is confirmed by auxiliary regressions involving the two variables23. 
This must mean that when (Rest6++Rest12+) is "normalized" by (U3+Ul) the two biases 
attributable to Rest^ cancel each other out.
Given the magnitude of the Restart programme we do not believe that 
measurement error poses a major problem in the estimation of overall and duration- 
specific outflow rates. At any rate, we can be quite certain that Restr is least affected 
by measurement error as the biases in this measure of Restart due to sources three and 
four are in opposite directions.
When investigating the effectiveness of Restart and EAS we are interested in
47
seeing whether these variables carry information about economic behaviour which has 
an impact on outcomes in the labour market. When estimating outflow rates it is 
important to ensure that the empirical results are not entirely dependent on some sample 
specific statistical artifacts. Two such artifacts come to mind. All the measures for 
Restart, but especially Rests, are characterized by initial dramatic "jumps" as the empty 
cells before the introduction of the programme are filled with zeros. But, when 
modelling the effect of Restart on outflow rates from unemployment we would like to 
be sure that our measures are not just proxies for the initial impact of the introduction 
of the programme which might e.g. be closely linked with a once and for all "shake out" 
of dubious benefit claimants in 1986/87 (cf. Disney et al. (1992), ch.6). Instead, our 
measures should reflect the effect of Restart throughout the entire period under 
consideration.24 Secondly, there is the possible existence of "influential points" which 
lower the predictive power of a regression equation. Inspection of Figures 1.3 and 1.4 
shows that it is worthwhile to investigate the existence of "influential points" for both 
Restart and EAS.
The existence of "jumps" and "influential points" in the data has two important 
implications. From a purely statistical point of view, the underlying data generation 
process might not be regular enough to warrant e.g. OLS estimation and/or distributional 
assumptions of normality. For the purpose of the evaluation of labour market measures 
such irregularities in the data could lead to wrong notions about the effectiveness of these 
measures.
3. Testing for "smoothness" and normality of the data and model selection
It is in general considered good methodology, when judging the merit of specific 
models, to take performance criteria into account which do not depend on distributional
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assumptions. From a general class of models, derived from economic theory, that model 
should be chosen which performs best under such "distribution-free" criteria.
One such performance criterion is the estimate of the mean squared prediction 
error, using complete cross validation, which we denote by Eccv. Define b(X) as the OLS 
predictor. Remove (y^XJ and get b_n(X), then Eccv is defined as
E = —  E", [y -b (X )]2 (1.31)ccv n - n v n/J
Calculate Eccv for all possible models in the general class and choose that model which 
minimises Eccv.
While such a selection procedure is desirable for many data sets, the criterion Eccv 
is especially useful in our particular case, where we are not certain about the regularity 
of the process underlying the data. To understand the usefulness of E ^  in deciding 
whether e.g. normality assumptions and/or OLS estimation procedures are appropriate25, 
some theoretical background needs to be presented.
Let H be the projection matrix XfX’Xj^X’, i.e. y = Hy, and let 1^  be the n-th
diagonal element in H, h„ = H^. Denote the n-th residual by rn = yn - b(Xn) and the n-th
deleted residual by r n = yn - b ^X J, hence
E = 1  Z ",(r )2 (1.32)CCV y y  n - l  \  - n '
The basic theorem which allows us to relate Eccv and the distributional 
characteristics of a data set is given below. Its proof is rather lengthy and omitted 26
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Theorem:
r n « - J I _  (1.33)
_n 1 -h
Corollary:
E - I s t i t — /  (1 -34)
ccv- N  b 1 L 1 _ ^ J 
n
When h„ ~ 1 , we obtain "influential points" which reduce the predictive power 
of an equation. More importantly, in the absence of such points is approximately 
equal to an adjustment factor times the Mean Residual Sum of Squares,
MRSS -  -  b { X ) f  (1.35)
Note that when k is the number of regressors, the projection matrix H has rank k and k 
eigenvalues equal to 1 and N-k eigenvalues equal to 0. Therefore,
-  trace(H) -  k U-36)
But
h - ±
N
(1.37)
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Now assume that h . * h , then
6 -  1 j*  r r“ i«v ^  »-l[ J_A
/I
« 1 1 T*
A/ — 2 n” * n
^  (1-/0
-lr-JL_iVr*
A r i - * / A r  "
So finally,
£ „  -  W , «SS (1.38)
(Wnfc )2
When (38) holds approximately, i.e. under the assumption that hn ~ h, we can be quite
certain, that the data are generated by some regular distribution (normal or uniform). 
Inspection of the values of h^ n=l,...,N, and comparing the LHS of (38) with its RHS 
should give some definite clues as to whether the underlying data generation process is 
normal or not, and whether we can have confidence in the usual test results associated 
with OLS estimation.
Without a priori distributional assumptions about the data we cannot construct 
confidence intervals for
E - __-  RSS (1.39)
(N-k )2
and test for approximate equality between the LHS and RHS of (38). One way to 
proceed is to use (39) as a relative measure. When Jackman and Layard estimate their 
model they make the implicit assumption that the underlying data generation process is 
"smooth" enough to use OLS and not e.g. LAD estimation and that its stochastic part is 
normally distributed. What could upset the "smoothness" and normality of the data 
generation process in our sample is the introduction of the two labour market policy
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measures Restart and EAS.
Let there be no initial assumptions about the distributional characteristics of the 
data generation process determining the overall outflow rate from unemployment in our 
sample. The percentage differences between the LHS and RHS of (38) can be computed 
for all models with different sets of regressors. The difference for model 0 (the original 
Jackman-Layard model) can then be taken as a benchmark: models with smaller 
differences are at least as satisfactory as model 0 with respect to the "smoothness" of the 
data generation process and with respect to the normality of its stochastic part. The 
construction of such a "relative normality test" might be preferable to the usual statistics 
which test for non-normality, since finite sample critical values of the latter statistics 
should actually be computed (but this is seldom done) for each sample size by Monte 
Carlo experiments (cf. Godfrey (1988), p. 145). Even if we abstract from such 
considerations, having established normality of the underlying data generation process 
"independent" of regression residuals, satisfactory normality test statistics might then be 
taken as additional evidence that the model is properly specified.
V Results
1. Model specification and selection
Before discussing the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of Restart and 
EAS we try to find the properly specified model of the determination of the overall 
outflow rate from unemployment by joining the results of Tables 1.1a, 1.1b, 1.2a and 
1.1b. CUSUM plots are added to standard diagnostic tests which are based on normality 
assumptions of regression residuals and combined with the "distribution-free" selection 
criteria discussed in the previous section.
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When estimating equation (8) we have to take account of the dynamic properties 
of the data. After some experimentation we arrived at the following specification of the 
most general model which satisfied the usually used diagnostics testing for fourth and 
first order serial correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity:
A Vln[ ] -  const. + seasonals + 5,ln[ 1 + 5-lnc
U 1 U 2
+ 5,Aln[Z] + 8,ln[-i] , + 8 J - L ]  „
3 u  4 u  5 1 0 0  O-40)
F A S+ 86- r 2 l  + (l-d)[87RESTs + 88RestL]
+ d[8gRestT] + e
where d is a dummy taking value 1 or 0. Because of strong collinearity between the 
various Restart variables27 but also for heuristic reasons Restj. cannot appear in the same 
regression equation as the other two measures of Restart
Table 1.1a presents results of OLS regressions on In (A/U) with a time trend 
while 1.1b gives results without i t  Figure 1.1 shows no discernible time trend over our 
sample period and the trend variable in Table 1.1a is not significant at conventional 
levels. However, the t statistics of the coefficients on this variable are often above 1 and 
it seems, therefore, advisable to investigate further whether a trend variable should be 
included in the regression or. Inspection of the Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
in Figure 1.A1 shows that models without a time trend which include the variable Rest* 
perform poorly under the CUSUM criterion. At the 5% significance level the hypothesis 
that the sum of the recursive residuals sum to zero, i.e. that there is no indication of a 
structural break in these residuals (cf. Harvey (1990), pp. 153-155) is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. In all other models, apart from model 5, the CUSUM statistic shows 
some evidence of a structural break when the trend variable is excluded, although not at 
a statistically significant level. Leaving out the time trend in some models might lead
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to possible misspecification which cannot be detected by the given standard diagnostics. 
All results of our estimation of the determination of the overall outflow rate are given 
with and without a time trend. When interpreting these results it should be kept in mind, 
then, that regressions with a trend seem for the most part preferable.
Table 1.2a reports the results of prediction error calculations for models with a 
time trend, Table 1.2b for models without a time trend. The results in the two tables are 
quite similar and discussion of model selection with the help of "distribution-free" criteria 
is therefore confined to the results of Table 1.2a.
First, Eccv has been calculated for all 9 models using 39 data points. This allows 
us to compare directly the performance of all models. Models 1 and 5 are the worst 
"performers" as the estimate of the mean squared prediction error is increased by 6 and 
6.4 per cent respectively relative to Model 0. On the other hand, Models 7 and 9 
perform well, their estimates of the mean squared prediction error are 8.6 and 10.1 
percentage points lower than that of the original Jackman-Layard model. The 
calculations of E ^  with 40 observations reverses the ranking of the best performing 
models but give, apart from Model 8, improvements over Model 0 of the same magnitude 
as do the calculations with 39 observations.
The last column in Table 1.2a allows us to say something about the "smoothness"
A
of the underlying data generation process of the specified models. The statistic Eccv is 
always greater than N/(N-k)2RSS, as Breiman (1988) has shown. Using the percentage 
difference between these two performance measures of model 0 as our benchmark, we 
can unequivocally state that those models which include Restj (Models 2 and 9) mirror 
a data generating process at least as smooth as does Model 0. Those models which 
include Rests (Models 1, 3, 6 and 7) perform especially poorly. For the best performing
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of these models (Model 7) the percentage difference of and N/(N-k)2RSS is about 4, 
for the worst performing (Model 1) approximately 16 percentage points above the 
benchmark value. We take this as evidence that the inclusion of Rests into the 
regression equation, especially when combined with EAS/V and/or Rest^ leads to 
irregularities in the data which question normality assumptions about the stochastic part 
of the underlying data generating process. Models which include EAS/V but exclude 
Rests perform worst as far as E ^  is concerned, but, on the other hand, they seem to 
exhibit enough regularity to warrant normality assumptions.
Before a final judgment on the model with the greatest predictive power can be 
made we need to look at the diagonal cells of the projection matrices reproduced in 
Tables A1 and A2 and see whether there are "influential points". The critical value for 
hi (i=l,...,N) is approximately equal to 2k/N as long as k/N < 0.4 (cf. Belsley et al. 
(1980), ch. 1). In Table Al h-values generated by models with 40 observations are 
presented. In all these models most h-values cluster around and none exceed their 
respective critical value. Furthermore, including one or two Restart variables in the 
regression causes only marginally higher values in all diagonal cells of the projection 
matrices relative to the projection matrix of Model 0. We conclude that models with 
Restart variables do not generate "influential points" in our sample. Models where 
EAS/V is included use 39 observations for estimation. In all these models, as Table A2 
shows, h38 exceeds its critical value and we observe a wider dispersion of the h/s than 
in the models were EAS/V is not present. The 38-th cell corresponds to the data point 
1991q4. We have no ready explanation why at this particular time interval the inclusion 
of EAS/V seems to generate an "influential point". When interpreting any regression 
results which include the EAS variable, one should keep in mind, that the predictive
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power of the estimated regression equation might be quite low.
The two criteria used in Tables 2a and 2b give firm guidance with respect to 
model selection.28 With 39 observations, Model 9 minimizes the estimate of the mean 
squared prediction error while, with 40 observations, it has the second lowest estimate 
and it has a lower percentage difference of E ^  and N/(N-k)2RSS than Model 0. This last 
result must imply that the stochastic part of the underlying data generating process of 
Model 9 is normally distributed if this is the case for the underlying data generating 
process of the original Jackman-Layard model. While with 40 observations Model 7 
minimizes Eccv, it essentially fails the relative normality test which we have 
constructed.29 All other models perform worse under both criteria than Model 9. 
Finally, the possible existence of "influential points" might lower the predictive power 
only of those models which include EAS/V.
Summarizing, the determination of the overall outflow rate from unemployment 
seems best modelled by the regression equation which only adds Restj as a regressor to 
the original Jackman-Layard model. Model 9 has strong predictive power and its 
underlying data generating process seems "smooth" enough to warrant normality 
assumptions about its stochastic part. Models which include Rests, whilst having a lot 
of predictive power, seem to generate too irregular distributions, while models with 
EAS/V and RestL have no predictive power but seem to generate "smooth" distributions.
Since those models which do not include Rests seem to be characterized by a 
normal error structure, the specification in equation (1.40) can be completed by adding 
the condition that as long as 87=0 , e ~ NCOjO2). An important implication of our results 
relates to the reliability of the usual test statistics associated with OLS and SUR 
estimation. When analyzing the empirical evidence, one needs to keep in mind that these
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statistics can only be relied on as far as models are concerned where Rests *s not a 
regressor.
2. Results of OLS and SUR estimation
We now revisit Tables 1.1a and 1.1b to analyze the impact of Restart and EAS 
on the overall outflow rate from unemployment. Whether a time trend is included or not, 
Restj and RestL are the two labour market measures which are well determined 
independent of the specification. The variable Res^ is only significant in the model 
without a time trend and when it is the sole labour market policy variable (Model 8  in 
Table 1.1b). Finally, the coefficient on EAS/V has the wrong sign four out of five times 
and is always insignificant at conventional levels. When it has the right sign it has a t 
statistic of approximately 0.1. The EAS/V measure is just too small to have a 
statistically significant impact on the rather well defined overall outflow rate from 
unemployment
For reasons discussed in length in the previous section we have strong doubts 
about the normality of the underlying process when Rests is included as a regressor. 
Results of models containing this variable should therefore be treated with caution. 
Exclusion of a time trend might also lead to misspecification in all models apart from 
Model 5. When comparing Tables 1.1a and 1.1b we seem to be confronted with a 
problem of omitted variables, as the coefficients on the Restart variables are consistently 
lower in models without a time trend. The negative sign of the trend in all models where 
it has predictive power leads us to conclude that exclusion of the trend might generate 
a downward bias of the coefficients on the Restart variables. In conjunction with the 
CUSUM plots, we consider this as sufficient evidence for the need to specify a model 
with a time trend. Combining the results from data exploration and estimation, the model
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which outperforms all others is clearly Model 9, which gives the following long-run 
relationship,
InA -  0.233 In A  + 0.557 Inf + 0.268 -  0.313_i_ (1.41)
U U T 100
The coefficient on In (V/U) is of the same magnitude as those estimated by Pissarides 
(1986) and Layard et al. (1991), while the coefficient on In c is very similar to the the 
latters’ estimate. We should also note, though, that the coefficient on Restj is not an 
elasticity and can, therefore, not be interpreted in a simple minded fashion. However, 
in steady state simulations of the impact of Restart on the overall outflow rate from 
unemployment this coefficient does have a sensible interpretation.30
The SUR equations have a similar dynamic specification as (1.40). However, 
because of the collinearity between the various labour market policy measures, they are 
estimated for each measure separately. To ensure that no statistically significant serial 
correlation occurs, the differenced form of the respective labour market policy variable 
is sometimes added to its level. The coefficients on In (V/U) have in all regressions 
similar magnitudes to those obtained by Jackman and Layard (1991) in their SUR 
estimates. Also there is only weak evidence of heterogeneity in these regressions, as the 
coefficients on In sd (d=l,...,5) have often a negative sign or are poorly defined. Again, 
this is in line with the findings of Jackman and Layard.
Table 3 shows a very dramatic effect of Rests on duration-specific outflow rates. 
We find a strong substitution effect for the first duration category of unemployment, 
while this measure of Restart seems to have a well defined positive impact on the 
outflow rates of all other duration categories of unemployment. Since Rests, like all 
other labour market variables, does not appear in lagged form, it is hard to justify its
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impact on those who already have been continuously unemployed for more than 4 
quarters. It becomes even more difficult to motivate its large and very well defined 
impact on the 1 -2  duration category, which, at best, it can only marginally influence (cf. 
footnote 16). We take these results as further evidence that Rests is not a good measure 
for capturing the effect of Restart on the average search effectiveness of the unemployed 
throughout the expansionary phase of the business cycle. Instead, it seems to either 
proxy for other labour market policies over the period affecting, apart from the shortest, 
all duration categories of unemployment evenly. Or it essentially functions like a dummy 
variable reflecting the possible initial impact of the introduction of Restart linked, as was 
already mentioned to a once and for all "shake out" of dubious benefit claimants in 
1986/87. Such a "shake out" might lower the outflow rate of the short-term 
unemployed31, and could have a positive impact on the outflow rates of all other 
duration categories. At any rate, we believe that these results constitute a further reason 
why regressions with Rests either not very informative or misleading.
In the regressions with Res^ we see a well defined substitution effect for the very 
short-term unemployed, as the coefficient on this measure is negative and statistically 
significant for the 0-1 duration category. However, this measure of Restart has no 
predictive power as far as the determination of all other duration-specific outflow rates 
is concerned (cf. Table 1.4).
The variable Restr, on the other hand, has more predictive power as Table 1.5 
shows. The substitution effect, again impacting on the shortest duration category, is 
highly significant, while for the 3-4 and 4+ duration categories the coefficients on Restr 
are positive and statistically significant with probability values 0.056 and 0.070 
respectively. There seems to exist a positive impact on the 2-3 category (the category
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where on a priori grounds one might have expected the strongest impact), but it is with 
a probability value of 0.190 not significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, the 
inclusion of Restr as a regressor gives results which are in line with theoretical 
considerations. A substitution effect for the shortest duration category seems plausible, 
while the Restart programme is meant to boost the outflow rates of all those who have 
unemployment spells longer than six months.
The measure of the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, which had no predictive power 
for the overall outflow rate, has a well defined influence on the determination of two 
duration-specific outflow rates (cf. Table 1.6). For the 2-3 and 4+ duration categories, 
the coefficients on EAS/V are positive and statistically significant with probability values 
0.054 and 0.064 respectively. At first glance this result seems to run somewhat against 
our priors. Since a person becomes eligible for the enterprise allowance scheme after 8  
weeks of a continuous unemployment spell and since we believe that lower outflow rates 
in longer duration categories are partially caused by heterogeneity we would expect the 
shorter duration categories to benefit more. This is because we believe that the "better" 
unemployed, i.e. those who have a competitive advantage in the labour market, are also 
the people most likely to fulfil the financial requirement of the scheme. These results 
could, on the other hand, be interpreted as implying dead weight loss. Assume that the 
take up of the scheme in each eligible duration category is proportionate to the relative 
size of the category. If e.g. we find an insignificant impact of EAS/V on the outflow rate 
of the 1-2 duration category, while the impact is significant with the 2-3 duration 
category, then dead weight loss is probable. In the shorter duration category, where, as 
long as some heterogeneity exists, the average "quality" of the unemployed is better, 
people take up the scheme who would have tried to find self-employment even in its
absence. Unfortunately, we have no information about the duration structure of EAS 
participants, but it is hard to come up with reasons why the duration categories 2-3 and 
4+ should be over-represented among those who take up the scheme. In conclusion, 
Table 1.6 points to some dead weight losses of the enterprise allowance scheme
supporting the evidence for such losses cited by Stem (1988).
Table 1.7 gives the long-run relationships implied by the estimated SUR equations 
for those duration-specific outflow rates which are determined by Restr and EAS/V, for 
the most part in a statistically significant way. We, also include the equation for (A/U) 3 
and Restr since the coefficient on Restr is relatively well defined and since this equation 
might prove useful in the simulations below. The steady state simulations of the
following section are based on these relationships and on equation (1.41).
3. Steady state simulations of the effectiveness of Restart and EAS
The following steady state simulations are back-of-the-envelope calculations meant 
to give a rough estimate of the effect which the introduction of Restart and of additional 
EAS-slots had on the total stock of unemployment during the expansionary phase of the 
business cycle in Britain. These calculations entail a comparison of stocks and flows of 
the quarters 1984(2) and 1990(2) which we designate as steady state quarters32.
Recall that in the steady state
Taking logs and differences we get
Alnt/ -  Ain /  -  Alnfji] (1.42)
U
For small A the growth rate of the stock of unemployment can be decomposed into the
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difference of the growth rate of inflows into unemployment and the growth rate of the 
outflow rate from unemployment For large values of A these "growth rates" are 
approximations of percentage changes with the base being the mean of the values of the 
two end points. Keeping this in mind, we can calculate the relative contribution of the 
overall outflow rate to the changing stock of unemployment between the two steady state 
quarters. Let 1984(2)=1 and 1990(2)=2, then
Ul -  7‘ -  6 2 8 9 0 0  -  1912530;
1 r A . 0.3288
77
U2 -  /z -  5 3 4 0 0 0  -  1110649.
2 r A, 0.4808
77 2
Let the difference taken between the two steady states be denoted by A^ and substitute 
this operator for A in (1.42), i.e.
Aj.jlnU -  A ^ ln / -  A2_,ln[-i] (1.42’)
Plugging the two sets of values for U33,1 and (A/U) into (1.42’) we get
- 0.54 = - 0.16 - 0.38 .
So, roughly 70% of the (negative) growth rate of unemployment between the two steady 
state quarters can be attributed to the rise in the outflow rate.
Applying A^to equation (1.41) we get
A ^ ln A  -  0.233A2_1ln^ . + 0 .5 5 7 ^ ,  Inc 
+ -  0.313V , • ?
(1.43)
100
The terms O^SA^Restr and -O^^A^t/lOO) give the contributions to the growth rate
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of (A/U) in absolute terms. But, these contributions depend crucially on the magnitudes 
of A^Restr and (A^t/lOO). Since we are primarily interested in the effect of Restart, we 
focus on the expression 0.268A2.1Restr. Clearly, if A ^R est^ l, i.e. if after the 
introduction of Restart (note that in 1984(2) Rest^O) all those who are eligible for an 
interview are participants in 1990(2), then the existence of Restart contributes 26.8 
percentage points to the growth rate of (A/U). In fact, the proportion of eligible 
participants was in the second steady state quarter only 0.6677. From equation (1.43) it 
follows that our measure of Restart contributes 17.89 percentage points to the total 38 
percentage points by which (A/U) grows between the two steady states. This result can 
also be written as
A Aln[ _ _ ] 2 -  ln[ _ _ ] 1 -  other effects + Restart effect ^  ^
-  0.2011 + 0.1789 -  0.38
From this we can calculate the overall outflow rate in the second steady state quarter if 
Restart had not been introduced:
ln[A], -  0 .2 0 1 1  + ln[A], .
{ / 2 U 1
Solving this last equation we get an outflow rate of 0.40207 instead of 0.4808 when the 
impact of Restart is taken into account. Between 1984(2) and 1990(2), our simulation 
computes a fall in the total stock of unemployment of about 802,000s4 with the higher 
Restart impacted outflow rate. On the other hand, the lower outflow rate 0.40207 implies 
a fall of the total stock of unemployment between the two steady state quarters of only 
584,403. It thus can be concluded that approximately 27 per cent of the fall of the total 
stock of unemployment between 1984(2) and 1990(2) seems to be attributable to the 
introduction of the Restart programme.
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From our SUR estimates we can calculate the contribution of the introduction of 
Restj- and of EAS/V to A^lnCA/UX,, d=l,..,5. Column two of Table 1.8 shows these 
contributions for four duration-specific outflow rates. Column three gives the actual 
outflow rates for the second steady state quarter, column four outflow rates imputed 
under the assumption that the respective ALMP has not been introduced. We can write 
equation (44) as two sets of equations for duration-specific outflow rates:
ln [A ]^  -  ln jA ]^  -  other effects + Restart effect, (1-45)
ln| ~  " other effects + EAS effect, (1-45*)
where d=l,..,5. We should note that in (1.45) the EAS effect, in (1.45’) the Restart effect 
is subsumed under other effects. These equation sets are then used to impute outflow 
rates in the presumed absence of the respective ALMP measure.
In the steady state, the stock of long-term unemployment is determined by the 
inflow into long-term unemployment and the outflow rate from it (cf. equation (1 .2 0 )). 
If we combine equation (1.22) which gives an estimate of the inflow into long-term 
unemployment35 with the information contained in Table 1.8, we can use equation (1.20) 
to simulate the effect of Restart and EAS on the stock of long-term unemployment 
between the two steady states.
Let ULtl be the actual stock of long-term unemployment in the first steady state 
quarter, 1984(2), and U12 be the actual stock of unemployment of the 0 -1  duration 
category in the second steady state quarter, 1990(2).36 Also, let (A/U)42=Pd,2> d=l,..,5, 
be the duration-specific outflow rates in the second steady state quarter. A simple
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recursive formula can then be used to estimate the inflow into long-term unemployment:
(1.46)
A 1 A A
*L»  -  ^ U 4.2+ U 5 l)
A A A
where U4 2, U5t2 and 1L2 are, for the second steady state quarter, estimates of the stock of 
duration categories 3-4. and 4+ and of inflows into long-term unemployment respectively. 
Finally,
0U - L ± ,  d-47)
Pst
and the estimated change in the stock of long-term unemployment between the two 
steady states equals UL>2 - UL1.
In Table 1.9 the results of four different scenarios are presented. When Restart 
is assumed to have been introduced and the ratio of EAS/V is assumed to have risen by 
52% (scenario I), the estimated stock of long-term unemployment in the second steady 
state quarter becomes 376,954 and the estimated fall in the stock of long-term 
unemployment between the two steady state quarters 466,37637.
Under scenario II we assume that Restart is not present, but that, when present, 
Restr has an impact on (A/U)3. This last assumption implies that p3 2 falls from 0.3496 
to 0.2998, while the statistically significant positive effects of Restr on the outflow rates 
of the last two duration categories also imply a fall of p42 from 0.2765 to 0.2279 and of 
p52 from 0.1789 to 0.1196. Under scenario D, the strong substitution effect acting on 
duration category 0-1 results in a rise of px 2 from 0.4574 to 0.5329. Our calculations 
show that this substitution effect leads to a net increase of the inflow into long-term
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unemployment when Restart is present (IL;2 equals 67,438 under scenario I, but only 
64,270 under II). However, the large impact of Restr on p52 implies an overall beneficial 
effect of Restart which is very substantial, as under II UL>2 falls only to 537,374 and ULj2- 
UL4 reaches only -305,956. As long as Restr impacts upon (A/U)3, 35 per cent of the fall 
in the stock of long-term unemployment between the two steady states can be attributed 
to the introduction of Restart.
Scenario m  is a slight modification of II: now, we assume that Restr does not 
affect (A/U)3, i.e. in the absence of Restart p3 2 remains 0.3496. Under El UL>2 falls to 
499,139, ULt2-UL4 becomes -344,191 and the introduction of Restart thus explains 26 per 
cent of the fall in long-term unemployment.
Finally, the additional impact of a 52 per cent increase in the ratio of EAS-slots 
to vacancies is investigated under scenario IV. As we assume Restart to be present, this 
additional impact is simulated by lowering p3 2 from 0.3496 to 0.3333 and p52 from
0.1789 to 0.1665. The increase in EAS/V makes a discernible, albeit small difference 
in the fall of the stock of long-term unemployment between the two steady states. Under 
IV ULt2-UL>i becomes -428,129 which implies that 8 per cent of the fall in long-term 
unemployment is attributable to A^EAS/V.
Our simulations therefore seem to indicate that the two ALMP measures act upon 
the stocks of both short-term and long-term unemployment.
The measure EAS/V has a positive net impact on outflows from both stocks. To 
the estimated 38,247 decrease in the number of long-term unemployed due to A^EAS/V 
we need to add individuals who leave short-term unemployment because of EAS. Since 
EAS is, however, not significant in the determination of the overall outflow rate, we 
cannot quantify this decrease in short-term unemployment with this simulation approach.
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This reduction of short-term unemployment leads, ceteris paribus, to smaller inflows into 
long-term unemployment and thus to a lower stock of long-term unemployment. Simple 
calculations show that without this indirect effect the stock of long-term unemployment 
would have only been reduced by 28,039 instead of 38,247.
i
The introduction of Restart, according to our calculations, has an adverse net 
impact on the outflows from short-term unemployment despite the fact that this measure 
is also targeted at shorter duration categories. A strong substitution effect acting upon 
the shortest duration category, and more than compensating for the increased outflows 
from the duration categories 2-3 and 3-4, causes an increased net inflow into long-term 
unemployment of 3,168 persons (when Restr affects (A/U)3) or of 7,741 persons (when 
Restr does not affect (A/U)3). The nature of the Restart programme seems to make a 
substitution effect highly likely. No matter which measure of Restart is used, in all SUR 
equations of the duration category 0 - 1  a well defined negative coefficient of similar 
magnitude can be found on the respective Restart variable. We, therefore, find our 
results, which hint at a strong substitution effect, very plausible. However, despite a 
strong substitution effect, the Restart programme is very succesful in reducing total 
unemployment. The number of persons not flowing out of very short-term 
unemployment because of Restart can only be a fraction of those who flow out of higher 
duration categories and long-term unemployment as a direct result of the introduction of 
the programme. The highly significant positive coefficient on Restr in the estimated 
equation of the determination of the overall outflow rate from unemployment can be 
taken as proof for this assertion. The idea put forward by e.g. Layard et al. (1991) that 
increasing the search effectiveness of the long-term unemployed will lower wage pressure
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and thus create additional employment seems to be borne out by our evaluation of the 
Restart programme.
Finally, the results of our simulations for Restart, based on the estimation of the 
determination of the overall and duration-specific outflow rates are only roughly 
comparable. The unobservable outflow rate p! enters the overall outflow rate, thus the 
overall outflow rate is not just a linear combination of the observable duration-specific 
outflow rates. The simulations are, nevertheless, roughly comparable because Restr 
should not affect pj by much. As Restart increases inflows into long-term unemployment 
according to our simulations, the reduction in total unemployment must be entirely driven 
by net outflows from long-term unemployment. We can, therefore, use the results from 
the overall outflow rate as a guide to the most likely scenario of our duration-specific 
simulations of the effectiveness of Restart. On the basis of the results of the overall 
outflow rate simulations, scenario II seems most probable as the difference in the 
reduction in total unemployment due to Restart is much smaller than under scenario IE 
(approximately 218,000 - 158,000 under II vs. 218,000 -115,000 under IE). One could 
also presume that the substitution effect is not picked up in the estimation of the overall 
outflow rate and that for that reason the reduction of total unemployment is greater in the 
overall outflow rate simulation. However, in duration-specific outflow rate simulations 
of scenario E with px 2 remaining at 0.4574, i.e. assuming no substitution effect, total 
unemployment falls by 254,512 due to Restart. So, the estimation of the determination 
of the overall outflow rate does pick up a substitution effect, and the existence of such 
an effect seems certain. In summary, scenario E seems most likely, i.e. Restart retards 
outflows from the duration category 0 - 1 , but boosts the outflow rates of the three longest
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duration categories. Thus, in our simulations 35 per cent of the reduction in long-term 
unemployment between 1984 and 1990 can be attributed to the introduction of Restart.
VI Conclusions
Applying transition methodology the role of Restart in the cure of the partial 
hysteresis of unemployment has been analyzed in this chapter. This methodology, 
looking at the determination of overall and duration-specific outflow rates from 
unemployment, is especially useful in the case of Restart since this programme does not 
create direct vacancies but is conceived to enhance the ability of the unemployed to flow 
from the register during an expansionary phase of the business cycle.
After a thorough exploration of the data we are certain that the appropriate 
measure for Restart is Restr, i-e* the ratio of the quarterly flow of all Restart interviews 
to the duration stocks of unemployment U3 and UL. This measure seems to be a 
"smooth" enough covariate to ensure that the underlying data generation process is 
regular and warrants normality assumptions. We are also certain, that our estimates are 
not the results of some statistical artifacts, but that they reflect some stable economic 
relationship for the sample analyzed.
In the OLS regression on the overall outflow rate from unemployment the 
coefficient on Restr is positive and highly significant. Thus Restart is an important 
determinant of the overall outflow rate and hence contributes to the cure of partial 
hysteresis. The estimates of duration-specific outflow rates with our Restart measure as 
a regressor show, however, that Restart results in a strong substitution effect acting upon 
the very short-term unemployment (those with continuous spells between 0 and 3 months) 
which, despite positive impacts on duration categories 2-3 and 3-4, causes increased net
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inflows into long-term unemployment. So, the reduction in total unemployment due to 
Restart comes entirely about via reductions in the stock of long-term unemployment. 
Steady state simulations imply that approximately 35 percent of the fall in long-term 
unemployment between 1984 and 1990 can be attributed to the introduction of Restart.
The impact of the Enterprise Allowance Scheme on the stock of unemployment 
has also been investigated. The variable EAS/V has no predictive power in the overall 
outflow rate equation, but seems to have a well defined positive influence on the outflow 
rates of the duration categories 2-3 and 4+. However, there is some evidence of dead 
weight loss as the outflow rates of unemployed persons with shorter spells (e.g. category 
1-2) are not influenced by EAS/V in a statistically significant way. Steady state 
simulations show that due to the Enterprise Allowance Scheme net inflows into long-term 
unemployment are lowered and that approximately 8  per cent of the fall in long-term 
unemployment can be explained by a rise in the EAS/V ratio between 1984 and 1990. 
The results involving EAS should, however, be taken with caution, as the possible 
existence of "influential points" in equations with EAS/V as a regressor hint at low out 
of sample predictive power.
While the Enterprise Allowance Scheme is only a small programme with marginal 
impact, the Restart programme has been a major tool in the fight against long-term 
unemployment in Britain and has, according to our results, in the second half of the 
eighties contributed to the cure of partial hysteresis in a substantial way. A vigorous and 
extended application of this programme seems, therefore, to be desirable during the next 
recovery phase. The question should also be pursued as to whether mechanisms can be 
devised which eliminate or reduce the observed strong substitution effect among the very 
short-term unemployed.
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Further investigations into the effectiveness of the Restart programme should, for 
the time being, concentrate on the question of how it influences the behaviour of the 
long-term unemployed during the contractionary phase of the business cycle, whether it 
e.g. increases labour force attachment during a slump. For such investigations aggregate 
time series analysis is, however, not an appropriate tool. Microeconometric studies 
analysing labour market transitions during the period 1991-1992 seem to lend themselves 
better to the task of establishing the determinants of labour force attachment or 
withdrawal.
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Footnotes
1. Previous British evaluation studies using time series and employing "transition 
methodology", i.e. outflow rate analysis, are Pissarides and Haskel (1987), Haskel and 
Jackman (1988), Lehmann (1990) and Disney et al. (1992).
2. Gregg (1989), Dicks and Hatch (1989) and Disney et al. (1992), ch.7.
3. For our Restart variable we have data points from 1986(3) to 1992(2).
4. The other two studies evaluating EAS using "transition methodology" (Disney et al. 
(1992), ch.7 and Lehmann (1990)) have far less data points for EAS than this study.
5. From July 1986 to March 1987 only persons who had been unemployed for more than 
a year were asked to attend a Restart interview, since April 1987 the scheme was 
extended to all with durations of more than 6  months.
6 . For a full description of this process see White and Lakey (1992).
7. According to White and Lakey approximately 18% of the cohort under study failed 
to attend the interview outright or were excused from it. Most of these people had found 
jobs or left the labour force between the mailing of the letter and the assigned date of 
interview. Another 18% of the sample were persons who unexcused failed to attend the 
interview at the assigned date, but who eventually did so after a follow-up letter. While 
the authors give no information on the average unemployment spell of this sub-group of 
first Restart interview participants, our interpretation is that most of this group will also 
fall into the 6-9 months duration category.
8 . Unpublished annual data on the break-down of Restart interviews by duration were 
made available by the Employment Service in Sheffield. The 6-9 months duration 
interviews as a percentage of the total were as follows:
April 1987 - March 1988 41
April 1988 - March 1989 35
April 1989 - March 1990 37
April 1990 - March 1991 40
April 1991 - March 1992 41
For April - July 1992 we also assume 41%.
9. c depends crucially on the duration structure of unemployment and thus varies over 
time.
10. Our statement that most males, if they flow from unemployment, have as their 
destination the state of employment is the conventional view on this issue which has been 
recently criticized by Schmitt and Wadsworth (1993). According to their evidence, an 
increasing fraction of male outflows from unemployment consists, especially in the late 
eighties, of transitions to the state of economic inactivity.
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11. The enteiprise allowance scheme might generate competition between participants 
in the scheme and other businesses, and hence increase inflows into unemployment via 
displacement of output effects. Stem (1988) cites evidence that inflows into EAS cause 
a 50% displacement of output effect Even assuming this high percentage, EAS does, 
nevertheless, not cause substantial inflows into unemployment. For, if we assume that 
all the displaced entrepreneurs are male and all flow into unemployment, the maximum 
percentage of inflows caused by EAS can, for our sample, amount to only 2.7 per cent 
(the mean would be 1.4 per cent) of all inflows into male unemployment. So, any 
indirect feedback effect on the overall outflow rate arising from EAS displacing small 
businesses must be negligible.
12. An exhaustive list of all such programmes can be found in Disney et al. (1992), ch.6 .
13. For a discussion of the many successive employment measures in Britain most of 
which were too short-lived to be analyzed with aggregate time series, cf. Gregg (1990).
14. For an extended and lucid discussion of how heterogeneity and state dependence can 
contribute to lower outflow rates of the unemployed with longer spells, s. Pissarides and 
Haskel (1987).
15. The definition of p! given in (13) is "based on the assumption that the outflow rate 
over the first 3 months is constant, so that by the end of a quarter the remaining stock 
excludes one-half of those who leave within the first three months of their 
unemployment" (s. Layard et al. (1991), p. 227). The weight given to p! consistent with 
its definition is 1/2 (1/ 11^ as only one-half of ^ contributes to the measured overall 
outflow rate. We should also note that the weights do not add to one since
E5 , 0 - 1 +0, > 1.;-i * '
16. The scenario under which both shortest duration categories are impacted positively 
by a Restart variable can be taken as a strong test of whether this variable proxies for the 
initial impact of Restart or other labour market policies not directly linked with the 
Restart process. If the Restart variable carries the information it is meant to carry, there 
can be no circumstances under which the first duration category is significantly positively 
affected by this variable. On the other hand, the second duration category might have 
a weak positive correlation with the proper Restart measure, as a small proportion of this 
duration category, before reaching the threshold of a six months spell, might receive a 
Restart letter and immediately leave the register. However, a very strong positive 
correlation with a Restart variable would lead to doubts about the appropriateness of the 
Restart measure used. In summary, if the coefficients on the Restart variable are highly 
significant for both p, and p2, this has to be taken as strong evidence, if the coefficient 
on this variable is highly significant and positive only for p2, as weak evidence that the 
chosen Restart measure proxies for something not directly linked to the Restart process.
17. Formal tests of whether the variables are 1(0) or 1(1) are not sensible given the few 
data points under consideration.
73
18. We should note that if we employ formula (1.13) for Pj, then for nearly all data 
points P j»  Pj.
19. Note that in the steady state A/U and c must be equal by construction. It should also 
be pointed out that the formula for c uses a much more elaborate duration structure than 
the one employed in equations (1.17) and (1.18). So, even though the first weight in the 
formula, I/2U, has a flow element, its contribution to c is minor and should not generate 
a simultaneity bias.
20. A description of the construction of sd can be found in the data appendix.
21. A discussion of their derivation from the available data sources can be found in the 
data appendix.
22. "Normalizing" the number of Restart interviews by the stock of eligible participants 
creates exogenous variables. Endogeneity problems are only caused by the fact that the 
Restart programme has a built-in mechanism which automatically triggers an increase in 
the number of Restart interviews as longer duration categories of unemployed enlarge 
their shares. There is no evidence for other sources of endogeneity, like e.g. a more 
forceful application of the programme by the government in reaction to higher levels of 
long-term unemployment.
20. We regress one of the ALMP variables which are suspected of collinearity on all 
non-ALMP variables. Then an ALMP variable is added to the regressors. Very high t- 
statistics of the coefficient on the RHS ALMP variable and a drammatic rise of R2 as we 
add this ALMP variable give some indication of collinearity between the two ALMP 
measures. For a discussion of this procedure, cf. Judge et al. (1985), ch.23.
Auxiliary Regressions
Dependent variables: 1. EAS/V; 2. Rest^ 3. RestL.
RHS ALMP variable R2 t-statistic
1.
none 0.325 __
Restj 0.660 5.609
Rests 0.643 5.345
RestL 0.612 4.864
2 .
none 0.697 __
Rests 0 .8 8 8 7.513
RestL 0.994 42.339
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3.
none 0.660
Rests 0.832 5.791
24. Rests behaves very much like a dummy variable, hovering around one. We would, 
therefore, expect that especially this measure of Restart carries information about the 
initial impact of the programme.
25. In the presence of important "outliers" the Least Absolute Deviation estimator (LAD 
estimator) can often be a better predictor than the OLS estimator. We would like to 
avoid LAD estimation, however, since there is no closed form solution available and the 
distribution theory underlying it is much less well established than the theory underlying 
OLS estimation.
26. It can be found in Breiman (1988).
27. See the results of the auxiliary regressions in footnote 23.
28. We should note, parenthetically, that the results and diagnostics in Tables la and lb 
not only give us no firm guidance but could be quite misleading as far as model selection 
is concerned. If we e.g. jointly take the standard error of the regression and the adjusted 
R2 statistic as selection criteria, Model 1 performs best in Table la, while by far worst 
when applying the two criteria tabled in 2 a!
29. Model 7 performs much better under the second criterion if we exclude the trend 
variable (cf. Table A2). However, the above reported CUSUM tests showed that 
dropping the trend variable from regressions which included Rests *s not permissible.
30. We should also note that because the coefficient on Restr is not an elasticity a test 
for CRS in f cannot be undertaken.
31. One can with some justification assume that the shortest duration category is not 
directly affected by the introduction of tighter benefit eligibility criteria. The very short­
term unemployed are clearly not the target of a policy of reducing fraud among benefit 
claimants. However, a small indirect and negative effect of such a policy for this group 
might exist insofar as persons from longer duration categories might now be more willing 
to flow back into employment and might thus compete with some of the very short-term 
unemployed over jobs. In addition persons from longer duration categories may, after an 
interval, re-register as unemployed and remain unemployed for a sufficiently long period 
to lower the outflow rate of the very short-term unemployed.
32. We do not take 1985(2), when abs(AU) is minimized, as the initial steady state 
quarter even though it was used for the calculation of c. For 1984(2) abs(AU) is also 
very small and by using this quarter the period which is of interest to us can be covered.
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33. The two stocks of unemployment are imputed from the values which we have for 
inflows and the outflow rate, thus ensuring that (42) will always hold. The actual values 
of U for the two quarters are quite similar.
34. The actual fall was 2,015,400 - 1,123,700 = 891,700.
35. Figure 5 plots a moving average of estimated inflows (based on the Haskel-Jackman 
formula) into long-term unemployment for our sample period.
36. Note that for consistency the same steady state quarters are used as when the effect 
of Restj- on the overall outflow rate was simulated. However, the data also support this 
choice as abs(AUL) is very small for both quarters.
37. We should note that the actual stock of long-term unemployment in the second steady 
state quarter (UL>2) and the actual fall in long-term unemployment between the two steady 
states (UL;2-UL 0 are 383,280 and -460,050 respectively. Since our simulation values are 
very close to these actual values, the undertaken simulations have a high degree of 
realism.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
The total stock of unemployment Ut, is represented by the X-11 series of male 
unemployment (excluding school leavers) in Great Britain, provided by the Department 
of Employment. It is consistent with the 1988 definition of unemployment.
We used the following duration-specific stocks of male unemployment:
1979(3)-1983(2):
U I ^ U ^ U ^ U ^ U ^ U  i2,t>U12+,t 
(Ulit e.g., means that the person counted at t was between 0  and 1 quarters continuously 
unemployed, U8t, between 6  and 8  and U12>t, between 8  and 12 quarters, while U12+t 
denotes an continuous unemployment spell of more than 1 2  quarters);
1983(3)-1992(3):
They were computed as beginning-of-the-quarter-stocks from data published in the 
January, April, July and October issues of the Employment Gazette and adjusted, where 
necessary, to ensure consistency with the total stock of male unemployment.
To get a series of actual vacancies, Vt (vacancies are only available for males and 
females, this does not cause any problems, however, since total vacancies better reflect 
the true state of the labour market, as does male unemployment), we adjust the published 
series of vacancies, which are notified vacancies at employment exchanges, by the 
procedure outlined in Jackman et al. (1989).
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A detailed description of the construction of the average search effectiveness 
index, ct, can be found in the appendix of Jackman and Layard (1991).
The construction of the "survival probabilities" to duration category d (d=l,..,5) 
are as follows:
S l ^ A i ;  ^2,t= U 2 ,/U t- l»  ^3,t= ^ 3 ,/U t-2 »
S4,t=U4,/Ut-3i S5tt=UL/(U M+U ,5+ ...+U ,n ).
The Restart and EAS measures were calculated on the basis of published data in 
the Employment Gazette (April and October issues) and of unpublished figures, made 
available by the Department of Employment.
Total EAS flows for males and females which were used in the analysis are only 
available on an annual basis. From the secular trend throughout the period we imputed 
quarterly flows rather than assume an equal share of the annual flows per quarter.
The quarterly joint number of Restart interviews for males and females can be 
calculated from the cumulative totals for a reported year which goes from April to March 
of the following year. A breakdown of these interviews by the duration structure of 
eligible unemployed is, however, only provided on an annual basis and given in footnote
8 . We assumed that this breakdown did not change for 4 quarters of a reported year and 
thus arrived at a partition of the number of Restart interviews for male and female 
unemployed with a spell between 6  and 9 months and for male and female unemployed 
with a spell longer than 12 months. The descriptive literature about the Restart 
programme substantiates this partition as the relevant one in terms of duration structure. 
Finally, the proportion of male unemployent in the relevant duration-specific stocks were 
used to compute the number of Restart interviews for males by duration.
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GAUSS routine for calculation of
e2=0;
n=rows(x);
i=l;
do until i > n; 
el=0;
yl=x[l,.];
x=trimr(x,l,0);
zl=x[.,6];
z2=x[.,4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13]; 
vl=yl[.,6];
v2=yl[.,4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13];
b=inv(z2’z2)*z2’zl;
pl=v2*b;
el=(pl-vl)A2;
e2=e2+el;
x=xlyl;
i=i+l;
endo;
pe=e2/n;
Table 1.1a
OLS regression on ln(A/U);samp!e period 82q3 to 92q2(92ql£)
Model ln(V/U) lnd Aln(V/U) ln(A/U) t/100 Rests RestL RestT Eas/V const
0 0.146**
(0.041)
0.371**
(0.161)
0.191**
(0.087)
0.486**
(0.153)
0.123 
(0.074)*
-0.229**
(0.099)
1 0.163**
(0.039)
0.342*
(0.171)
0.094
(0.088)
0.204
(0.166)
-0.252
(0.167)
0.095** 
(0.037)
0.127
(0.078)
-1.064 
(0.926)
-0.462**
(0.134)
2 0.156**
(0.042)
0.316*
(0.183)
0.126
(0.092)
0.367**
(0.157)
-0.214
(0.175)
0.175** 
(0.082)
-0.433
(0.928)
-0.349**
(0.131)
3 0.164**
(0.041)
0.390**
(0.173)
0.106
(0.090)
0.233
(0.170)
-0.052
(0.116)
0.100** 
(0.038)
-- -0.924
(0.949)
-0.402**
(0.132)
4 0.161**
(0.043)
0.342*
(0.187)
0.139
(0.094)
0.416**
(0.157)
-0.153
(0.178)
0.142
(0.085)
-0.111
(0.927)
-0.279**
(0.124)
5 0.163**
(0.045)
0.396**
(0.189)
0.155
(0.097)
0.460**
(0.160)
0.075
(0.116)
-- 0.095
(0.946)
-0.201*
(0.118)
6 0.157**
(0.037)
0.426**
(0.151)
0.149*
(0.079)
0.224
(0.166)
-0.256
(0.160)
0.083**
(0.034)
0.112
(0.078)
-- -- -0.391**
(0.105)
7 0.159**
(0.038)
0.459**
(0.152)
0.152*
(0.081)
0.248
(0.168)
-0.077
(0.103)
0.088**
(0.034)
— — — -0.344**
(0.101)
ooO
Table 1.1a
OLS regression on In(A/U) (continued)
Model ln(V/U) lnd Aln(V/U) ln(A/U) t/100 Rests RestL RestT Eas/V const
8 0.144** 0.338** 0.184** 0.441** -0.102 0.133 -0.293**
(0.040) (0.158) (0.084) (0.152) (0.159) (0.084) (0.104)
9 0.144** 0.345** 0.172** 0.381** -0.194 _ _ 0.166** -0.339**
(0.038) (0.153) (0.082) (0.153) (0.166) (0.078) (0.107)
£ When eas is included sample period is 82q3 to 92ql.
Standard errors in brackets. 6 Standard error for variable t/100 has been scaled accordingly.
** (*) significant at the 5% (10%) significance level. A Chow-test for structural stability could not be 
performed, however the text discusses other stability tests.
Table 1.1a (continued)
Diagnostics
Model 4th order ser. 
(1st order ser. 
Chi2 (4) (Chi2
corr. 
corr.) 
(1))
Funct
Chi2
. Form 
(1)
Normality 
Chi2 (2)
Heteroscedasticity 
Chi2 (1)
SE adj.R2
0 4.607 [0.330] 
(1.783 [0.182]
1.049 [0.306] 0.562 [0.755] 0.004 [0.945] 0.036 0.955
1 3.109 [0.540] 
(0.302 [0.582]
0.772 [0.379] 1.677 [0.432] 0.281 [0.596] 0.032 0.964
2 2.352 [0.671] 
(0.680 [0.409]
0.822 [0.364] 0.178 [0.915] 0.001 [0.973] 0.034 0.960
3 2.265 [0.687] 
(0.207 [0.648]
0.992 [0.319] 1.970 [0.373] 0.092 [0.761] 0.033 0.962
4 2.806 [0.591] 
(1.039 [0.308]
0.851 [0.356] 0.055 [0.973] 0.009 [0.921] 0.035 0.958
5 2.982 [0.561] 
(1.594 [0.207]
1.287 [0.257] 0.782 [0.676] 0.002 [0.968] 0.036 0.955
6 2.347 [0.672] 
(0.400 [0.527]
0.415 [0.519] 0.794 [0.672] 1.234 [0.266] 0.032 0.963
7 1.867 [0.760] 
(0.479 [0.489]
0.632 [0.427] 0.862 [0.650] 0.676 [0.411] 0.033 0.962
8 4.686 [0.321] 
(1.230 [0.267]
0.650 [0.420] 0.104 [0.949] 0.0001[0.995] 0.035 0.957
9 3.887 [0.422] 
(0.793 [0.373]
0.549 [0.459] 0.163 [0.921] 0.061 [0.804] 0.034 0.960
Probability values in brackets.
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Table 1.1b
OLS regression on In(A/U) without time trend ;period 82q3 to 92q2(92ql£)
Model ln(V/U) InS Aln(V/U) InfA/U).! Rests RestL RestT Eas/V <const
0 0.156**
(0.041)
0.430**
(0.161)
0.178*
(0.089)
0.501**
(0.157)
-0.122
(0.077)
1 0.152**
(0.040)
0.299*
(0.173)
0.114
(0.089)
0.280*
(0.162)
0.082** 
(0.037)
0.040
(0.054)
-1.343
(0.928)
-0.462**
(0.134)
2 0.149**
(0.042)
0.284
(0.183)
0.142
(0.092)
0.426**
(0.151)
0.096*
(0.052)
-0.668
(0.915)
-0.347**
(0.133)
3 0.159**
(0.038)
0.355**
(0.153)
0.111
(0.088)
0.259
(0.158)
0.092**
(0.034)
-- -1.093
(0.859)
-0.420**
(0.124)
4 0.154**
(0.042)
0.314*
(0.183)
0.148
(0.093)
0.446**
(0.153)
0.085 
(0.054)
-- -0.373
(0.872)
-0.294**
(0.122)
5 0.172**
(0.042)
0.457**
(0.163)
0.151
(0.096)
0.444**
(0.157)
-- 0.518
(0.679)
-0.143*
(0.076)
6 0.152**
(0.038)
0.408**
(0.155)
0.168**
(0.081)
0.309*
(0.162)
0.061*
(0.032)
0.015
(0.050)
-- -- -0.356**
(0.105)
7 0.154**
(0.037)
0.424**
(0.143)
0.164**
(0.079)
0.297*
(0.154)
0.068**
(0.022)
-- — — -0.348**
(0.101)
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Table 1.1b
OLS regression on ln(A/U) without time trend (continued)
Model ln(V/U) lnd Aln(V/U) ln(A/U) Rests RestL RestT Eas/V const
8 0.144**
(0.040)
0.339**
(0.157)
0.189**
(0.084)
0.455**
(0.149)
-- 0.085**
(0.037)
-0.288**
(0.103)
9 0.142**
(0.039)
0.341**
(0.154)
0.185**
(0.082)
0.430**
(0.148)
0.082** -- 
(0.033)
-0.314**
(0.106)
£ When eas Is included sample period is 82q3 to 92ql.
Standard errors in brackets. ** (*) significant at the 5% (10%) significance level. A Chow-test for
structural stability could not be performed, however the text discusses other stability tests.
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Table 1.1b (continued)
Diagnostics
Model 4th order ser. corr. 
(1st order ser. corr.) 
Chi2 (4) (Chi2 (1))
Funct. Form 
Chi2 (1)
Normality 
Chi2 (2)
Heteroscedasticity 
Chi2 (1)
SE ad j. R2
0 1.924 [0.750] 
(0.560 [0.454])
2.481 [0.115] 1.540 [0.463] 0.094 [0.759] 0.037 0.953
1 2.384 [0.666] 
(0.503 [0.478])
0.768 [0.381] 2.009 [0.366] 0.028 [0.867] 0.033 0.963
2 3.161 [0.574] 
(1.206 [0.272])
0.843 [0.358] 0.357 [0.836] 0.104 [0.746] 0.034 0.959
3 1.554 [0.817] 
(0.316 [0.574])
0.907 [0.341] 1.999 [0.368] 0.006 [0.937] 0.033 0.963
4 3.538 [0.472] 
(1.391 [0.238])
0.875 [0.349] 0.254 [0.881] 0.095 [0.757] 0.035 0.958
5 2.069 [0.723] 
(1.366 [0.242])
1.568 [0.210] 0.954 [0.620] 0.074 [0.785] 0.036 0.956
6 2.312 [0.679] 
(1.009 [0.315])
0.378 [0.538] 1.011 [0.603] 0.185 [0.667] 0.033 0.961
7 1.941 [0.747] 
(0.888 [0.346])
0.451 [0.501] 0.984 [0.611] 0.265 [0.607] 0.033 0.963
8 5.441 [0.245] 
(1.522 [0.217])
0.612 [0.434] 0.210 [0.900] 0.009 [0.921] 0.034 0.958
9 5.254 [0.262] 
(1.438 [0.230])
0.515 [0.473] 0.295 [0.863] 0.001 [0.973] 0.034 0.959
Probability values in brackets.
oo
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Table 1.2a 
Prediction error calculations with trend
% Change % Difference of
Eccv over Model 0 N/(N-K)2*RSS ECCV&N/(N-K) 2*RSS
With 39 observations
0.0017619 — — ------
0.0018683 + 6.0 0.0015328 17.95
0.0017063 - 3.2 0.0016738 1.90
0.0017903 + 1.6 0.0015644 12.61
0.0018359 + 4.2 0.0017691 3.63
0.0018749 + 6.4 0.0018112 3.39
0.0016746 - 4.9 - - --
0.0016102 - 8.6 - - - -
0.0017163 - 2.6 -- - -
0.0015842 -10.1
With 40 observations
0.0017265 -- 0.0016864 2.32
0.0016599 - 3.8 0.0014754 11.11
0.0015735 - 8.9 0.0014764 6.17
0.0017313 + 0.3 0.0016616 4.02
0.0015905 - 7.9 0.0015680 1.41
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Table 1.2b
Prediction error calculations without trend
% Change % Difference of
Eccv over Model 0 N/(N-K)2*RSS ECCV&N/(N-K) 2*RSS
With 39 observations
0.0016421
0.0018581 +13.2 0.0015449 16.85
0.0016683 + 1.6 0.0016437 1.47
0.0016103 - 1.9 0.0014687 8.79
0.0017243 + 5.0 0.0016930 1.81
0.0017256 + 5.1 0.0017169 0.50
0.0017523 + 6.7 -- --
0.0014964 - 8.9 - -
0.0016305 - 0.7 - - - -
0.0015946 _ 3.0 _ — _ _
With 40 observations
0.0017575 -- 0.0017263 1.77
0.0016816 - 4.3 0.0014994 10.83
0.0014449 -17.7 0.0014086 2.51
0.0016085 - 8.4 0.0015775 1.92
0.0015507 -11.7 0.0015354 0.98
87
Table 1.3
SURE Regressions on Ain (A/U)d; Sample Period 82q3 92q2
Duration In (V/U) In sd In (A/U)^ t/100 Rests SE ad j. R2
0 - 1 0.382**
(0.056)
0.205
(0.175)
-1.340**
(0.154)
0.753** 
(0.185)*
-0.154**
(0.045)
0.054 0.792
1 - 2 0.115
(0.077)
-0.290
(0.304)
-1.244**
(0.144)
-0.467*
(0.269)
0.225**
(0.073)
0.086 0.755
2 - 3 0.344**
(0.058)
0.484**
(0.154)
-0.846**
(0.125)
-0.136
(0.211)
0.179**
(0.063)
0.069 0.739
3 - 4 0.212**
(0.063)
0.208
(0.151)
-0.802**
(0.144)
-1.011**
(0.294)
0.136**
(0.056)
0.065 0.739
4+ 0.166*
(0.092)
-0.457**
(0.211)
-1.201**
(0.147)
-0.340
(0.482)
0.355**
(0.162)
0.151 0.820
Standard errors in parentheses. * The standard errors of the variable time have been scaled 
appropriately. The coefficients on the variables Aln(V/U) and Arests which were included in 
the regressions are not recorded in the table. ** (*) = significant at 5% (10%) significance 
level.
LM-test for serial correlation: 8.896; Chi2(4)0>05 = 9.48.
oo
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TABLE 1.4
SURE Regressions on Ain (A/U)d; Sample Period 82q2 92q2
Duration In (V/U) In sd In (A/U)*,.! t/100 RestL SE ad j. R2
0 - 1 0.269**
(0.049)
0.019
(0.181)
-1.134**
(0.140)
0.724** 
(0.298)*
-0.228*
(0.130)
0.059 0.781
1 - 2 0.259**
(0.077)
0.114
(0.326)
-1.074**
(0.130)
0.485
(0.421)
-0.148
(0.190)
0.092 0.719
2 - 3 0.356**
(0.063)
0.376**
(0.176)
-0.732**
(0.116)
0.128
(0.315)
0.073
(0.152)
0.077 0.672
3 - 4 0.179**
(0.062)
0.067
(0.137)
-0.718**
(0.136)
-1.013**
(0.311)
0.197
(0.132)
0.069 0.695
4+ 0.226**
(0.089)
-0.388**
(0.190)
-1.002**
(0.129)
-0.443
(0.695)
0.548
(0.364)
0.160 0.798
Standard errors in parentheses. & The standard errors of the variable time have been scaled 
appropriately. The coefficients on the variable Aln(V/U) which was included in the 
regressions are not recorded in the table. ** (*) a significant a 5% (10%) significance level.
LM-test for serial correlation: 5.633; Chi2(4)0>05 = 9.48.
oo
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Table 1.5
SURE Regressions on Ain (A/U)d; Sample Period 82q2 92q2
Duration In (V/U) In sd In (A/U)*,^ t/100 RestT SE ad j. R2
0 - 1 0.306**
(0.052)
0.012
(0.178)
-1.206**
(0.141)
0.927**
(0.301)*
-0.277**
(0.114)
0.057 0.796
1 - 2 0.232**
(0.081)
0.034
(0.328)
-1.071**
(0.133)
0.153
(0.433)
0.015
(0.171)
0.093 0.713
2 - 3 0.343**
(0.063)
0.344**
(0.171)
-0.777**
(0.118)
-0.110
(0.316)
0.179
(0.135)
0.077 0.676
3 - 4 0.175**
(0.062)
0.068
(0.136)
-0.763**
(0.135)
-1.164**
(0.318)
0.221*
(0.115)
0.068 0.703
4+ 0.191**
(0.090)
-0.360*
(0.199)
-1.017**
(0.129)
-0.715
(0.724)
0.615*
(0.339)
0.157 0.806
Standard errors in parentheses. * The standard errors of the variable time have been scaled 
appropriately. The coefficients on the variable Aln(V/U) which was included in the regressions 
are not recorded in the table. ** (*) = significant at 5% (10%) significance level.
LM-test for serial correlation: 5.223; Chi2(4)0>05 = 9.48.
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Table 1.6
SURE Regressions on Ain (A/U)d; Sample Period 82q3 92ql
Duration In (V/U) In sd In (A/U)d/-1 t/100 Eas/V SE ad j. R2
0 - 1 0.294**
(0.058)
0.308
(0.210)
-1.173**
(0.166)
0.315* 
(0.170)6
-0.617
(1.364)
0.059 0.758
1 - 2 0.236**
(0.087)
-0.072
(0.350)
-1.037**
(0.174)
-0.026
(0.262)
1.579
(2.181)
0.092 0.718
2 - 3 0.361**
(0.064)
0.423**
(0.160)
-0.615**
(0.108)
-0.014
(0.180)
2.948*
(1.547)
0.069 0.741
3 - 4 0.275**
(0.077)
0.265
(0.181)
-0.623**
(0.141)
-0.672**
(0.258)
1.784
(1.545)
0.065 0.739
4+ 0.225**
(0.096)
-0.685**
(0.235)
-1.103**
(0.148)
0.034
(0.458)
8.016*
(4.321)
0.157 0.811
Standard errors in parentheses. & The standard errors of the variable time have been scaled 
appropriately. The coefficients on the variables Aln(V/U) and Aeas which were included in the 
regressions are not recorded in the table. ** (*) = significant at the 5% (10%) significance 
level.
LM-test for serial correlation: 4.257; Chi2(4)0.0S = 9.48.
Table 1.7
Long-run relationships implied by SUR estimation
For variable Restj
ln[A], -  0.2531nZ + 0 .7 6 8 -L  -  0.229Rest 
U '  U 100 1
ln[A], -  0.441 In A  + 0.442Ini, + 0.230Rest 
U U
ln[A], -  0.2291nZ -  1 .5 2 5 -L  + 0.2H9RestT 
U 4 U 100 T
ln[A ], -  0.1881nA -  0.3541m, + 0.604i?ertT 
U U
For variable EAS/V
A V  F A Sln[__] -  0.5861n__ + 0.6871ns. + 4.793 _
U U V
A V  F A Sln[__], -  0.2041n_ -  0.6211ns, + 7.267
U 5 U d V
Table 1.8
Steady state impact calculations of ALMP on duration-specific outflow rates
(1)
A^lntA/U)*
(2)
contribution of ALMP 
to (1) 
RestT(=R) ; EAS/V(=E)
(3)
Actual (A/U)df2
(4)
(A/U)df2 w/o ALMP
A2.1ln(A/U) x=0.1538 (R) -0.1529 0.4574 0.5329
Aa.1ln(A/U)3=0.5236 (R) +0.1535$ 0.3496 0.2998
(E) +0.0479 0.3496 0.3333
A2.1ln(A/U)4=0.0122 (R) +0.1929 0.2765 0.2279
Aj.ilntA/UJgsO.AVSl (R) +0.4032 0.1789 0.1196
(E) +0.0726 0.1789 0.1665
Aj.jsdifference taken between 2 steady state quarters; ALMP=Active Labour Market Policy; 
(A/U)d2=duration-specific outflow rate of 2nd steady state quarter.
$ Coefficient on RestT in SUR estimation of (A/U)3 has a probability value of 0.190.
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Table 1.9
Steady state simulations of the effect of RestT and EAS/V on long-term unemployment
Probabilities used fLr2 0Lf2 Fall in LTU due to ALMP 
absolute numbers (in %)
I. Restart present and increase of EAS/V by 52% .
plf2=0.4574;p2i2=0.3807 67438 376954 
p3 2=0. 3496;p4r2=0 .2765 
p5 2=0.1789.
-466376 ““ “
II. Restart not present and assuming RestT affects (A/D)3.
plf2=0.5329;p2f 2=0.3807 64270 537374 
p3’2=0 .2998;p4'2=0 .2279 
P5f 2=0.1196.
-305956 160420 (35%)
III. Restart not present and assuming RestT does not affect (A/U)3.
Pi,2=0 • 5329;p2f2=0.3807 59697 499139
p3'2=0.3496;p4'2=0.2279
p5'2=0.1196.
-344191 122185 (26%)
IV. Increase of EAS/V by 52% .
plf 2=0.4574 ;p2f 2=0.3807 69131 415201 
p32=0.3333; p4j 2=0.2765 
p5 2=0.1665.
-428129 38247 ( 8%)
Note; Ulf2=358120; UL>1=843330 .
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Table 1.A1
h values for models with 40 observations
In column 5 we show the actual mean, k/N and the critical 
values = 2k/N. Note that critical values are only meaningful 
if k/N < 0.4.
Model 0:
0.3419 0.2881 0.2692 0.3396 mean=0.2249
0.1674 0.1559 0.1470 0.1615 k/N =0.2250
0.1289 0.1933 0.1676 0.1809 2k/N=0.4500
0.1210 0.1434 0.1427 0.2290
0.1760 0.1528 0.2385 0.2164
0.1821 0.1705 0.2031 0.1793
0.1544 0.1498 0.2300 0.2306
0.1864 0.2269 0.2125 0.2583
0.2458 0.3015 0.3453 0.2734
0.3462 0.4209 0.3087 0.4115
Model 6:
0.3494 0.3180 0.2774 0.3725 mean^O.2749
0.1701 0.1571 0.1498 0.1747 k/N =0.2750
0.1396 0.2012 0.1960 0.1926 2k/N=0.5500
0.2248 0.2499 0.2736 0.2818
0.3228 0.3788 0.4823 0.2199
0.2958 0.4150 0.2288 0.1859
0.1620 0.1981 0.2341 0.2466
0.1934 0.2427 0.2271 0.3580
0.2697 0.3275 0.3581 0.3269
0.3743 0.4671 0.3269 0.4276
Model 7:
0.3450 0.2974 0.2736 0.3514 mean=0.2499
0.1700 0.1568 0.1470 0.1732 k/N =0.2500
0.1289 0.1976 0.1680 0.1848 2k/N=0.5000
0.1535 0.1852 0.1702 0.2291
0.2443 0.2395 0.3110 0.2180
0.2956 0.4125 0.2190 0.1800
0.1615 0.1928 0.2339 0.2393
0.1919 0.2331 0.2156 0.3395
0.2477 0.3053 0.3550 0.2775
0.3462 0.4579 0.3267 0.4225
Model 8:
0.3455 0.3116 0.2738 0.3640 mean=0.2499
0.1676 0.1561 0.1497 0.1640 k/N =0.2500
0.1396 0.1961 0.1947 0.1875 2k/N=0.5000
0.2023 0.2191 0.2568 0.2813
0.2385 0.2677 0.3844 0.2187
0.1844 0.1811 0.2102 0.1847
0.1555 0.1588 0.2301 0.2362
0.1873 0.2382 0.2253 0.2859
0.2690 0.3254 0.3496 0.3254
0.3740 0.4344 0.3087 0.4150
Table LAI
h Values for models with 40 Observations (continued)
Model 9:
0.3442 0.3205 0.2755 0.3666
0.1680 0.1559 0.1497 0.1665
0.1386 0.1940 0.1924 0.1854
0.2203 0.2401 0.2761 0.2794
0.2060 0.2170 0.3239 0.2179
0.2049 0.2274 0.2036 0.1812
0.1556 0.1650 0.2310 0.2324
0.1866 0.2435 0.2258 0.3042
0.2622 0.3228 0.3533 0.3183
0.3619 0.4569 0.3114 0.4116
meaifcsO .2499 
k/N =0.2500 
2k/N=0.5000
Note: The matrices should be read across columns, e.g. h22 is 
the entry in the first row, second column and hg6 is the entry 
in the second row, second column. All models are with a time 
trend.
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Table 1.A2
h values of models with. 39 observations
In column 5 we show the actual mean, k/N and the critical 
values = 2k/N. Note that critical values are only meaningful 
if k/N < 0.4. Starred entries exceed the critical value.
Model 1:
0.3863 0.3326 0.2839 0.4044 mean=0.3076
0.1827 0.1759 0.2261 0.2109 k/N =0.3076
0.1487 0.2101 0.2107 0.1990 2k/N=0.6153
0.2251 0.2505 0.2750 0.2884
0.3229 0.3902 0.5191 0.5198
0.5168 0.4185 0.2323 0.1968
0.1908 0.2394 0.2462 0.2939
0.2203 0.2430 0.2336 0.3678
0.2780 0.3694 0.3981 0.3433
0.4046 0.6209* 0.4221
Model 2:
0.3651 0.3336 0.2831 0.3979 mean=0.2819
0.1767 0.1761 0.2155 0.1879 k/N =0.2820
0.1454 0.2032 0.2144 0.1889 2k/N=0.5641
0.2210 0.2409 0.2775 0.2831
0.2284 0.2379 0.3243 0.4768
0.4983 0.2500 0.2161 0.1950
0.1732 0.1850 0.2454 0.2953
0.2013 0.2436 0.2316 0.3192
0.2720 0.3606 0.3972 0.3384
0.3982 0.6170* 0.3828
Model 3:
0.3831 0.3130 0.2815 0.3880 mean=0.2819
0.1823 0.1746 0.2256 0.2082 k/N =0.2820
0.1404 0.2078 0.1784 0.1905 2k/N=0.5641
0.1558 0.1876 0.1758 0.2338
0.2451 0.2478 0.3557 0.5099
0.5151 0.4165 0.2226 0.1902
0.1892 0.2306 0.2455 0.2841
0.2197 0.2334 0.2201 0.3464
0.2586 0.3442 0.3961 0.2985
0.3783 0.6026* 0.4213
Model 4:
0.3672 0.3320 0.2824 0.3918 mean=0.2820
0.1753 0.1757 0.2155 0.1806 k/N =0.2820
0.1474 0.2045 0.2106 0.1917 2k/N=0.5641
0.2058 0.2234 0.2644 0.2870
0.2543 0.2841 0.3875 0.4611
0.4993 0.2199 0.2221 0.1966
0.1710 0.1745 0.2460 0.2939
0.2012 0.2384 0.2321 0.3085
0.2765 0.3531 0.3981 0.3391
0.4027 0.6048* 0.3780
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Table 1.A2
h Values of Models with 39 Observations (continued)
Model 5:
0.3650 0.3118 0.2797 0.3731
0.1746 0.1744 0.2153 0.1764
0.1395 0.2027 0.1778 0.1843
0.1307 0.1540 0.1599 0.2335
0.1864 0.1584 0.2440 0.4472
0.4983 0.2140 0.2138 0.1899
0.1685 0.1617 0.2454 0.2841
0.2010 0.2278 0.2178 0.2814
0.2563 0.3247 0.3961 0.2920
0.3751 0.5838* 0.3778
mean=0.2563 
k/N =0.2564 
2k/N=0.5128
Note: The matrices should be read across columns, e.g. h22 is 
the entry in the first row, second column and h^ is the entry 
in the second row, second column. All models are with a time 
trend.
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Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.2
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Figure 1.3
Inflows into EAS / Vacancies (male and female)
Great Britain: 1982 q2 - 1992 q1
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Figure 1.4
Different Duration Types of Restart Participation 
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Figure 1.5
Estimated inflows into long-term unemployment 
Britain (males): 1982q3 - 1992q1
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Figure Al.I 
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Figure A l.l
CUSUM Plots (continued)
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Figure A l.l
CUSUM Plots (continued)
ttadel 7 u it h  t l a e  -  rio t o f  C u a u la tlv e  Sua o f  R ecu rsive  R e s id u a ls  "odel 7  u/o t l a e  -  rio t o f  C a a U t i *  Sua o f  R ecu rsive  R e s id u a ls
1 2 .396712.3967
3.7187
9.1322
-12.3967 87538SQ1
Tie straight lives n-picscat critical hoaads at 5* sigalficaace teuel
8753
critical hoaads at S* sigalficaace levelThe straight liaes
Itodel a uith tlae - riot of Cuaalatlue Sua of Recursive Residuals (lodcl 6 uxv tlae -  riot of Caaalatlvc Saa of Recursive Residuals
13.3395 13.3395
—9.9965
-13.3395
I 253 8SQ1 8753 esqi
The straight liaes represeat critical hoaads at Sac sigalficaace level The straight Hues represent critical hoaads at Sx. slgalf ii level
(lode 1 9 alth tlae - riot of Cuaulatiue Sua of Recursive Residuals "odel 9 veo tlae - riot of Cuaulative Sua of Recursive Residuals
-13.3395
8253 8551 8753 98Q1 925
The straight liaes represeat critical hoaads at S* sigalficaace level
87538SQ1
The straight liaes icpieseat critical hoaads at Sx sigalficaace level
104
Chapter 2
Employment Schemes in Ireland: An Evaluation*
I Introduction
The primary aim of this chapter is to evaluate the effect which the following 
employment schemes (ES) had on the overall outflow rate and age-by-duration outflow 
rates from unemployment in Ireland from 1980(1) to 1989(4):
(a) Work Experience Programme (WEP);
(b) Employment Incentive Scheme (EIS);
(c) Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS);
(d) Teamwork (TWK);
(e) Social Employment Scheme (SES).
Over the eighties the proportion of long-term unemployed people in the total stock of 
unemployment has risen relentlessly for all age groups. The methodology used also 
allows us to test whether this change in the duration structure is an important factor in 
determining the overall outflow rate and age-by-duration outflow rates. The chapter is 
broken up into six more sections. Section II describes the composition and trend of 
unemployment in the eighties in some detail as the experience of the Irish labour market 
is not well known. Section II also describes the official aims of the ES, while Section 
HI looks at the role of the ES and hysteresis. Sections IV and V look at the 
methodology used to evaluate the effect which ES and the changing duration structure
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have on the overall outflow rate and age-by-duration outflow rates and give the results 
of our estimations. Section VI gives an overall assessment of the schemes and makes 
some policy recommendations. Section VII summarises the main points.
II Unemployment Trends and the Official Aims of the Employment Schemes
The total stock of unemployment in Ireland has risen relentlessly between the 
beginning of the eighties and 1987; after that year we have a slight downward trend for 
the rest of the decade (cf. Figure 2.1). The flows into and out of unemployment, which 
underly its build-up are plotted in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.1 also shows that the duration 
structure has dramatically shifted during the eighties. Having divided the stock of 
unemployment into 3 duration categories (<6 months = short-term unemployment, 6-12 
months, >12 months = long-term unemployment)1 we can see that the proportion of 
those with an uninterrupted unemployment spell of more than 12 months was smaller 
than the proportion of short-term unemployment (a spell of less than 6 months) from 
1980 to 1985, but then exceeded it until the end of the period while the relative 
magnitude of the 6-12 months duration category hardly changed. The age structure of 
the stock of unemployment, on the other hand, did not experience such dramatic change. 
Figure 2.3 shows the development of three age categories (<20 years, 20-44 years, >44 
years) from 1980 to 1989. Clearly, throughout the period the 20-44-years category bore 
the main brunt of unemployment.
The stability of the age structure of unemployment in the eighties can also be seen 
in Figure 2.4 where we compare the percentages of the three specified age groups on the 
Live Register in April 1982 and October 1988. Between these dates the proportion of
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the middle-aged unemployed rose by 3.8 percentage points at the nearly equal expense 
of the other two age groups. So we have only a very insignificant shift in the age 
structure of unemployment. Similarly, Figure 2.5 which gives the percentages of these 
age groups in the labour force for 1982 and 1988, shows no remarkable change. 
Inspection of Figures 2.4 and 2.5 also shows that middle aged persons are over­
represented on the Live Register in both periods while young persons have the same 
proportion on the register and in the labour force in 1982 and are slightly over­
represented on the register in 1988. The relative incidence of unemployment for older 
persons is in both periods approximately 4 percentage points below their share of the 
labour force. Nevertheless, the age distribution of unemployment roughly corresponds 
to the age distribution of the labour force2.
The shift in the duration structure of unemployment, on the other hand, was quite 
dramatic for two duration categories between April 1982 and October 1988 (cf. Figure 
2.6). While the 6-12 months duration category experienced a small fall in its relative 
magnitude between April 1982 and October 1988, the proportion of short-term 
unemployment decreased from 50 to 37 per cent and unemployment spells longer than 
12 months rose from 31.8 per cent to 46.6 per cent. The changing age-by-duration 
structure of unemployment can be seen in Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9. For all age groups 
we can observe swings from short-term to long-term unemployment of about the same 
magnitude. However, the duration stocks are quite different for the various age groups 
in both periods. For example, in 1982 two thirds of all young unemployed were in short­
term unemployment with only 18 per cent in long-term unemployment the older 
unemployed were already experiencing more long-term than short-term unemployment
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(45% compared with 37%). In 1988 half of all young unemployed still experienced 
spells of less than 6 months, although long-term unemployment in this age group had by 
then risen to about 32 per cent. The respective figures for the older unemployed in 1988 
were 29 and 56 percent. The changes in the duration structure of the middle aged group 
mirrors the duration structure changes of the total stock of the unemployed (cf. Figures 
2.8 and 2.6).3
Two points should be made on the basis of the data presented so far. First, long­
term unemployment had become the most pressing issue in the Irish labour market by the 
end of the decade. Secondly, while all age groups experienced similar relative rises in 
long-term unemployment, its proportion in 1988 was nearly 25 percentage points higher 
for older unemployed persons than for the young unemployed (and 6 percentage points 
higher than for the middle aged). This must mean that even though an older person has 
a relatively smaller incidence of unemployment once he/she becomes unemployed his/her 
chances of leaving unemployment are much (or somewhat) smaller than those of the 
young (or middle aged) unemployed. The age structure was, through the prolonged spells 
of older unemployed affecting the overall level of unemployment.4
Over the last decade Ireland has been subject to tight monetary and fiscal 
constraints when dealing with unemployment. This led the government to turn to 
manpower policy as a means of alleviating unemployment. The primary objective of 
manpower policy, as stated in the White Paper (1986), was to deal with any structural 
changes in the Irish labour market by ensuring an adequate supply of skilled and highly 
qualified manpower for the needs of the economy. Its secondary objective was one of 
promoting more equal access to employment opportunities. Employment schemes were
108
introduced to achieve this objective. Thus, manpower policy had an important social 
policy function. The evolution of schemes tended in the first instance to be ad hoc 
responses to particular difficulties at specific times. Many were originally designed as 
temporary to overcome a seemingly cyclical increase in total unemployment. Yet, as 
unemployment persisted the employment schemes became a permanent feature of 
government policy.
In general, the ES promoted more equal access to employment opportunities by
(a) re-integrating disadvantaged groups into the labour force and (b) creating jobs for the 
unemployed. We look at five major employment schemes which account for all 
participants on the National Manpower Services (NMS) Programmes between 1980(1) 
and 1987(4) and for 97 per cent of participants on FAS employment schemes from 
1988(1) to 1989(4). The basic details of the schemes are given in Table 2.1.
Two schemes (EIS and EAS) were aimed at direct job creation for the 
unemployed. Since 1984 EIS has made special provisions for the long-term unemployed, 
but participation levels have never exceeded 17 percent. The proportion of long-term 
unemployed on EAS has steadily grown since 1983 and reached 40 per cent at the end 
of the decade. The remaining three schemes tried to reintegrate disadvantaged groups. 
When looking at participation levels in Figures 2.10(a) and 2.10(b) we see an obvious 
swing from reintegrating young first-time job seekers to reintegrating the young (TWK) 
and other (SES) long-term unemployed. The government from 1984 onwards saw all the 
long-term unemployed as the main disadvantaged group rather than young first-time job 
seekers. So the government clearly did take account of the drammatically shifting 
duration structure of unemployment, across all age groups, in the formulation and
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application of manpower policy.
Up to 1986 SES and EIS accounted for the majority of scheme provisions for the 
long-term unemployed. The government announced the Direct Action Programme for 
the long-term unemployed in its White Paper (1986). Since then SES, EIS and EAS have 
accounted only for 50 per cent of the provisions for the long-term unemployed and FAS 
training schemes for the other 50 per cent.
Job creation for the unemployed has an obvious economic function as well as a 
social function. The White Paper (1986) stated that the reintegration of disadvantaged 
groups, apart from having a social function, was in the long-term interest of society. 
Whether intended or not this reintegration may have a longer term economic function. 
In a recovery period, if the employment schemes have reintegrated disadvantaged groups 
into the effective labour force, this will ensure that these groups do not become a major 
channel of hysteresis. This is the topic of the next section.
m  The Role of Employment Schemes and Hysteresis
To understand the longer term economic function of the ES it is worth looking 
at the human capital explanation of hysteresis. The human capital explanation of 
hysteresis can be sketched as follows. After an adverse shock the inflow into 
unemployment increases. The longer people remain unemployed the more likely they are 
to experience a depreciation in skills and a reduction in job search intensity, resulting in 
an even longer duration of unemployment. This implies that the duration of the 
unemployment is state dependent. A competing theory would state that after the adverse 
shock the existing vacancies are filled from the best of the unemployed, leaving the less
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skilled and unqualified behind. Here workers are thought to be heterogeneous and the 
worst people are supposed to have the longest unemployment spells. The first scenario 
tells us that the longer people are unemployed the less search effective they are likely to 
be. One very important factor which reduces a long-term unemployed person’s search 
effectiveness is the fact that employers use unemployment as a screening device and 
discriminate more against the long-term unemployed. This reduces the effective supply 
of labour. In the presence of a recovery employers do not consider the total pool of the 
unemployed for the growing vacancies but only a subset of the pool. This leads to 
increased wage pressure and unemployment cannot fall to its pre-shock level. Thus, 
unemployment results in a partial persistence in unemployment, i.e. hysteresis. Layard 
(1990b) thinks that long-term unemployment is still a major channel of hysteresis in the 
UK. He sees an obvious role for manpower policies to cure this type of hysteresis. By 
reintegrating the long-term unemployed into the labour force such policies will reduce 
wage pressure and allow unemployment to fall towards pre-shock levels.
The type of schemes proposed by Layard were introduced in Ireland during the 
eighties but their economic function was not appreciated. The objective was one of 
promoting more equal access to employment opportunities. Ireland has one of the 
highest incidence of long-term unemployment in the OECD. This may lead one to 
believe that long-term unemployment is a major channel of hysteresis. But this might 
not be the case for the following two reasons: First, the source of this type of hysteresis 
is the existence of a disadvantaged group outside the effective labour force. As in the 
UK the government in Ireland defines all long-term unemployed as the disadvantaged 
group outside the labour force. We believe that in the Irish case long-term
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unemployment is not a good enough definition of the disadvantaged group. Because of 
the severe lack of vacancies people of all ages and human capital levels may well drift 
into long-term unemployment. Many of the long-term unemployed would be considered 
for a vacancy, especially in a recovery period and this group would not reduce the 
effective supply of labour. We would argue that the group out of the effective labour 
force is comprised of people with minimal human capital levels and very long 
unemployment spells. It is this smaller group only, a subset of the long-term 
unemployed, which could be a source of hysteresis. Secondly, vacancies remained at 
very low levels through most of the eighties. For the given vacancies there was a 
plentiful effective supply of labour. Hence, the existence of a disadvantaged group 
cannot be a major source of wage pressure and therefore hysteresis. However, in times 
of a recovery, if the ES have failed to reintegrate the disadvantaged group into the 
effective labour force, the human capital explanation of hysteresis will become relevant. 
To evaluate the ES is also to see whether they can prevent hysteresis of this type, 
fulfilling their longer-term economic function. By the end of the eighties the 
government’s active labour market policies were mainly targetting all the long-term 
unemployed. As explained above we feel, however, that the truly disadvantaged group 
is only a subset of the long-term unemployed. If placement officers take the best of the 
long-term unemployed5, they might not be reintegrating the truly disadvantaged group. 
We, therefore, feel that the ES may not achieve their longer-term economic function.
A general policy recommendation to prevent hysteresis would be to identify and 
reintegrate the truly disadvantaged group outside the effective labour force. When we 
have long-term unemployment as the sole selection criterion for the relevant ES, we may
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fail to reintegrate this group. We strongly believe that more refined selection criteria 
should be developed for the ES so that the truly disadvantaged group is targeted. This 
will definitely be more equitable and also would prevent hysteresis in a recovery period.
IV The Effect of Employment Schemes on the Overall Outflow Rate
Many empirical studies work with unemployment as a stock. Additional insights 
can be gained by analysing the flows into and out of unemployment. In a steady state 
the stock of unemployment (U) can be expressed as a ratio of inflows over the outflow 
rate,
I inflow
U = ------ = --------------------------, when I = A
A/U outflow rate
Figure 2.11 shows a moving average of the log of the overall outflow rate. Until 
the middle of 1985 we have a downward trend, after which the rate recovers slowly to 
the levels prevailing at the beginning of the decade. Using basic steady state calculations 
one can conclude that in Ireland the net fall in the outflow rate between the first quarter 
of 1981 and the second quarter of 1988 roughly explains 48 per cent of the rise in the 
stock of unemployment. The ES were introduced to increase the overall outflow rate. 
This increase can occur for two reasons: (a) entry onto a scheme implies a one-to-one 
outflow from the Live Register (LR) and (b) the function of some schemes is the 
reintegration of the disadvantaged group into the labour force, which will raise the 
outflow rate via increased search effectiveness after the brief, government financed 
employment spell. In theory ES should not increase inflow rates, but in practice some 
schemes (e.g. EIS and EAS) could have displacement of output and hence employment
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effects, implying that ES are positively correlated with the inflow rate. Here we do not 
model the inflow rate but consider it worthwhile doing.
The overall outflow rate function:
Outflow from the LR can be thought of having three destinations: (1) emigration,
(2) employment and (3) out of the labour force. Following the approach taken by 
Jackman and Lehmann, (1990), let
At = f(Vr  Ut; eXt) (2.1),
where Vt is notified vacancies, and ct Ut is the search effective part of the stock of 
unemployment, where
0 3 ct ^ 1 and ct = ct (1 + <I> Mt)
and
5
(a) M = X p. ES- is a weighted sum of the ES
i=l
(ES are expected to increase the average search effectiveness of the unemployed, i.e. 
> 0);
(b) ct = ZdI dg*t is a weighted sum of steady state exit rates from unemployment, where 
ad is the steady state exit rate of the d-th duration group and g^t is the proportion of this 
group to the total stock of unemployment in period t.
Since the steady state exit rate from unemployment declines with duration, the 
index ct will fall as more of the unemployment stock drifts into long-term unemployment 
This implies a lower average search effectiveness of the total unemployment stock. The 
time trend, e*\ controls for all other factors affecting the overall outflow rate and which
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are not modelled. Assuming CRS in V and cU and log-linearising we can write (1) as
In 5l In T
\ u  j'
+ (l-8), In c, + 82\ , (2.2)
For small values of <I>M and removing the restrictions on the coefficients our estimable 
equation becomes:
In const. + seasonals + 8 ^ (2.3)
+ 8 2  In ct + § 2  ^  Mt + 8g^/100 + ^  with e^  - N(0,o^
The restrictions on the coefficients in equation (2.2) would only allow ES to have an 
indirect effect on the overall outflow rate via the search effectiveness index. By dropping 
the restrictions the function gives a more general relationship between A/U and ES. The 
problem with the estimation of equation (3) is that how the outflow rate and ES are 
related is determined by numerous unknown factors which are not modelled. The 
coefficient on M will beside the indirect effect pick up the other intended direct effect 
which is the one-to-one outflow from the LR after entry onto a scheme. The coefficient 
may also pick up many distortive effects such as substitution effects which could lead to 
a negative relationship between the overall outflow rate and the ES. Yet we know that 
ES are intended to have a positive effect on the overall outflow rate without distortions. 
Data:
(1) Employment Schemes: Monthly stocks of participation levels were made available to 
us for the entire decade by the Department of Labour. M, a weighted sum of the 
participation levels, is assumed exogenous to the stock of unemployment and
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consequently the overall outflow rate from unemployment. This assumption is realistic 
considering the permanency of the employment schemes and the financing structure6.
(2) The Irish Vacancy - Unemployment Rate: Theoretically this rate proxies the state of 
the Irish labour market. Since registered vacancies are very unreliable we used the MSL 
vacancy index which has been calculated by MSL International since 1977 as such a 
proxy. This index is based on all managerial job advertisements in Irish newspapers.
(3) The Overall Outflow Rate: Total inflows and the stock of unemployment form the 
basis of our calculations. This data is available from the CSO on a monthly basis. We 
interpolated quarterly inflows for the period 1980(1)-1982(4) from the age-by-duration 
structure of unemployment7. The overall outflow rate is derived from the following 
identity:
It - At = A Ut+p  which implies
(2.4)
Results of estimation
The following table gives our estimation results of equation (2.3).
OLS Regression on ln(A/U): Sample Period 80Q2-89Q4
K ln(V/U) In c t/100 M
2.6 0.2621 2.2747 1.870 -0.00003
(3.0) (5.0) (2.8) (4.2) (1.7)
SE
0.092
R2
0.79
Absolute t-values in brackets.
DW = 1.64; LM-test of 4-th order serial correlation: 
3C2(4) = 2.8.
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The results say two important things:
1. c is significant, implying that as more unemployed drift into long-term unemployment 
the average search effectiveness of the total stock of unemployment is falling, thus 
lowering the overall outflow rate. So there is justification for the introducton of ES to 
reverse this falling average search effectiveness. This fall was due to either state 
dependence or heterogeneity or both, but clearly the goals of the ES could be achieved 
more easily, if the fall were due to state dependence. When state dependence dominates 
employment on a scheme can lead to the reconstruction of human capital levels attained 
before the incidence of unemployment3. Some people, after the end of this government 
sponsored employment spell, might on the basis of their regained skills directly flow into 
private employment. Those who flow back into unemployment will have a greater search 
effectiveness than before they participated in the scheme, thus increasing the average 
search effectiveness of the stock of the unemployed. If, on the other hand, heterogeneity 
is the main reason why certain people find themselves in the pool of long-term 
unemployment then the use of ES will only have small or no effects on the average 
search effectiveness of the unemployed and equity considerations must be the main 
justification for the application of such schemes.
2. The results are very discouraging since they show a negative relationship between the 
overall outflow rate and ES. It is likely that distortions cause negative effects which 
outweigh the intended positive effects of the ES. In the next section we analyse the 
determination of age-by-duration outflow rates to get deeper insights into this result.
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V The Effect of Employment Schemes on Age-by-Duration Specific Outflow Rates
In this section we look at the effect which an individual ES has on each 
age-by-duration outflow rate. Theoretically an ES should only increase the outflow of 
its targeted group or groups and have no effect on non-targeted groups. But, in practice 
an ES can have a negative impact on the outflow rate of a non-targeted group via e.g. 
a substitution effect. (An employer who would otherwise have hired an unemployed 
person of a non-targeted group instead takes a person on an ES.) The following 
methodology will, however, not allow us to pick up pure substitution effects, because it 
tests for a general relationship between an employment scheme and a non-targeted group. 
This relationship can be determined by many other factors, e.g. ES change the duration 
structure of unemployment since many of the participants re-enter unemployment as 
short-term unemployed.
The age-bv-duration outflow rate functions: 
We can write these functions as
(A) a^e { t) dur
where
8 /-1,..., 5 (2.5)
(1) age = young (<25 years), middle aged (25-44), older (>44 years) and dur 
STU (<6 months), LTU (>6 months);
(2) (AJ aj^ r = an age-by-duration specific outflow from unemployment;
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(3) (aM ) aJ ^  = search effective part of the stock of unemployment of a 
particular age-by-duration category, with 0<oCt<l;
(4) (oQ agedur a agedur
w Z
( u , r
i.e. it equals the steady state exit rate of an age-by-duration specific group weighted by 
the proportion of the duration specific stock of an age group over the total stock of this 
age group. This index controls for differences in search effectiveness of groups over 
time. It uses the empirical fact that the steady state exit rate is different for every 
age-by-duration group and controls for the changing duration structure within an age 
group and its effect on the search effective part of a particular age-by-duration group. 
Vt is measured as in the previous section and e^ represents a time trend, which controls 
for other variables determining age-by-duration specific outflow rates. Assuming CRS
in ((XtUt) aj^ r and Vt, log-linearising (2.5) and dropping restrictions on coefficients, we
arrive at the following estimable set of equations:
Ain A_V -  const. + seasonal + 8. In dur 1 + 82 Ind af e 2 ' dur
119
+ 83 <|> ESt + S4 In
Data:
The only new data to be discussed is the age-bv-duration data from the LR which 
provides the basis for the age-by-duration outflow rates. It has been published 
semi-annually (April and October) since April 1980 by the CSO. We could aggregate 
the data only into the three duration categories presented in section D: (a) <6 months,
(b) 6-12 months, (c) >12 months. Having three duration categories we can only compute 
two outflow rates for each age group, short-term and long-term unemployment outflows 
rates9. As was shown in chapter 1 the overall outflow rate is a linear combination of 
the duration specific outflow rates. This result is easily extended to age-by-duration 
specific outflow rates.
For each age group short-term and long-term unemployment outflow rates are 
shown in Figure 2.12. They enable us to trace through the dynamics of unemployment 
during the eighties. With rising inflows into unemployment which were continously 
substantially larger than outflows until the middle of 1985 (cf. Figure 2.2) short-term 
unemployment outflow rates fell for all age groups, but in particular for middle aged 
persons (the group with the largest unemployment incidence) until October 1986. With 
rising inflows this fall in short-term outflow rates must mean a build-up of long-term 
unemployment10. With this build-up the long-term unemployment outflow rates more 
and more dominate the overall outflow rate. As these long-term rates are so much lower 
than the short-term outflow rates, they pull down the overall outflow rate. For the young
_A
77
>age
dur 85 to/100 + e,, e, -  N(0,o*).
(2.6)
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and older unemployed the long-term unemployment outflow rates have seemingly 
negligible downward trends until October 1986 and remain stationary thereafter while for 
the middle aged group there is a slight upward trend. The main source (apart from the 
secular rise of inflows) for the dynamic behaviour of the stock of unemployment must 
be the movements of the short-term unemployment outflow rates as they determine the 
duration distribution of the pool of the unemployed over time. With short-term rates 
rising, assuming constancy of long-term rates, the duration structure will shift (possibly 
very slowly) back in favour of short-term unemployment, thus giving more weight to 
short-term rates. The resulting rise in the overall outflow rate, with rising inflows, will 
slow down the rise in unemployment. If the rise in the overall outflow rate is strong, as 
was the case in Ireland after 1986, the rise in unemployment might be halted or reversed 
(cf. Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.11).
Results of estimation:
Table 2.2 shows the fit of our model as formulated in (2.6) without the ES. The 
coefficients on the vacancy/unemployment ratios for the respective age-by-duration group 
have the right sign and are with one exception well defined. The time trend is only well 
defined for three groups; in two cases it is positive and once negative. Inspection of 
Figure 2.12 leads us to think that this is an acceptable result, although modelling the time 
trend with a simple linear time dummy might be questionable11. As mentioned above, 
there has been a dramatic change in the duration structure of unemployment for all age 
groups. The proportion of long-term unemployed within each group has risen 
substantially. The fact that the coefficients on the index of search effectiveness are
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always positive and highly significant in four out of six cases means that this shift in the 
duration structure has had a major impact on the age-by-duration outflow rates. This has 
led to a fall in the overall outflow rate as seen in Section IV. Hence there is an obvious 
role for ES to reverse the falling average search effectiveness in all age groups. Table 
2.3 gives the direction of the impact which an ES has on age-by-duration outflow 
rates12. ES were introduced to raise the outflow rate of the targeted group, without 
affecting the outflow rates of non-targeted groups. But, Table 2.3 shows that there have 
been quite a few positive and negative effects on non-targeted groups. Our methodology 
cannot pinpoint the exact channels through which these effects occur. We do feel, 
however, that substitution effects as discussed above must be important. We can also see 
that most ES have a negative impact on targeted groups. Again, the methodology does 
not tell us why this had happened, but one important reason could be that if we take the 
best people from a group and place them on an ES a smaller group is left behind which 
is less search effective. So our results support other evidence that placement officers 
have taken the best from each group (cf. NESC, 1985). The methodology in the last two 
sections can tell us that the ES have not achieved their intended aims, but it cannot tell 
us why they have failed to do so. In the next section to encourage debate we give 
reasons why we think that the ES were not successful and offer a policy 
recommendation.
VI Overall Assessment of Employment Schemes 
WEP. The NESC report (1985) felt that WEP was not targeting the truly 
disadvantaged. The OECD has stated frequently if schemes place participants who are
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especially attractive to employers, this gives rise to the probability of significant dead 
weight loss and substitution effects. There is indirect evidence in Table 2.3 that WEP 
took the best from the young STU, thus lowering the average search effectiveness of the 
group and consequently its outflow rate, while with the young long-term unemployed the 
programme does not seem to have done this. We have also indirect evidence that as a 
consequence of creaming off the best of the young short-term unemployed there are 
substitution effects which have lowered the outflow rates of the middle-aged and older 
STU. WEP was terminated in 1988, but if the selection criteria applied by placement 
officers had picked out the truly disadvantaged first-time job seekers, distortive effects 
would have been less; the search effectiveness of the targeted age-by-duration group 
would have been higher, and, apart from being more equitable, the reintegration of the 
disadvantaged group would help in the prevention of hysteresis.
EIS. In its present form it is causing substantial negative effects. The negative 
effects on all age groups of the STU may indicate two things: substitution effects and that 
the programme creamed off the best of each group. The lack of impact of EIS on all age 
groups of the long-term unemployed points to the failure of special premia to boost the 
outflow rates of the long-term unemployed. This is not surprising considering that 
participation of this group has never exceeded 17 per cent of those on the scheme. In 
Section HI we argued that long-term unemployment was not a good enough definition 
of a disadvantaged group outside the labour force. If EIS could target the truly 
disadvantaged among the long-term unemployed, this would lead to considerably less 
dead weight loss and substitution effects. In Sweden special wage subsidies are targeted 
at the long-term unemployed. Within long-term unemployment they distinguish between
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two groups and work with the principle that the more disadvantaged group must receive 
a higher subsidy for a longer period to ensure employers’ participation in the scheme. 
If EIS is to entice employers to take on the truly disadvantaged group the special 
premium must be fixed for a much longer period than at present. A reformed EIS which 
targets the truly disadvantaged group among the long-term unemployed could be a very 
beneficial programme. Apart from reducing distortions the reintegration of the 
disadvantaged group will prevent hysteresis in the longer-term. Also, given the lack of 
vacancies it is better to have an EIS that targets a smaller group without distortions, since 
it creates additional jobs, than to abolish this scheme of wage subsidies.
EAS. Both EIS and EAS can cause serious displacement of output and hence 
employment effects so, as we have already mentioned , one should look at the impact 
which these schemes have on inflows. EAS does not seem to be significant at all. This 
could hint at dead weight loss, considering the nature of the scheme. It is worth noting 
that the requirements to participate in EAS are quite stringent, and yet 40 per cent of 
EAS participants are defined as long-term unemployed. This again indicates that long­
term unemployment is too broad a definition of a disadvantaged group.
TWK and SES. TWK and SES have negative effects on their respective targeted 
group, possibly reflecting the fact that TWK is taking the best of the young and SES the 
best of the older long-term unemployed. It is not clear that these schemes will 
reintegrate anybody into the labour force, so maybe they should include an element of 
training and give some worthwhile job experience. Again it is more equitable when the 
schemes target the truly disadvantaged group among the long-term unemployed.
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VII Conclusions
The changing duration structure has been an extremely important factor in 
determining the overall outflow rate and the age-by-duration outflow rates. So, 
manpower policy could have played a vital role in increasing the overall average search 
effectiveness of the unemployment stock and hence outflow rates. Yet, our results show 
that the presence of the ES has had a negative impact on the overall outflow rate due to 
the many distortive effects on the age-by-duration outflow rates.
We strongly believe that more refined selection criteria should be developed for 
the ES so that the truly disadavantaged group is targeted. This will minimise distortive 
effects, increase the average search effectiveness of the targeted age-by-duration group 
and apart from being more equitable the reintegration of the truly disadvantaged group 
will help in the prevention of hysteresis.
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Footnotes
* This chapter is a revised version of an article co-written with Patrick Walsh which 
appeared as Lehmann and Walsh (1990).
1. In this section we define short-term unemployment in a somewhat unusual way while 
long-term unemployment has the normal definition. Below, when we discuss age-by- 
duration outflow rates, data limitations only allow us to calculate two duration categories 
of outflow rates from unemployment: short-term unemployment outflow rates (the 
average probability of flowing out of unemployment within the next 6 months after an 
uninterrupted unemployment spell of less than 6 months) and long-term unemployment 
outflow rates (the average probability of flowing out of unemployment within the next 
6 months after an uninterrupted unemployment spell of more than 6 months). When 
analyzing the stocks of unemployment we have three duration categories with the 6-12- 
months category termed medium-term unemployment (a category not very important 
compared with the other two). What in our opinion dominates long-term unemployment 
outflow rates is the > 12-months category of unemployment.
2. The fact that age is not a "selection criterion" for unemployment in the eighties can 
point to an economy in deep and perpetual recession where unemployment incidence is 
not confined to specific age groups.
3. This age structure of long-term unemployment is roughly representative for all those 
OECD countries where long-term unemployment has been a problem in the eighties (cf. 
OECD, 1988, pp. 14-22).
4. In section IV the relationship between age-by-duration outflow rates and the stock of 
unemployment will be discussed.
5. In the literature dealing with the evaluation of labour market policies this is often 
referred to as "creaming" off the stock of long-term unemployment (cf. e.g. OECD, 1988, 
p.51).
6. Half the expenditures on employment schemes come from the European Community 
Social Fund.
7. The approach employed by Layard et al. (1991), ch.5, was used here. We took the 
stock of those unemployed for less than one month at a specific point in time as a proxy 
for monthly inflows and then estimated quarterly inflows from these flows. For the 
period where we have monthly inflows (1983 to 1989) we simulated quarterly inflows 
using the above mentioned proxy and compared them to actual inflows. The comparison 
allowed us to calculate an adjustment factor with which we multiplied the estimated 
quarterly inflows for the period 1980(1) to 1989(4).
8. Employment schemes with a training component can lead to a level of human capital 
larger than the before the incidence of unemployment.
9. For the definition of these rates compare footnote 1.
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10. An elegant exposition between outflow rates and duration specific stocks can be 
found in Haskell and Jackman (1988).
11. Experimentation with other specifications of the time trend were even less 
satisfactory. Given the short time series and the very strong seasonality using a fixed 
seasonal dummy might not smooth the data enough.
12. The results of 5 seperate SURE regressions are shown in the appendix. To exclude 
endogeneity problems, an optimal strategy in these regressions would have been to 
instrument the individual employment schemes. However, in the Irish case there are no 
sensible instruments available on a semi-annual basis. A second best is here to 
"normalize" the participation levels by the targeted stock of the unemployed thus getting 
close to exogeneous regressors.
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Table 2.1
Details of the Employment Schemes Analysed
A. Name B. Targeted Group C. Description of Scheme D. Aim of Scheme E. Time Analysed
WEP Under 25 first time 
disadvantaged job 
seekers.
Participants spend 26 weeks 
in employment gaining experience 
from on-the-job training.
Reintegration of this 
targeted group into the 
labour force.
1980(1)-1988(1)
EIS Persons who have been 
unemployed for at 
least 13 weeks.
It gives an employment subsidy 
for 24 weeks to employers who 
recruit additional unemployed 
workers. The subsidy is doubled 
if you are over 25 and LTU.
Job creation for unemployed 
workers. Since 1984 a special 
incentive of a double subsidy 
was introduced to create jobs 
for LTU.
1980(1)-1989(4)
EAS Persons who have been 
unemployed for at 
least 13 weeks.
A weekly allowance is paid for a 
maximum of 1 year to aid the 
unemployed in setting up in 
self-employment.
Job creation in the form 
of self-employment for 
unemployed job seekers.
1984(1)-1989(4)
TWK Persons between the 
ages of 17-25 and 
unemployed for at 
least 6 months.
The scheme helps local communities 
provide temporary work for young 
persons.
Reintegration of this 
targeted group into the 
labour force.
1983(1)-1989(4)
SES Persons over 25 and 
unemployed at least 
a year.
Provides public sector and 
voluntary work for an average 
of 2.5 days per week up to 
1 year.
Part-time employment for 
the LTU with an aim to 
reintegration.
1985(2)-1989(4)
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Table 2.2
f  \
S.U.R.E. RE G R ESSIO N S O N  Ain A
U\  J
% W IT H O U T  E M P L O Y M E N T  M E A S U R E S *
AG E lnaJ.at
f  \
I n M
M
Ji
liri TIME S.E.
S.T.U
YOUNG 0.42198 0.03759 -1.0599 0.002127 0.02467
(2.4908) (2.1362) (5.9408) (0.59873)
MIDDLE-AGED 0.49002 0.077625 -0.91228 0.0077042 0.03342
(3.8807) (2.1157) (4.6425) (1.9646)
OLDER 0.77462 0.045966 -0.90712 0.16153 0.04661
(5.9889) (0.90797) (6.4012) (4.6630)
L.T.U.
YOUNG 0.69090 0.19473 -0.95683 -0.010683 0.06582
(1.6140) (3.5015) (6.1013) (0.92966)
MIDDLE-AGED 1.0354 0.43940 -1.2301 0.00115 0.1116
(1.5070) (4.2588) (7.7027) (0.09801)
OLDER 2.1160 0.25923 -1.1281 -0.027011 0.08865
(4.6693) (3.0621) (7.8043) (4.4268)
LM-test for serial correlations: 4.61 X (5) = 11.1. Absolute t-values in brackets. 
* Sample Period 80:1 to 89:2 (semi-annual).
Table 2.3
Impact Assessment of Employment Measures
AGE WEP EIS EAS TEAMWORK SES
STU(<6 months)
YOUNG -* _ * NE* NE -
MIDDLE-AGED - _ * NE* + -
OLDER _ * NE* + +
LTU(>6 months)
YOUNG +* NE* NE* _ * NE
MIDDLE-AGED NE NE* NE* - NE*
OLDER + NE* NE* NE _ *
NE = no effect, i.e. not significant at 5% level. 
* = targeted group.
Table 2.A1
S.U.R.E. REGRESSIONS ON  Ain
f  \
A %j #
77 a '
EMPLOYMENT MEASURE: W.E.P.
AGE lna"(
(  \  
ml M  
u i  V dlJ
WEP
UTY
f
In —
H - S.E.
S.T.U
YOUNG 0.61930
(4.4065)
0.00979
(0.39660)
-0.76238
(1.7694)
-1.2589
(8.1818)
0.0234
MIDDLE-AGED 0.71544
(7.2625)
-0.024303
(0.060281
-1.9420
(4.2971)
-1.0372
(7.4260)
0.0305
OLDER 0.66224
(5.1998)
-0.42614
(0.69910)
-1.9381
(3.5335)
-0.98815
(6.5923)
0.0561
L.T.U
YOUNG 1.1103
(3.2937)
0.32023
(4.3721)
2.8193
(2.5543)
-1.1442
(12.424)
0.0616
MIDDLE-AGED 0.62703
(0.78288)
0.31020
(2.1283)
-0.1229
(0.077386)
-1.0300
(7.9101)
0.1091
OLDER 2.1564
(4.8164)
0.42564
(5.1027)
3.8264
(4.8170)
-1.2026
(9.6559)
0.0806
LM-test for serial correlations: 4.7 X (5) = 11.1.
Absolute t-values in brackets.
Table 2.A2
S.U.R.E. REGRESSIONS ON  Ain
r \  
A V
a EMPLOYMENT MEASURE: E.I.S.
AGE lnocjdt
In
IT?
v
E/S
T / f
In
(
A
V A"1 S.E.
S.T.U
YOUNG 0.38237 0.050153
(7.2596) (4.755)
MIDDLE-AGED 0.27994 0.13504
(3.9915) (4.4169)
OLDER 0.16203 0.10785
(1.2651) (2.1288)
-2.5633 -1.3802 0.0159619
(4.5426) (11.484)
-3.0161 -1.2831 0.0296706
(2.7475) (7.6342)
-5.9234 -1.1539 0.0614174
(5.7803)
L.T.U
YOUNG 0.30644 0.15505
(2.0185) (3.2299)
MIDDLE-AGED 1.3001 0.43762
(3.0652) (4.1012)
OLDER 0.53968 0.23826
(0.90449) (2.1944)
-1.4548 -0.98050 0.0648944
(0.64131) (8.2374)
-5.4648 -1.1851 0.108508
(1.4802) (8.4814)
-1.5420 -0.98010 0.104962
(0.37867) (5.4283)
LM-test for serial correlations: 5.88 X (5) = 11.1. Absolute t-values in brackets.
Table 2.A3
S.U.R.E. REGRESSIONS ON  Ain A
U
\
V
i i EMPLOYMENT MEASURE: E.A.S.
AGE lnaJ.di
In
r  \  
V
m
\  dly
EAS
U r
In
f  j
A
TJ J.. , v A -1 S.E.
S.T.U
YOUNG 0.34263 0.032513
(4.1314) (1.9397)
MIDDLE-AGED 0.28235 0.10201
(3.0819) (2.8638)
OLDER 0.092843 0.015847
(0.48996) (0.22120)
-0.77803 -1.1064 0.0231722
(0.79274) (7.3267)
-0.83058 -1.1152 0.0353287
(0.53988) (6.7066)
-3.8953 -0.91278 0.0646619
(1.1547) (4.9497)
L.T.U.
YOUNG 0.33508 0.14342
(2.1391) (2.8789)
MIDDLE-AGED 1.3580 0.37192
(3.0418) (3.2981)
OLDER 0.61292 0.21641
(0.96159) (1.9015)
-2.5601 -1.0626 0.0658644
(0.90713) (9.1910)
-7.0436 -1.1685 0.110385
(1.5055) (7.6444)
-2.1099 -0.96271 0.105254
(0.40586) (5.2028)
LM-test for serial correlations: 6.41 X (5) = 11.1.
Absolute t-values in brackets.
Table 2.A4
S.U.R.E. REGRESSIONS ON Ain g  ; EMPLOYMENT MEASURE: TEAMWORK
AGE lnaj’
In
II?
TMWK
UTY
In
( V 
A
vTf„. .V A -1 S.E.
S.T.U
YOUNG 0.48766 0.044104
(5.5328) (2.6272)
MIDDLE-AGED 0.40650 0.12009
(4.5062) (3.4857)
OLDER 0.50036 0.095406
(3.0725) (1.2927)
1.077 -1.2383 0.0233902
(1.3568) (8.0025)
2.0163 -1.1157 0.0338338
(1.7052) (6.8305)
4.1307 -0.96271 0.0614932
(1.8395) (5.4186)
L.T.U.
YOUNG 0.46259 0.12944 -5.5875 -1.0048 0.055577
(3.4946) (3.1177) (3.0011) (10.520)
MIDDLE-AGED 1.4954 0.36354 -7.9913 -1.1225 0.1054
(3.3309) (3.3120) (2.1575) (6.9941)
OLDER 0.80802 0.20634 -4.0076 -1.0020 0.1045
(1.5265) (1.8612) (1.0964) (5.5930)
LM-test for serial correlations: 5.25 X (3) = 11.1.
Absolute t-values in brackets.
Table 2.A5
S.U.R.E. REGRESSIONS ON  Ain
( \
A %j t
u  a '\
EMPLOYMENT MEASURE: S.E.S.
( \ (
In V SES In A
AGE InaJ.at m  I * UT v P
S.T.U
YOUNG 0.22171 0.07177
(2.6070) (4.6887)
MIDDLE-AGED 0.15646 0.19761
(1.5773) (4.3817)
OLDER 0.45143 -0.016325
(3.2155) (0.24836)
-1.2606 -1.3543 0.0178178
(2.9752) (8.5541)
-1.8689 -1.5301 0.0303319
(2.3868) (6.8344)
1.8598' -0.69953 0.0581404
(2.1213) (3.9996)
L.T.U.
YOUNG 0.27883 0.166447
(1.0427) (2.8732)
MIDDLE-AGED 1.2915 0.444185
(2.0073) (3.6642)
OLDER 1.7324 0.32346
(3.0633) (3.3702)
0.14282 -1.0772 0.067023
(0.10617) (8.0450)
-0.79516 -1.1524 0.113537
(0.41530) (6.9660)
-3.8870 -0.95605 0.0942276
(2.9329) (5.7398)
2LM-test for serial correlations: 4.94 X (5) = 11.1. 
Absolute t-values in brackets.
Figure 2.1 - Total unemployment and unemployment by duration 
Semi-annual data for Irish labour market (men and women): April 80 - Oct 89
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Figure 2.2 - Inflows into and outflows from unemployment 
The Irish labour market: 1980(4)- 1989(3)-men and women
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Figure 2.3 - Unemployment by age in Irish labour market 
Semi-annual data : April 1980 - October 1989
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Figure 2.4 - Percentages of Live Register by age
Ireland: April 1982 - October 1988
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Source: Irish Central Statistical Office (1991)
Note: Data are not disaggregated by sex.
Figure 2.5 - Percentages of Labour Force by age 
Ireland: 1982-1988
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Figure 2.6 - Percentages of Live Register by duration
Ireland: April 1982 - October 1988
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Figure 2.7 - Percentages of Live Register by duration 
Ireland: April 1982 - October 1988 
Age group: <25 years
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Figure 2.8 - Percentages of Live Register by duration 
Ireland: April 1982 - October 1988 
Age group:25-44 years
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Figure 2.9 - Percentages of Live Register by duration 
Ireland: April 1982 - October 1988 
Age group:>44 years
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Figure 2.10a - ES participation levels (men & women) 
The Irish labour market: 1980(1) to 1989(4)
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Figure 2.10b - ES participation levels (men & women) 
The Irish labour market: 1980(1) to 1989(4)
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Figure2.11 - Moving Average of the Log of 
Overall Outflow Rate from Unemployment 
lreland:1980(4)-1989(2)
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Figure 2.12- Semi-annual age-by-duration 
outflow rates from unemployment (men and women) 
Ireland: April 1980 - April 1989
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Chapter 3
Productivity, Employment and Labour Demand in Polish Industry in the 1980s: 
Some Preliminary Results from Enterprise-Level Data*
I Introduction
The Polish economy of the 1980s can be characterized as a partially-decentralized 
socialist economy (SE). The reform of 1982 established enterprises as nominally 
independent and self-financing entities, but in fact formal and informal central guidance of 
enterprises continued. The 1982 reform was also supposed to establish market-clearing 
prices, but markets continued to be characterized by disequilibrium and persistent shortage 
throughout the 1980s. During this period price controls were widespread; though the scope 
of these controls gradually declined, even at the end of the period (just before the major 
price liberalization that started in mid-1989) about 70% of all market transactions took place 
at state-controlled prices.
In this chapter we investigate the nature of one market in particular - the market for 
labour. It is often argued, in simple neoclassical fashion, that in Poland during this period, 
as in socialist economies generally, wages were set (directly or informally) by the center 
below the levels that would clear the labour market, and that the result was excess demand 
by enterprises for labour. A number of alternative views of the market for labour in socialist 
economies have also been put forward. One of the more prominent views may be termed 
the "chronic shortage economy" view; its best-known proponent is Komai (e.g. Komai 
(1980)). In this view the demand for labour by enterprises is insensitive to the wage; excess 
demand for labour would appear at any wage.
We use a panel data set consisting of annual data from approximately 350 Polish
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industrial enterprises over the period 1983-88 to try to test empirically a simple neoclassical 
approach to the socialist labour market. We describe here our initial investigations; the 
results reported are preliminary at best and can only be taken as suggestive of how the Polish 
labour market operated in the 1980s and of the directions further research should take. Our 
approach is as follows. First, we estimate directly an enterprise production function, 
allowing for firm-specific fixed effects. The resulting estimated marginal products of labour 
are then compared to the wage paid by enterprises. Our results indicate that for most 
enterprises, the MPL exceeds the wage by a considerable margin. The second step in our 
investigation is to look at the rate of change of employment in the majority of enterprises 
for which the MPL exceeds the wage and in that small but still substantial minority of 
enterprises for which the wage exceeds the MPL. One implication of the simple neoclassical 
approach is that the latter group of enterprises should try to shed labour. It turns out nearly 
half of these enterprises actually increased their employment Put another way, the simple 
neoclassical explanation of labour shortage in socialist economies fails not because wages 
are low relative to the marginal products of labour-they are—but because the labour 
demanded by socialist firms does not appear to be consistent with profit maximization.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. We begin with a discussion in Section 
II of labour markets and wages in socialist economies in general and in Poland in particular. 
Section III describes the model to be estimated, the econometric problems involved, and the 
data used. In Section IV we present our results, and Section V concludes.
II Labour Markets and Wages in Socialist Economies (SEs)
In SEs policy makers were influenced in their employment and wage setting policies 
by the basic Marxist tenets that labour is the sole creator of wealth and should therefore not
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be treated as a commodity and that income equalization is the center piece of social policy. 
This led to wage setting through administrative channels, direct and indirect employment 
regulation, and the planned supply of human resources. The main features of employment 
and wage structure in SEs are the following:
1. SEs operate at full employment, and open unemployment is nearly non-existent. 
Dismissal of workers for bad performance is extremely difficult (though dismissal for 
political transgressions is not uncommon).
2. Wage regulations are an important tool for achieving distributive targets. One result 
of the commitment to a fairly equal distribution of income has been a highly 
compressed within-fimrwage structure.
3. Wages are a smaller part of workers’ income than in Western countries, e.g. in the 
years 1983-88 in Poland on average more than one third of workers’ remuneration 
was non-wage income. Wages also do not give an accurate picture of income 
differentials, as entitlement to consumer goods which are in short supply vary 
dramatically across firms and industries. Furthermore, they do not reflect true labour 
cost as shown in a stylized table of labour costs in Polish industry for the year 1986 
(See Table 3.1).
4. Apart from some very basic benefits like health care and education many social 
benefits are explicitly tied to the job which a worker holds. This is in stark contrast 
to the Western work environment where relatively efficient and competitive labour 
markets are supplemented by a general safety net for those who are least endowed 
and skilled.
5. The industrialization drive undertaken by all socialist regimes had to keep 
consumption low to achieve high investment rates. Since for a long time the 
development of heavy, capital intensive industry was emphasized the tendency to 
depress consumption levels was further strengthened. On the firm level high 
investment rates meant that the wage bill had to be kept as small as possible. The 
macro and micro implications of the industrialization drive resulted in an 
administered real wage below the market clearing wage.
Labour supply changes in the 1970s and the 1980s in Poland.
We are primarily concerned in this chapter with enterprises’ demand for labour. A
few words here are in order, though, on labour supply in Poland in the period under
consideration.
147
Let us write labour supply as
Ls=Ls(w;z)
where w is the real wage and z is a vector of shift variables. To z belong variables which 
relate to social policy, the legal environment and activities in the black (grey) economy and 
in the private sector. Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s changes in z caused a 
decrease in the supply of labour (World Bank, 1987, pp. 150f and Krajewski and Smusz, 
chapter 8).
First of all, a shift in social policy in the 1980s caused a fall in the participation rates 
of men and women. The government increased old age pensions and changed retirement 
policies allowing, for example, women to retire at 55 if they had worked for 30 years. The 
aftermath of the imposition of martial law saw further provisions to encourage retirement in 
general. Also in the 1980s unrecorded activities in grey/black markets increased 
substantially. The government was aware of falling participation rates and tried to counteract 
these with "antiparasitism" laws and with tax incentives to lure retirees back into the labour 
force. These counteractive measures were clearly not successful as the participation rate for 
males fell from 1.09 in 1960 to 0.89 in 1985, while the rate for females fell from 0.79 in 
1970 to 0.66 in 1985. A further ingredient determining the decline in labour supply in the 
socialized sector of the economy was the fall in hours worked due to the introduction of free 
Saturdays and the rise of incidents of absenteeism (only the two years following the 
imposition of martial law saw a temporary reversal of this trend). Finally, through the 1980s 
the labour-intensive private sector grew rapidly.
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The neoclassical demand for and supply of labour.
In the basic static neoclassical theory of the firm under certainty, the demand for 
labour is given by the first order condition of the maximization of profits: taking labour costs 
as given, the amount of labour demanded is where the marginal product of labour would 
equal labour costs (the net wage plus social security contributions and so on). The supply 
of labour is derived from the individual’s utility maximization problem. Given the above 
outlined characteristics of employment and wage setting one might pose the question whether 
it is sensible to discuss employment and wages within a neoclassical framework of a labour 
market where we have supply of and demand for labour.
This approach can be defended in two ways. First, there exists some empirical 
evidence that labour markets function partially in SEs:
1. We have labour turnover on similar levels as in Western countries.
2. Labour force participation rates are high. Taking the unit of analysis as the 
household, this can be explained as a consequence of low real wage setting (a single 
income is typically not enough to support a family), the absence of unemployment 
benefits and the tying of social safety net provisions to the workplace.
3. People are not allocated specific jobs, but rather choose them freely. Even in the 
Soviet Union we observe "the low [proportion] of job vacancies that are filled 
through any form of planned hirings" (Granick, 1987, p. 12). The standard 
neoclassical utility-maximization approach to labour supply is therefore not 
unreasonable.
Second, a simple neoclassical approach can be directly defended as providing a 
reasonable theoretical framework for the analysis of employment and labour demand in 
Poland in the 1980s.
The assumption of profit maximization is not obviously correct, to put it mildly. 
Still, as Goldfeld and Quandt (1988,1990) argue in their papers modelling the socialist firm, 
it is a sensible starting point for the analysis. Beginning in 1982 Poland implemented a
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major enterprise reform that was supposed to transform state-owned enterprises into 
independent, self-financing and profit-maximizing firms.1 Furthermore, if the neoclassical 
approach has empirical implications that are contradicted by the data, we have some 
evidence for questioning its assumptions. If our investigation shows that Polish enterprises 
did not in fact choose or adjust their employment levels in ways consistent with a 
neoclassical profit maximization model, we have shown something substantive about the 
micro behaviour of socialist enterprises.
The "bailout" or "soft budget constraint" problem should be mentioned here. The soft 
budget constraint, it is often argued, has the effect of increasing factor demand; the intuitive 
reason given is that if the state subsidizes labour costs, more labour will be demanded by 
firms.2 This simple argument does not work, however, if the soft budget constraint is a 
subsidy on profits rather than costs, since (in a simple neoclassical model) any monotonic 
transformation of profits leaves the maximization problem, and thus factor demand, 
unchanged. Schaffer (1990), using the same dataset of Polish firms as that used in this 
chapter, provides evidence that indeed subsidies to Polish state-owned enterprises took the 
form of profit subsidy, with loss-makers being subsidized at a higher rate than profit-makers. 
Goldfeld and Quandt have modelled the effect of the soft budget constraint on factor demand 
in a more sophisticated but still neoclassical fashion. They show that, in the presence of 
uncertainty and allowing for a special labour input used to "whine" for subsidies, factor 
demand is increased by the presence of a soft budget constraint taking the form of a profit 
subsidy. We do not, however, apply this analysis in our empirical work, and use instead the 
simple neoclassical formulation of factor demand.
Finally, a simple neoclassical model where firms take the wage as given and then try 
to adjust number of workers is not unreasonable for Poland in this period. Wages were
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heavily influenced by central policy, both formally, through the use of a punitive tax on 
wage increases in excess of centrally-set limits, and informally. Assuming the wage was 
centrally set and thus exogenous is not too unrealistic. Under the 1982 enterprise reform, 
enterprises were supposed to be autonomous; this included employment policy. Legislative 
restrictions on firing workers would have slowed any downward adjustment of employment, 
but this could still have been achieved by natural attrition (the annual attrition rate— 
departures/employment—for industry as a whole in the 1980s was in the range of 15-20%).
Figure 3.1 shows the two regimes which a profit maximizing firm can face in a 
simple neoclassical world with instantaneous adjustment if the wage is administratively set 
at a low level wa. The location of the firm’s demand for labour curve will above all depend 
on technology parameters, the quantities of other inputs, and the price which it can fetch for 
its product Most firms in SEs can be thought of having a demand for labour represented 
by L?. Given a wage wa profit maximizing firm will try to hire labour up to the point where 
wa equals the marginal product of labour. At this wage, however, workers are unwilling to 
supply this amount of labour, and so we see an employment level of Li and excess demand 
for labour (Lr La). There could be, however, some firms whose labour demand is 
characterized by L^, so here wa results in an employment level of L2 and excess supply of 
labour (Lj-LJ. With instantaneous adjustment, we would expect to observe most firms 
operating on the labour supply schedule; they are constrained in the amount of labour they 
are able to hire. A smaller number of firms, having a relative high administratively set 
wage, would be operating on the labour demand schedule; here, workers are constrained in 
the number of jobs they can obtain.
As long as the wage is exogenously set by the center and forced upon both firms and 
workers, it will only be by sheer coincidence that such a wage will equilibrate the demand
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for and supply of labour. The difference between the marginal product of labour and the 
wage implies an inefficiency in the allocation of labour; the larger the difference, the greater 
the inefficiency.
Excess demand or excess supply are the plausible regimes which firms and workers 
experience. An administered wage which is substantially lower than the MPL of most firms 
means most firms are in the excess demand regime; thus we would see excess demand in 
the labour market and continual shortage of labour. Another possibility is that the wage is 
set higher than the MPL of most firms. In this case, most firms are in the excess supply 
regime but seek to maintain and even increase their employment levels because of directives 
from the center to enterprises. Here shortage of labour is the result simply of these central 
directives. The third possibility is that the low wage observed in SEs is the result of low 
productivity and that the wage set by the center, while not exactly the equilibrium wage, is 
close to it for most firms.
With slow adjustment to changes the situation is somewhat more complicated. 
Labour employed by enterprises can change slowly because of difficulties in firing workers, 
training and other adjustment costs, etc. Labour supplied by workers can change slowly 
because of delays in finding a new job, costs of moving to a new location, etc. Figure 3.2 
shows the dynamics we would expect to see with slow adjustment. At we long-run 
equilibrium employment is Le, where the labour demand and labour supply curves cross. 
Below we at w1? say, employment will eventually settle down to L1? on the labour supply 
curve; to the right of the labour supply curve, firms will lose workers (despite wanting more 
of them at that wage), and to the left of the labour supply curve firms will gain workers. 
Above we at w2, say, employment will eventually settle down to L^ , on the labour demand 
curve; to the right of the labour demand curve, firms will release or not replace workers
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(despite workers wanting employment at that wage), and to the left of the labour demand 
curve, firms will hire additional workers.
The direction of labour adjustment predicted by the simple static neoclassical model 
can, given observed enterprise wages and employment and estimated enterprise marginal 
products of labour, be examined directly. Assume, for simplicity only, that neither the 
centrally-set wage nor the labour demand and supply curves are expected by both enterprises 
and workers to change. For some firms, the centrally-set wage would be below the marginal 
product of labour. In Figure 3.2, these firms lie to the left of the labour demand curve. If 
such a firm experiences a decrease in employment, it indicates that the firm is located in 
quadrant A and therefore the wage it is paying is below the equilibrium wage we. If the firm 
increases its employment, it is located in quadrant B, in which case we cannot immediately 
say whether the wage it is paying is above or below we. For some firms, the centrally-set 
wage would be above the MPL. From Figure 3.2 we can see that we would expect all such 
firms experience a decrease in their employment. Note that this will be the case regardless 
of the location of the labour supply curve. Note also that adding labour adjustment costs 
(e.g. training costs) to the model would move the labour demand curve to the left and would 
therefore not affect the predicted labour adjustment behavior of firms whose wage is above 
their MPL.
The above dynamics can in principle be formalized and estimated directly. We do 
not undertake this in this chapter, but leave it instead to future work.
A brief discussion of the phenomenon of hidden or disguised unemployment in 
socialist economies is in order here. We can define hidden unemployment as employment 
above what would be observed in a competitive economy with profit-maximizing firms (and 
utility-maximizing workers). The profit of a firm with hidden unemployment does not
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decrease if its labour force decreases. The situation is analogous to the employment of 
labour in agriculture in a Lewis-type model. In the literature on socialist economies, hidden 
unemployment is sometimes called labour hoarding. In the Western economics literature, 
however, this term usually refers to Gong run profit-maximizing) increased employment in 
the presence of output cycles; extra workers are kept on during a slump to avoid retraining 
and other costs when output picks up. We will use the latter definition of this term in this 
chapter. We note here, however, that similar cyclical effects on labour demand may operate 
in socialist economies. Socialist enterprises typically "storm", meaning that they concentrate 
their production at the end of the month or year to fulfil their output target Enterprises 
could hoard labour during slow months, in anticipation of the rush work at the end of the 
year, and still have excess demand for labour over the entire year.
In a simple neoclassical framework, excess demand for labour is inconsistent with 
hidden unemployment. Say a firm in a socialist economy faces a centrally set wage above 
we and is operating at an employment level where this wage exceeds the marginal product 
of labour. In the static neoclassical model, this means it is operating at a point to the right 
of its labour demand curve. Also say that this point is on or to the left of the labour supply 
curve, thus placing the firm in quadrant C in Figure 3.2. If the employment level of the firm 
does not adjust downwards over time, we observe persistent excess supply of labour. One 
should interpret this excess supply of labour as hidden unemployment. Excess supply of 
labour in such a firm persists because the firm cannot or will not shed labour rapidly or 
refuse employment to new workers. In a socialist economy this would likely be because it 
is prevented from doing so because the central authorities are committed to full employment. 
A firm persistently operating to the right of both the labour supply and demand curves 
(quadrant D) would also be said to have hidden unemployment. This situation is unlikely,
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however, since it implies that workers are forced to take jobs and are not free to leave them. 
Note that this means that we are likely to observe this type of hidden unemployment only 
when the wage is above the equilibrium wage we.
To generate simultaneous excess demand for labour and hidden unemployment as the 
result of some optimization process we need a more sophisticated model. For example, if 
we have heterogeneous labour and the center administratively sets the average wage we 
could end up simultaneously with excess demand for labour and hidden unemployment. 
Suppose we have skilled and unskilled labour and the central authorities impose a ceiling on 
the average wage that the firm can pay its workers. Also suppose that firms try to increase 
the motivation of skilled workers by attractive wage rises or, to put it another way, firms try 
to pay efficiency wages to the skilled part of their work force. As long as the proportion 
of unskilled workers is not too large it might pay for a profit-maximizing firm to demand 
more unskilled labour in order to enable it to hire more skilled (high-wage) labour. This 
could be the case even if the wage paid to unskilled workers exceeds their marginal 
products. There is some evidence that Hungarian firms followed such a strategy in their 
hiring decisions after the reforms of 1968.3 We do not, however, pursue this idea further 
in this chapter.
As noted in the introduction, an alternative approach to the analysis of the socialist 
labour market is to take pervasive chronic shortage throughout the economy as the starting 
point (cf. Hare, 1989). Basically there is excess demand for labour no matter what the wage. 
Firms react to the resulting shortage of labour by accumulating extra workers which in turn 
exacerbates the shortage situation. This view sees excess demand for labour and labour 
shortage as phenomena feeding on each other.
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m  Modelling Strategy
Our strategy is to specify and estimate a production function, and use the parameter 
estimates together with enterprise inputs and the enterprise wage to calculate for each firm 
an estimate of the marginal product of labour. We then compare the MPL for each firm 
with the cost of labour (the net wage plus wage taxes) for each firm. This (very simplistic) 
comparison allows us to classify firms into excess demand and excess supply regimes: 
assuming profit maximization and a well-behaved production function, if, for firm i, 
MPLj > Wj, then firm i has an excess demand for labour, and visa-versa if MPLj < Wj. The 
last step is to compare the dynamics of labour employed by enterprises in the two regimes. 
Again assuming profit maximization, and taking the wage as exogenous, ceteris paribus, 
firms in the excess supply regime should shed labour faster than those in the excess demand 
regime.
Production function estimation.
In estimating a production function for Polish enterprises in the 1980s, the single 
biggest problem faced is that of distorted output prices. Large-scale formal and informal 
state regulation of enterprise output prices means that the total sales of each enterprise are 
valued at prices which are sector- and even firm-specific. The existing literature on socialist 
economies unfortunately gives us little guidance on how we might model the price formation 
process. Nor does the data set we use contain information on the price of output; only total 
output in current prices is available.
We address this problem in a pragmatic and somewhat ad hoc fashion by using the 
panel nature of the data set. We postulate that each firm sells its output at a (relative) price 
specific to that firm. This firm-specific price fluctuates randomly over time around a mean 
"base price" which does not change over time, and thus can be viewed as "fixed effect" plus
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an error term. We assume as well that each firm is characterized by a technological level 
taking the form of a firm-specific multiplicative parameter, assumed constant over time (also 
a "fixed effect"), and a time-varying multiplicative parameter, assumed constant across firms. 
We write
Yit = PieuhtAieu2ltBtF(Lit,Kit,Mit) enterprise i, time t (3.1)
where
Yit = gross output
Pi = firm-specific "base price", assumed constant over time
ulit = white noise random error in the firm’s actual price
u2it = white noise random error in the firm’s output
A = other firm-specific attributes (technology, etc.), assumed constant over time
B = technical progress parameter, shared by all firms
L = labour
K = capital
M = materials
Writing lower case for logs, we have
yit = r  + a, + bt + fCL^K^M,,) + ulit + (3.2)
Collapsing the two fixed effects into a single fixed effect oCq and the two error terms into a
single error term u* t, and writing dt to represent a vector of time dummies to capture the 
shared rate of technical progress, we estimate
yit = do + fCLit.Kn.M.J + d, + u„ (3.3)
We use as our production function the flexible translog form: 
f(Llt,Klt,Mit) = a ,llt + Ojkj, + a 3m„
+ a 4(lit)2 + a 5(ki,)2 + a 6(m,J2 
+  Ojluk,, +  c ts l.m , +  a ^ m .,  
where again lower case letters denote logs.
Direct estimation of a production function using ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
typically subject to simultaneous equations bias; because the level of output is chosen 
simultaneously with the level of inputs used, the inputs will typically be correlated with the 
error term in the production function equation. In an economy characterized by shortage and 
excess demand for inputs, however, this is not a problem, since we can take the observed 
levels of inputs as exogenously given by some rationing process. The situation is not so 
simple here, though, since in fact we find a small but still significant number of enterprises 
are apparently in the excess supply regime and should not therefore be constrained in this 
way in their choice of labour input This suggests that simultaneous equations bias may still 
be present if we use OLS but it should be only a small problem. An alternative approach 
to this problem is to use instrumental variables (TV). Unfortunately, the data set used suffers 
from a lack of possible instruments, and when we tried using simply lagged values of 
variables as instruments we obtained very poor results.
Marginal products, excess demand and supply of labour, and labour adjustment
When we compare the MPL with the wage we use the estimated marginal revenue 
product of labour net of turnover tax, which we refer to as the "net marginal product of 
labour" (NMPL). The Polish turnover tax is a linear sales tax and so acts as a wedge 
between the consumer and producer price of a good. Profit maximization in this context 
means maximization of profits at producer prices, i.e. net of turnover tax. This approach 
seems reasonable, since anecdotal evidence suggests that bargaining between the center and 
the enterprise over turnover tax bills was not typical.
Enterprises are separated into excess demand and excess supply categories simply by 
comparing their NMPLs with their labour costs. We make no attempt to correct for the fact 
that a firm whose NMPL differs only slightly from its labour costs is liable to -be less
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reliably categorized. We then look at the change in employment by firm, measured as ln(Lt) 
- lnCLj.i), and its relationship to the sign or degree of excess demand/supply, measured as 
ln(NMPL) - ln(labour costs). Those observations where a firm is in one regime at time t-1 
and in the other regime at time t are excluded.
Data Sources. The annual enterprise-level data is from the Polish "Lista 500", the list of the 
500 largest (by sales) state-owned manufacturing enterprises in Poland, published annually 
in the Polish journal Zarzadzanie. We use data for the period 1984-88 and only for those 
enterprises which appear every year in the list Deletion of a few additional firms which are 
tremendous outliers or suspected of corrupted data reduces the sample to 350 enterprises.
Socialist economic data are often criticized on a number of grounds, and these are 
no exception. The most serious problems are:
(1) Output is measured by total sales in nominal zloty. Production data in real zloty 
would be ideal, but we can only deflate and hope for the best We make no attempt 
to construct sector-specific price indices, and use simply the implicit price deflator 
for socialized industry from the annual statistical yearbook (Rocznik Statvstvcznv) 
to put sales into approximate 1984 prices.
(2) Labour input is measured by average annual employment by the enterprise. Part-time 
workers are weighted as such. Data on hours worked is not given, nor are data on 
skill levels available. Note that in a full translog production function we cannot say 
that skill levels are in the firm-specific fixed effect because of the interactive terms 
between labour and capital and labour and materials.
(3) The figure for end-year fixed capital given in the Lista 500 is a mixed nominal/real 
number. The fixed capital stock of all enterprises was revalued at the end of 1982 
in 1982 prices, and investment and depreciation from then on was done without 
attention to inflation, which by the end of the period was substantial. We first put 
the 1984 end-year mixed nominal/real capital stock for each enterprise into 
approximate 1984 prices by using industry-wide data from the statistical yearbook on 
the discrepancy between real and mixed nominal/real capital. We then calculate 
capital in subsequent years simply by deflating, using the implicit deflator for 
investment in industry, the increment in enterprise mixed nominal/real fixed capital 
(data on enterprise gross investment and depreciation is not given).
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(4) Materials input also has measurement problems. It unfortunately includes 
depreciation of fixed capital, but this is typically small in industry (< 5%). It is 
given in nominal zloty, and we again simply deflate with the same deflator used for 
output.
(5) Remuneration is also in nominal zloty, and we again use the same deflator (the 
consumer price deflator is little different). It is composed of the basic wage plus the 
bonus paid from profit. To approximate labour costs we take the stylized ratio of 
labour costs to remuneration given by the World Bank for 1986 taken from Table 3.1 
above - 1.77 - and multiply the average remuneration for each firm by this figure. 
This approximation should be reasonable since the major missing components from 
labour costs, social security contributions and wage taxes, were (supposed to be) 
applied at the same linear rate for all enterprises. In Poland, the bonus earned in a 
year is paid in March of the following year, which poses a problem for our 
comparisons of labour costs and marginal products. We make no attempt to correct 
it.
IV Empirical Results
Production function estimates
We start out by estimating a general translog production function in levels and first 
differences; the software package used is DPD, developed by Arellano and Bond (1988). 
We use the test statistics of first order and second order serial correlation developed by 
Arellano and Bond to decide which specification will give us consistent estimates. These 
test statistics which are based on the residuals of the estimated regression are distributed as 
a standard normal as the number of observational units gets large.4 These statistics also 
allow us to say something about how likely the presence of fixed effects is or whether the 
error term is characterized by a random walk.
When we estimated the production function in levels without allowing for fixed 
effects we got massive first and second order serial correlation. Such a result is expected 
if the true model has either fixed effects or a random walk characterization of the error term. 
Of course, it could also indicate the presence of both. After estimating the equation in 
differences, however, the test statistics give us additional information about the underlying
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data generation process. To see this let us assume two different types of this process:
Model (a)
yt = XJ3 + f + Uj, t=l,...,T. y, X, have the normal interpretation of stacked vectors and 
matrices, f  is a vector of stacked fixed effects, while the error vector is distributed as white 
noise.
Model (b)
yt = XJ3 + Ut, t=l,...,T. Assume that 1^  = 11^  + ^ ,  where e is distributed as white
noise.
In model (a) we have fixed effects and white noise errors, while (b) has no fixed 
effects and random walk error terms. When we difference (a) we have negative first order 
serial correlation and no second order serial correlation. After differencing (b) the error 
terms are just white noise and uncorrelated with each other. The test statistics of serial 
correlation presented in Table 3.2 show no first order serial correlation in the differenced 
errors. This can be taken as evidence against model (a) and for the presence of a random 
walk element It is preferable, however, to perform such a test on a more general model. 
We assume an AR(1) process of the error term and the presence of fixed effects in our 
equation and use the procedures as outlined in Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan 
(1982) to estimate p and to test for a unit root. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.07 and the 
adjusted estimated p is 0.91. We then use the Durbin-Watson statistic to test for a unit root. 
Since according to the above authors the upper critical value is 0.93 under the null 
hypothesis we can reject the existence of a unit root.5
In sum, our tentative conclusion is that the data generation process is well represented 
by the presence of fixed effects and an AR(1) error process that is close to, but significantly
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different from, a random walk. Since the estimated p is nearly 1, first differencing achieves 
almost the same efficiency as quasi-differencing using this estimate. For our preliminary 
investigations, therefore, we use parameter estimates obtained from estimating the equation 
in first differences.
Table 3.2 gives the results of the estimation of the unrestricted translog production 
function in first differences form. The standard errors and the other test statistics are 
computed in such a way that they are consistent in the presence of general heteroscedasticity. 
The only coefficients which need some further explanation are the coefficients on the 
constant and the time dummies. The coefficient on the constant term gives the intercept 
coefficient for the first cross-section used in estimation, while those on the dummy variables 
are deviations from this initial intercept value.
From this general production function we want to find the specific production 
function which most closely reflects the underlying data generation process. The Wald test 
chosen by us rejects the null hypothesis that the squared and interactive terms are jointly not 
significantly different from 0, i.e. it rejects a simple Cobb-Douglas specification of the 
production function. We therefore proceed to impose a single restriction (that a coefficient 
is equal to zero) at a time on the coefficient with the lowest absolute t-value and then re- 
estimate the production function incorporating this restriction. We repeat this procedure until 
we are left with those regressors which have absolute t-values greater than 1 (except for the 
constant term, which is always retained in the equation).
The result of this "testing down" procedure can be seen in Table 3.3. The 
coefficients on the k^-term and the l*m-term were found to be not significantly different 
from 0, and in our final estimation of the production function we imposed zero restrictions 
on these two coefficients. Our calculations of marginal products of inputs, elasticities of
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substitution among inputs and degree of homogeneity of the production function for each 
individual firm were then calculated using the coefficient estimates of Table 3.3.
The estimated production function seems reasonable. Figures 3.3-3.9 present the 
distributions in the sample of the estimated marginal products, elasticities of substitution, and 
degree of homogeneity. The distributions include observations in every year on every 
enterprise. The number appearing below a bar in a bar chart is the lower bound for that bar.
Marginal products are nearly always positive, as we would expect Second 
derivatives (not shown) are nearly always negative, again as expected. The marginal product 
of capital seems plausible—usually between 4% and 20%. An interesting feature of the 
marginal product of materials is that it is generally less than one. This suggests over-use of 
materials by enterprises and is consistent with the view that socialist economies are material­
intensive. It is also an indication that the enterprises are not behaving as profit-maximizers, 
since most could increase their profits by lowering their materials usage. The elasticities of 
substitution between factors also seem plausible; all three elasticities typically lie in the 
range 0.6-0.8. Finally, the point estimates of the degree of homogeneity suggest that most 
firms faced decreasing economies of scale. Finally, Table 3.3 shows that total factor 
productivity fell by 0.6% over 1984-85 (the constant term), increased over 1985-86 by 4.3% 
(the 1986 time dummy plus the constant), by 1.7% over 1986-87, and by 0.9% over 1987-88, 
making for a total increase in TFP over 1984-88 of about 7%. By comparison, the figures 
for annual labour productivity growth in the sample were rather higher—5.8%, 9.9%, 4.0% 
and 4.6%, making for a total growth in labour productivity in the period 1984-88 of over 
24%—indicating over two thirds of the growth in labour productivity over the period is 
accounted for by changes in input usage rather than technical progress.
Figure 3.10 shows the distributions of the net marginal product of labour and labour
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costs. Note that the range of labour costs is much narrower than the range of marginal 
products. This is consistent with the earlier observation that wage scales in socialist 
economies tend to be compressed. Also note that the mean net marginal product of labour 
is clearly higher than the mean labour cost, as predicted by the simple neoclassical view.
Table 3.4 makes this last point more clearly. It compares the net marginal product 
of labour with labour costs, by year. The results are quite clear; in every year, out of 350 
enterprises, about 300 have an NMPL which exceeds the cost of labour. That is, about 85% 
of enterprises, if they were static neoclassical profit maximizers and were unconstrained in 
the labour market, would want to hire more workers at the given wage.
So far the neoclassical story is not contradicted by the empirical evidence. We now 
consider labour adjustment. Figure 3.11 shows the distribution of enterprise employment 
growth. Most firms actually shed rather than hired workers. This could be consistent with 
the neoclassical story. Labour supply to socialist industry was shrinking during this period, 
moving the labour supply curve left. Firms whose wage was set below the equilibrium wage 
we would be constrained in the labour market, and employment would decrease as workers 
left firms (see Figure 3.2). We then divide firms according to whether the wage was below 
or above the NMPL; we include only observations on firms for which this was true in two 
consecutive periods. Figure 3.12 plots the distribution of the percent change in enterprise 
employment for the enterprises in the two groups. Most (67%) of the enterprises whose 
labour costs were below the net marginal product of labour, and therefore were below the 
labour demand curve, shed labour. Based on the dynamics in Figure 3.2, this would place 
the administered wage below the equilibrium wage we, which is consistent with the simple 
neoclassical story. We are unable to say how many of the remaining 33% were operating 
with an administered wage below the equilibrium wage.
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When we consider those firms operating above the labour demand curve, we have a 
problem. According to the simple dynamics in Figure 3.2, all such firms should shed labour; 
but in fact only a little more than half (56%) did so. Indeed, a greater proportion of these 
enterprises took on more workers than did the group whose wages were below the net 
marginal products. This evidence runs directly against the simple neoclassical story of 
labour demand. Another way to see this is from the scatter plot in Figure 3.13, with the 
percent difference between the net marginal product of labour and labour costs on the 
horizontal axis and the percent change in employment on the vertical axis. We expect that 
below zero on the x-axis (or near zero, since we have only approximate labour costs) we 
should see mostly decreases in employment; but we don’t. It is interesting to note that the 
failure of firms with too many workers to shed some of them suggests the possible existence 
of hidden unemployment. We should caution, however, that the above test is based on a 
relatively small number of observations at the extreme end of a distribution.
A more econometric, but still rather ad hoc, approach to this question is as follows. 
Say that the administered wage is below the equilibrium wage we. In this case we would 
expect to see a slow movement of employment towards the labour supply curve (see Figure 
3.2). We begin by modelling this in a simple partial adjustment framework. First, say the 
long-run (log) level of employment 1* of firm i is given by some firm specific constant and 
the (log) wage, where the coefficient on the log wage p is the long-run elasticity of labour 
supply with respect to the wage:
l *t = «, + Pw-, (3-5)
Log labour adjusts according to the usual partial adjustment equation, where lambda is the
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speed of adjustment:
(3.6)
Substituting, rearranging, and adding an error term, we obtain:
h t ~ ^  ^ a i + (  ^ + ^ i t - l  + eit (3.7)
Take first differences to remove the firm-specific fixed effect and we obtain as the basic 
estimating equation:
Now consider the role of labour demand. If in fact the administered wage exceeds the
adjustment would be given by the difference between the marginal product of labour and the 
wage: if, for firm i, MPLt > wi5 then employment by firm i would increase, and visa-versa 
if MPL; < Wj. And even if the administered wage is below the equilibrium wage, we might 
still expect the marginal product of labour to influence employment. A firm with a marginal 
product of labour that exceeded the administered wage, but which was losing workers 
because the wage was below the equilibrium wage (region A in Figure 3.2), would try to 
slow the rate of labour shedding by, say, firing fewer workers than it would otherwise, or 
trying to retain those workers who have announced their intention to leave, etc. Put another 
way, in terms of Figure 3.2, we would expect the rate of labour shedding to be greater in
equilibrium wage we, then according to the dynamics of Figure 3.2 the direction of labour
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region A than in region D.
This suggests adding the ratio NMPL/(labour costs) to the partial adjustment 
estimating equation. We would expect to find a positive coefficient if firms are profit 
maximizers: the higher the value of NMPL/(labour costs), the more valuable an additional 
unit of labour is to the firm and so the increase in employment should be greater (or the 
decrease smaller).
The results of this estimation are given in Table 3.5. OLS estimation is inappropriate 
here since the lagged dependent variable, used as a regressor in the equation is correlated 
with et_j. We instrumented the lagged dependent variable with lagged values of In 1 OUJt-3 
etc.) and employed the general-method-of-moments estimator using all possible moment 
restrictions . The Sargan test indicates that our choice of instruments is satisfactory. Time 
dummies are used while industry dummies are excluded from the set of regressors6. The 
constant is interpreted as the growth rate of employment in the first period (1985-86); the 
time dummies give the deviations from this base rate. The test statistic for (negative) first 
order serial correlation is significant, the statistic for second order serial correlation is not; 
this is consistent with 8 being a white noise error term in the equation in levels, before first 
differencing. The speed of adjustment lambda (the coefficient on the change in lagged log 
employment) is highly significant, and with a value of 0.64, still reasonable. The coefficient 
on the change in the log wage has the right sign but not too well defined, and the implied 
long run wage elasticity of labour supply is quite low (0.10). Finally, the coefficient on 
NMPL/labour costs is near zero and of the wrong sign, but insignificant. We can interpret 
this as further evidence that firms are not behaving as profit maximizers; changes in 
employment do not seem to be influenced by differences between the net marginal product 
of labour and the cost of that labour.
V Conclusions
In this chapter we have estimated a production function and examined the dynamics 
of labour adjustment using data from a panel of Polish industrial firms over the period 1984- 
88. The production function estimates seem reasonable, and the finding that the marginal 
products of labour are generally above enterprise labour costs is consistent with the simple 
neoclassical model of labour demand we use. However, the dynamics of employment 
predicted by this simple model for firms whose wages exceed their marginal products of 
labour are not confirmed by the data. We also find that the marginal product of materials 
of most firms is less than one, which is also evidence against the model we use.
If the model and its estimation are correct, the results above—the failure of labour to 
adjust as predicted, and also the estimated marginal product of materials—suggest that 
socialist firms were not behaving as profit-maximizers. It is perhaps worthwhile ending this 
section with a list of possible explanations for this finding.
1. The model is incorrect A properly worked-out neoclassical model with dynamic
optimization and adjustment, expectations, etc. treated properly could yield results 
consistent with profit-maximization.
2. The model is incorrect; wages are endogenous. This could complicate the dynamics
considerably, since enterprises may temporarily lower or raise wages in order to shed 
or attract workers. For example, the fact that a firm’s wage exceeds its net marginal 
product of labour may be the result of a temporary increase in the wage in order to 
attract extra workers.
3. The production function specification is too restrictive. All enterprises are assumed
to share the same coefficients (aside from the intercept) regardless of, say, industry.
4. The data are unreliable. In particular, we do not have data on separate categories of
labour by skill level, data on labour costs are only approximations based on wages, 
and materials are measured inaccurately.
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5. The model is incorrect; socialist firms are not profit-maximizers.
As noted in the introduction, the work reported here is preliminary in nature. In the 
next stage of our work we will address (1) above directly and develop a proper model of 
employment level in socialist firms. We may also address point (2) and incorporate a theory 
of socialist wages. Estimations of the production function will allow for industry- 
specific coefficients (point 3). There is litde we can do with the data we have to enhance 
its reliability except construct industry-specific price deflators using aggregate industry data 
(point 4). And keeping point (5) in mind as we do this is a good idea.
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Footnotes
* This chapter is based on joint research with Mark Schaffer.
1. See, for example, Gomulka and Rostowski, 1984.
2. Freeman (1987) makes this argument.
3. See Berend and Rdnki, 1985, ch. 7.
4. A detailed description of these statistics can be found in Arellano and Bond (1990).
5. Of course, these statistics also strongly reject the hypothesis of white noise errors; for 
example, model (a).
6. We first included industry dummies. However, a Wald test for the joint significance of 
industry dummies produced a test statistic of 18 (with df=10) which is insignificant at the 
5% level.
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Table 3.1
Stylized Zloty Monthly Wage Costs, 1986
Basic Wage 20,000
Soc. Sec. & Payroll Tax 12,600
Social Fund 2,700
Housing Fund 1,350
Share of Profit 1,500
38,150
Source: World Bank (1987), p. 160.
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Table 3.2
Unrestricted Estimates of the Production Function
FIRST DIFFERENCES OLS
Number of firms: 350 Sample period is 1985 to 1988
Observations: 1400 Degrees of freedom: 1387
Dependent variable is: Log(sales)
RSS = 10.012823 TSS = 15.758543
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 0.003610
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 342.582198 df = 9
Wald test - jt sig of time dums: 73.588906 df = 4
Wald test selected by user: 11.639890 df = 6
(Hq: a 4= a 5=.....= a 9=0)
Var Coef Std.Error T-Stat P-Value
const -0.005970 0.006982 -0.855079 0.392508
k 0.317792 0.458386 0.693284 0.488131
1 -1.363388 0.629529 -2.165729 0.030332
m 0.795485 0.440500 1.805866 0.070939
l2 0.075495 0.049019 1.540110 0.123534
r2 0.028459 0.033395 0.852188 0.394110
m2 0.048948 0.027337 1.790540 0.073367
lk 0.054101 0.065874 0.821280 0.411487
lm -0.003170 0.061084 -0.051889 0.958617
km -0.126489 0.047740 -2.649546 0.008060
td(86) 0.049070 0.006195 7.920756 0.000000
ooT3 0.023762 0.006929 3.429582 0.000605
td(88) 0.015127 0.007420 2.038786 0.041471
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: 0.721 [ 350]
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 0.183 [ 350]
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Table 3.3
Estimates of the Production Function with Coefficient Restrictions 
FIRST DIFFERENCES OLS
Number of firms: 350 Sample period is 1985 to 1988
Observations: 1400 Degrees of freedom: 1389
Dependent variable is: Log(sales)
RSS = 10.019058 TSS = 15.758543
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 0.003607
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 298.307384 df = 7
Wald test - jt sig of time dums: 71.972309 df = 4
Wald test selected by user: 9.186939 df = 4
(Hq: a4=a6=cc7=a9=0)
Var Coef Std.Error T-Stat P-Value
const -0.006048 0.006680 -0.905360 0.365275
k 0.499796 0.371156 1.346591 0.178112
1 -1.474437 0.637567 -2.312600 0.020745
m 0.740753 0.308850 2.398420 0.016466
l2 0.059834 0.045766 1.307391 0.191080
m2 0.048605 0.026712 1.819579 0.068823
lk 0.090520 0.054959 1.647032 0.099551
km -0.122498 0.051178 -2.393553 0.016686
td(86) 0.049121 0.006273 7.830822 0.000000
td(87) 0.023697 0.006967 3.401471 0.000670
td(88) 0.015457 0.007128 2.168610 0.030112
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: 0.768 [ 350 ]
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 0.161 [ 350 ]
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Table 3.4
Labour Costs vs. Net Marginal Products of Labour
Year Number of firms (percent Number of firms (percent of
of sample) whose estimated sample) whose estimated net
net marginal product of labour marginal product of labour 
exceeded its estimated labour exceeded the sample labour 
costs. costs.
1984 288(82.3%) 280(80.0%)
1985 301(86.0%) 290(82.9%)
1986 307(87.7%) 295(84.3%)
1987 312(89.1%) 305(87.1%)
1988 307(87.7%) 295(84.3%)
Total number of firms in the sample:350.
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Table 3.5
Estimates of the Labour Adjustment Equation
FIRST DIFFERENCES INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Number of firms: 350 Sample period is 1986 to 1988
Observations: 1050 Degrees of freedom: 1044
Dependent variable is: ALog(L)
RSS = 1.358547 TSS = 1.632070
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 0.001301
TWO-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 242.054427 df = 3
Wald test - jt sig of time dums: 42.147905 df = 3
Sargan test (validity of instruments): 10.959501 df = 8
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value
const 0.002897 0.003628 0.798453 0.424608
ALog(wage) 0.037663 0.031601 1.191847 0.233321
ALog(L(-l» 0.639681 0.041367 15.463581 0.000000
NMPL/(L costs) -0.001220 0.002568 -0.475181 0.634658
td(87) -0.006896 0.004138 -1.666576 0.095599
td(88) -0.021902 0.004188 -5.229581 0.000000
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -2.857 [ 350 ]
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.152 [ 350 ]
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Figure 3.1
Labour Market Disequilibrium for an Individual Enterprise, 
Instantaneous Adjustment
L '-  U  T-, L
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Figure 3.2
Labour Market Disequilibrium for an Individual Enterprise, Slow Adjustment
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Figure 3.3
Distribution of Estimated Marginal Product of Labour
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Figure 3.4
Distribution of Estimated Marginal Product of Capital
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Figure 3.5
Distribution of Estimated Marginal Product of Materials
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Figure 3.6
Distribution of Estimated Labour-Capital Elasticity of Substitution
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Figure 3.7
Distribution of Estimated Capital-Materials Elasticity of Substitution
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Figure 3.8
Distribution of Estimated Labour-Materials Elasticity of Substitution
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Figure 3.9
Distribution of Degree of Homogeneity
Degree of Homogeneity, All Years
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Figure 3.10
Net Marginal Product of Labour and Labour Costs
Net MPL ir L Costs, All Years
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Figure 3.11
Distribution of Employment Growth
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Figure 3.12
Distribution of Employment Growth by Group of Enterprises
Distr. of AL/L, 2 Regimes
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Figure 3.13 
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Chapter 4
Flow and Stock Analysis of Polish Unemployment:
January 1990 - June 1991*
I Introduction
There have been some attempts to describe and explain the development of wages 
and unemployment in Poland in the period from January 1990 until the beginning of 
1991 (Coricelli and Revenge, 1991; Rutkowski, 1991). This chapter tries to shed 
additional light on the unemployment phenomenon as it evolved through the first 18 
months after the "Big Bang".
An economy in transition is meant to be an economy "on the move" with e.g. 
displacement of workers in the socialized sector and ultimate absorption of these workers 
(or some of them) in the private sector. It strikes us, therefore, as sensible to analyze the 
flows which occur in the Polish labour market. Since we want to probe deeper into 
unemployment we are particularly interested in the flows into and out of unemployment. 
Even though there is very little quantitative information for the reported period about 
these flows we are able to describe the composition of these flows and their main 
determinants. In conjunction with the analysis of stock data on unemployment and 
vacancies this gives us some important (and quite firmly grounded) insights into the 
nature of Polish unemployment in the period under discussion. The four most important 
insights which we gain from our analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. Throughout 1990, a very substantial portion of the growing stock of unemployed were 
people from outside the labour force.
2. There have been no layoffs on a large scale in the socialized sector.
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3. In the discussed period, demand and supply shocks were experienced across the 
socialized sector arising from the stabilization and price liberalization programme and 
have been mainly responsible for the rise in unemployment Restructuring, on the other 
hand, has not been an important source of unemployment.
4. Unemployment can be expected to rise to much higher levels in the near future if 
restructuring gets under way in earnest.
The newest changes to the Act on Employment which came into force after July 
1991 are not incorporated into this chapter as we limit our analysis to the first 18 months 
after the ,!Big Bang". The most important change is the ending of unemployment 
benefits after 12 months. As far as the labour market is concerned, we see the first 18 
months after the implementation of the reform programme as a period contained in itself 
without any major structural breaks. The chapter would in our opinion lose some of its 
cohesiveness if we included more than the first 6 months of 1991.
In the next section we present the framework of our flow analysis of 
unemployment and discuss the composition of the various flows and their determinants. 
Section 3 takes a close look at all the stock variables that are available. We then give 
some conclusions.
n  Flow Analysis of the Polish Labour Market
The main criticisms directed against flow analysis of unemployment are twofold. 
First, some economists argue that flow analysis cannot well track the dynamics of 
unemployment because the size of inflows and outflows relative to the unemployment 
stock is too large. Second, the distinctive nature of the states unemployment and out of 
the labour force is often questioned. Lehmann (1991) shows that in West European
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economies even quarterly flows are smaller than the unemployment stocks in times of 
relatively high unemployment.1 In the Polish case, after a few months in 1990, the stock 
of unemployment became quite large. We assume and we try to justify this in the 
chapter that this build-up was due to very limited outflows. The relatively slowly rising 
stock of unemployment after this initial phase under the assumption of limited outflows 
would point to a large stock relative to inflows. In the above cited paper, Lehmann also 
discusses the question whether in Poland the economic behaviour of the unemployed and 
of persons who are out of the labour force is distinct. During 1990, a substantial 
proportion of the unemployed were only on the register to receive benefits and were, 
therefore, not fully distinct in their economic behaviour from people who are out the 
labour force. This problem of coinciding behaviour has become less important after 
some changes to the legal environment towards the end of 1990.2
Analyzing labour flows in a developed Western economy one normally 
distinguishes six flows between three states: employment, unemployment and out of the 
labour force.3 In transition economies, because of the rapidly changing ownership 
structure, flows from employment in the socialized sector into private employment are 
a quintessential feature of the transition. Hence, we have twelve flows between still three 
states; however, the state of employment is subdivided into two "sub-states”, employment 
in the socialized and private sector respectively. Figure 4.1 gives a stylized picture of 
the flows which occur in the Polish economy. It shows the various flows between three 
distinct states: employment (socialized and private), unemployment and out of the labour 
force. We will mainly concentrate on the flows into and out of unemployment even 
though knowledge about the other flows helps us understand the dynamics of 
unemployment. One reason for this is that there are virtually no data available about
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flows within the employment sector and about flows from employment to outside the
labour force and vice versa.
We now derive the relationship between the present stock of unemployment and 
all past net flows into unemployment. Then, we analyze the composition of the flows 
and their determinants.
We start out with the identity
where: UT is the stock of open unemployment at the beginning of period T;
Ix is the total inflow into unemployment during the period;
Ax is the total outflow from unemployment during the period;
Equation (4.1) states that the stock of unemployment at the beginning of this 
period equals the stock at the beginning of last period plus the inflow minus the outflow 
during last period. Equations (4.2a) and (4.2b) describe the various components of total 
inflows and outflows. The inflow into unemployment during period T can be decomposed 
into the inflow from outside the labour force (Ix°), from socialized (Ixs) and private 
employment (Ixp). Total outflows from unemployment also consist of 3 components with 
the superscripts having the same meaning as the inflow equation. The inflows and 
outflows of the socialized and private sector can be further decomposed by sub-sector:
Ux+1 — Ux Ix — Ax (4.1)
(4.2a)
Ax = Ax° + Axs + Axp (4.2b)
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/ r‘-E /^  i~s,p (4-3a)
>1
Aj =Y,Ajj i-s,p (4.3b)
H
where M is here the equal number of sub-sectors in the private and socialized sector.
Active labour market policies by the Polish government are considered in these 
decompositions. We can think of direct employment schemes by the government as one 
of the socialized sub-sectors, while employment connected with loans to set up one’s own 
business or with marginal wage subsidies to private enterprises forms a sub-sector in the 
private sector.
Finally,
It/  = It/CXtj1) and ATj‘ = AjjXyTj1)
(4.4)
IT° = IT°(xx°) and At° = AT°(yT°) 
i=s,p; j=l,...,M;
The vectors Xj1 and x° are vectors of inflow determinants, while yj1 and y° characterize 
outflow determinants. They can but need not have common elements. We will discuss 
them in detail below.
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Repeatedly substituting into (4.1) gives
u T.r u 0+h i , - A )t-1
Using (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) and setting U0 = 0 we get
The first term of the outer sum corresponds to flow (7) in Figure 4.1, the first 
inner sum to flows (3) and (5), the third term of the outer sum to flow (8) and the second 
inner sum to flows (4) and (6). When discussing these flows and their determinants we 
identify them by the numbers given in figure 1.
Flow (1) - Inflow into unemployment from outside the labour force.
This flow is composed of school leavers, people who have never worked or have 
not worked recently and people who work in the "parallel economy".4 As mentioned in 
Annex 1, until September 1, 1990 all people who registered were eligible for benefits. 
After September 1, only those not working previously who had registered before were 
entitled to benefits until December 1, 1990. The imposition of the work requirement 
reduced benefit entitlements substantially. However, the large number of exceptions 
which are still provided for in the Law on Employment leads even now to many cases 
where people who never worked are entitled to benefits. One can conjecture that before 
the work requirement was introduced a large percentage of the unemployed were people 
who had no intention to work, but were just interested in benefits. For a part of those 
who are today exempt from the work requirement this is also true now.
Workers in the "parallel economy" should, of course, not be counted as out of the
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labour force and as unemployed when they go on the register. We have, however, no 
hard evidence about the proportion of this last group with respect to the total inflow from 
out. of the labour force.
What determines the size of flow (7)? We can think of 4 important determinants:
a. The legal environment;
b. The overall state of the economy;
c. The emergence of markets;
d. Mismatch.
Not much needs to be said about the first determinant; suffice it to say that the 
legal changes restricting benefit entitlements coming into force September 1, 1990 
slowed down the inflow from outside the labour force.
The overall state of the economy is most likely the most important determinant. 
With average real wages falling sharply in the first two months of 1990 and only 
recovering to 80% of the 1989 average at the end of the year (Schaffer, 1992) household 
incomes dropped substantially and forced secondary workers into the labour market. The 
recession which occurred must also have affected the "parallel economy" negatively, so 
some workers who work exclusively in the "parallel economy" and have lost their 
"parallel" jobs or are worried about their employment prospects in this unofficial sector 
of the economy might now be registered even though they are not entitled to benefits. 
Those who exclusively work in the "parallel economy" and register and therefore appear 
as part of flow (7) should not be many, though.5
We have already defined the "parallel economy" as a complementary sector of the 
socialized economy. With the emergence of markets and a demand constrained economy, 
"parallel activities" are slowly being crowded out, and the fall in employment in this
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unofficial sector will, if at all, appear in official statistics as increased inflow from 
outside the labour force.
Mismatch is an important determinant only for that part of flow (7) which is 
comprised of school leavers. Many school leavers have been trained in skills for which 
under the new economic circumstances there is little demand. This mismatch is likely 
to be made worse by a lack of general educational background and by very narrow 
vocational training.
Rows (3) and (5) - Inflows into unemployment from socialized and private sector.
We discuss these flows together as they overlap in their composition considerably. 
The inflow from the socialized sector is comprised of people who voluntarily quit6, of 
group layoffs and individual layoffs. For group layoffs and individual layoffs in the 
Polish context we need not distinguish between the population of jobs and the population 
of the employed, a distinction which might be sensible in a Western economy (Bruni 
(1988)). A person flowing out of socialized employment corresponds in virtually all 
cases to the destruction of the job which he/she occupied. Row (5) is composed of 
voluntary quits and individual layoffs - the law on group layoffs only relates to socialized 
enterprises.
We should also mention that the official figures understate the inflows from the 
private sector. We can think of two downward biases in these flows. A large proportion 
of family members who work in urban family enterprises are not officially employed. 
Upon termination of employment they are not eligible for benefits and many of them will 
not register as unemployed. In the rural areas of Poland surplus labour in agriculture has 
for many years been a major problem. After the implementation of the reform
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programme the ongoing recession has increased this surplus labour. Unemployed persons 
from the countryside commute in increasing numbers to urban centres to look for work 
without appearing, though, in official unemployment statistics.
One category of workers in the socialized sector needs special mentioning, namely 
the "peasant-workers". These are people who own some land but in their majority have 
to work in industry in order to earn enough income to provide for their families.7 They 
are discriminated against in two ways: they are the first to go when firms dismiss 
workers (basically on the insistence of the workers’ councils) and in their vast majority 
they are not entitled to benefits. The main point here is that they should appear as part 
of flow (3), but that if they are actually accounted for in official statistics form part of 
flow (12) in Figure 4.1.
So, altogether, there are in our opinion three sources for a downward bias in flows 
(3) and (5).8
The determinants of flow (3) are many and should be divided into those which 
speed up the inflow into unemployment and into those which counteract this speeding up 
of the inflow. There is a third kind of determinant which in a period of economic 
transition can at the margin slow down the inflow, i.e. active labour market policies. We 
will not discuss these policies here, however.
Determinants speeding up inflows:
a. Negative demand shocks;
b. Negative supply shocks;
c. The hardening of the budget constraint;
d. Mismatch by skill (in the long run).
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We can identify 3 main sources of a negative demand shock to Polish firms in
1990 and 1991. The stabilization policy reduced consumers’ income substantially, the 
lowering of tariffs exposed Polish firms to foreign competition and the collapse of 
CMEA-trade which began at the end of 1990 and gathered pace in the first quarter of
1991 caused a dramatic reduction of exports into this area. There were substantial 
increases over 1990 in exports to most hard currency countries in 1991 but, clearly, this 
increase might have been accomplished by firms which already in 1990 had successfully 
boosted their sales to Western countries.9
The imposition of a rational price system can imply dramatic price increases for 
essential inputs (e.g. energy and raw materials). With some real wage rigidity for those 
firms whose material costs rise in real terms layoffs would be unavoidable if they 
behaved like profit maximizing firms.
Unit labour cost can be expressed as wN/Y, where w is the real wage, N is the 
level of employment and Y  is real output. Let cmM /Y  be unit material cost, with cM 
the unit material real price and M the number of units used. On average in all 
industries10 real unit labour cost fell in the first two months of 1990 and reached at the 
end of 1990 the level of December 1989 (Schaffer, 1992). In a few sectors (especially 
energy) real unit material cost could have fallen if real material costs (cmM ) fell by more 
than real output. Real unit material cost could have remained constant if the numerator 
(cmM ) and denominator (Y ) fell by the same amount. Whether real unit material cost has 
fallen or stayed constant, in both cases a fall in output could have only been caused by 
a demand shock.
Labour cost on average is estimated to make up a quite small proportion of total 
production cost. The estimates for it range from 15 to 25 per cent Independent of this
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proportion, though, in those sectors where unit material cost rose by more than unit 
labour cost fell, a cost shock under most circumstances must have contributed to the fall 
in output.
One can think of different scenarios of the reaction of a monopolistically 
competitive profit maximizing firm to the stabilization and price liberalization11 
programme. Clearly, when we have a regime of full price liberalization an upward shift 
of the marginal cost schedule of an enterprise will result in a fall of equilibrium output. 
In the case of administered prices, however, the analysis is not quite so straightforward. 
The essential point with a regime of administered prices is that cost shocks need not 
translate into negative supply shocks. In the discussion of whether the Polish recession 
has mainly been due to supply or demand shocks this point has been overlooked. It is, 
admittedly, of minor importance and certainly not central to our flow analysis. We, 
therefore, relegate the elaboration of this point to Annex 2 where we analyze how a 
monopolistically competitive profit maximizing firm reacts under an administered price 
regime to cost shocks. Our analysis there shows that in the case of constant marginal 
cost the output decision of such a firm is independent of cost shocks and solely 
determined by the demand it faces, as long as it does not shut down. With rising 
marginal cost, a fall in demand below a certain threshold will again cause demand to 
alone determine the output level of such a firm.
One of the consequences of the "hardening" of the budget constraint should, in 
theory, be in the short run the reduction and in the long run the elimination of hidden 
unemployment. In practice, however, hidden unemployment was not reduced but actually 
increased in 1990 as overall output fell by much more than overall employment.12
199
The most important long run determinant of flow (3) is skill and regional 
mismatch which results from structural changes of an economy in transition to a demand 
constrained economy. For the period under discussion, though, mismatch by skill did not 
contribute much to the inflow into unemployment Regional mismatch, however, was a 
problem if we use the term in the sense of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), i.e. 
there was a wide dispersion of regional unemployment and vacancy rates. On the other 
hand, if we think about regional mismatch as a situation where some regions have excess 
supply of and other regions excess demand for labour, mismatch in this sense did not 
exist. In all regions there was and still is excess supply.13
Determinants counteracting the speedine up of flow (3):
a. The existence of worker controlled firms;
b. Tax based incomes policy (TIP, in Polish "popiwek").
Before discussing the above mentioned determinants, we need to address the 
question whether for state enterprises budget constraints remained somewhat "soft". At 
the beginning of 1990, a substantial part of all subsidies was eliminated; according to 
some Polish economists, however, hidden forms of subsidization of state enterprises 
played a role in keeping the budget constraint of these firms "soft". Firms, so their story 
goes, still bargained with the state about reductions of tax payments to the state budget. 
Even if many firms were not successful in their bargaining, some of them were e.g. able 
to avoid paying the "dividend” which can be thought of as a rental rate of enterprise 
capital payable to the state. We do not believe that there is much evidence for such a 
concessionary stance of the government, though. In 1990 there were hardly any loss 
makers among Polish state enterprises (Schaffer 1992). Since enterprises have to report
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their financial results monthly the ministry of finance was nearly immediately aware of 
this virtually universal good financial situation. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that in 
1990 the government saw itself compelled to grant hidden subsidies on any discernible 
scale in order to avoid the feared collapse of some of the state enterprises.
Workers’ councils have a powerful position in the enterprises and they may 
strongly influence the decisions of management Wage policies were not completely in 
the domain of firm managers. Employment decisions, on the other hand, are made within 
the firm. Managers even if they want for cost reasons to dismiss workers are essentially 
told by workers’ councils not to do so.
The TIP was introduced in order to avoid a wage-price spiral in the initial phase 
of the stabilization and price liberalization programme. Surprisingly, this incomes policy 
was not binding in the first 10 months.14 This phenomenon is somewhat an economic 
puzzle - if we take into account the powerful position of workers’ councils.
There exist various attempts to explain why wages did not rise for most of 1990 
by as much as they could have. Some authors presume that the actions of workers’ 
councils showed the rational behaviour of agents in a market economy: they were 
restrained in their wage demands because they were afraid to lose their employment in 
the face of adverse economic conditions.15 Alternatively, this phenomenon can be 
explained by a lag in workers’ adjustment to the new economic environment. Many 
factors may have contributed to this lagged adjustment. Besides the factor of voluntary 
wage restraint mentioned above, one can among others think of 2 reasons. First, 
workers’ interests could and can in theory be represented by the trade union "Solidarity" 
or by "OPZZ".16 "Solidarity" could not immediately oppose a government which in its 
entirety had come from its own ranks, while "OPZZ" as a force associated with the
previous government was at the beginning of 1990 politically impeded. So, at least in 
the initial phase of the reform programme, workers had no organization which 
exclusively represented their interests. Secondly, in the absence of well defined wage 
bargaining mechanisms, workers had to learn how to exert wage pressure.17
Furthermore, one should avoid a too direct application of the neo-classical theory 
to the behaviour of large firms in the post-command economy. These firms in such an 
economy might show a quite different responsiveness to wage changes from firms in a 
market economy. The absence of capital markets in the Polish economy can imply a 
very inelastic demand for labour as there is no opportunity cost of using retained earnings 
in production.
From November 1990, the TIP has been binding and become one of the most 
important tools of keeping wages down, hence, counteracting the speeding up of flow (3).
The movement of wages can only partially explain why the huge fall in output 
was not transformed into large outflows from socialized employment In a developed 
market economy such a transformation would have taken place because once wages have 
been bargained over employment decisions are unilaterally made by management (cf e.g. 
Layard et al., 1991). Polish managers in state enterprises have been much too weak to 
make employment decisions by themselves, workers’ councils until now seem to have 
had an important, if not the final say when it comes to firing employees. Actually, in 
many cases workers’ councils removed firm directors.18
The determinants of flow (5) are:
a. Overall state of the economy and market conditions;
b. "Hardening" of budget constraint for socialized enterprises.
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The first determinant is very straightforward. Private firms have always been 
demand constrained. Aggregate demand fell dramatically in 1990. Furthermore, input 
prices rose considerably. In 1990 the TIP did apply to private firms and might have 
determined movements of private firm wages. Since the beginning of 1991 the TIP does 
not apply for these firms, so wages since then are entirely determined inside the firm. 
In understanding the latter wage determination process one should keep in mind that 
workers have a weak bargaining position in these firms. Nevertheless, it is conceivable 
that real wages have not been flexible enough downward to fall to the level necessary to 
offset the rise in real input prices. Furthermore, there are private firms which have 
difficulties in adjusting to changing market conditions. Such firms will close down or 
lay off workers. The crucial point is that, no matter how a reduction in the output of a 
private firm comes about, this reduction will be directly translated into a fall in 
employment The amount of private labour shed should in the present Polish situation 
only be a function of technology and not also of some long-run profit maximization 
strategies.19
In the past, private firms could easily gain from wasteful operations by the state 
economy. Socialized firms could with impunity waste money and resources. The entire 
existence of some private firms was based on the utilisation of this situation, e.g. they 
bought inputs at low prices or received them gratuitously and sold their output at high 
prices. With the "hardening" of the budget constraint managers in socialized firms had 
to care about their finances. As a consequence of this some of these private firms folded. 
This "hardening" of the budget constraint also affected many other private firms which 
had only partially benefitted from the wasteful behaviour of state firm management.
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Flow (8) - Outflow from unemployment out of the labour force 
The largest part of this outflow consists of people who had registered before the 
change of the law which took place in 1990. As of December 1, 1990 they lost their 
eligibility for benefits and most of them do not believe that they can find jobs through 
labour offices. In the already mentioned survey only approximately 20 % of dismissed 
unemployed believed in the effectiveness of search through labour offices. Another 
group are discouraged workers, although we think that in 1990 it was negligibly small. 
Thirdly, people who retired while being unemployed made up part of this flow. Since 
people had the option to choose early retirement while still employed, this third group 
was very small as well in 1990.
The main determinant of flow (8) was definitely the changing legal environment. 
If, however, in the future the overall state of the economy will be depressed for long 
periods of time and this will result in the lengthening of unemployment spells we could 
see a sharp rise in discouraged workers (especially with benefits cut off after 12 months), 
thus boosting flow (8).20
Row (4) - Outflow from unemployment into socialized sector 
Clearly in the first 18 months after the "big bang" inflows into unemployment 
from the socialized sector were greater than outflows into this sector. This does not 
mean, however, that these outflows were negligible. There is evidence that in 1990 all 
sub-sectors hired substantial numbers of workers (Blaszkiewicz, 1990 and Maly Rocznik 
Statystyczny, 1991, section X). The sub-sector Communications and some other services 
actually had positive inflows into employment in 1990.
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Since the socialized sector will for a long time make up the bulk of the economy, 
increased outflows into the socialized sector will arise with positive supply and demand 
shocks.
Firms have started to be more careful in their hiring decisions. This implies that 
the mechanisms which are in operation in Western labour markets might start to work 
in Poland as well. So, workers with long unemployment spells and/or with low 
qualifications will have a low search effectiveness and might not be hired even in the 
socialized sector.
Flow (6) - Outflow from unemployment into private sector
The private sector is something of a "black box" in Poland. Data about it are not 
reliable if available at all. However, we can say with certainty that within private 
enterprises owner-managers experience few institutional constraints in their actions. 
Given this fact, we think that the neo-classical theory of the firm mirrors reasonably well 
the behaviour of Polish firms in the private sector.
There exists some evidence suggesting that wages in private firms are higher but 
not much higher than in the socialised sector (see Tulski and Wozniakowski (1990)). 
This can be given as one reason why private sector managers are able to be quite choosy 
in their hiring decision. Consequently, not many unemployed are likely to be hired by 
this sector and most of the hiring should take place through flow (l).21
Virtually all socialized enterprises after privatization will shed labour and only 
keep on part of the staff. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that these firms will hire people 
from the unemployment pool in the foreseeable future. The speed at which new private 
firms can be formed is, in our opinion, by far the most important determinant of this
205
flow. The higher investment rates from domestic and foreign sources are, the greater this 
speed. It is hard to see how domestic investment rates can become large in the near 
future given the low levels of domestic savings. On the other hand, foreign investment 
figures for 1990 and 1991 are not very encouraging either.22 So we would argue that 
this flow will, in the absence of large scale marginal wage subsidies which target the 
unemployed, stay very small.23
We first give the composition of the stock of unemployment on the basis of data 
for May 31, 199124. We do not have data on quits and the people who are exempted 
from the previous work requirement. The above quoted case study on dismissed workers 
suggests that about 10% of these workers quit voluntarily. Unfortunately we have no 
way of estimating the proportion of the unemployed who receive benefits and are 
exempted from the previous work requirement. Setting the number of these people equal 
to Z we arrive at the following composition of the stock of unemployed which we think 
is more or less representative:
Total Stock: 1434508
From Employment
Group Layoffs: 286161
HI Analysis of Unemployment and Vacancy Stocks
Quits:
Individual Layoffs: 
From Outside the Labour Force
74379 - 0.1 *Z
669406 - 0.9*Z
School Leavers: 134489
Not Entitled to Benefits: 270073
Entitled to Benefits
w/o Work Requirement: Z
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For the period in question the elements given in this table varied. On the 
dynamics of some of them we have some evidence.
In Figure 4.2 we see how the total stock of unemployment evolved over the 
period. The monthly increases varied but over the whole period we have a virtually 
linear upward trend. The variations in the monthly increases can to some extent be 
explained by the dynamics of the stock of school leavers and of group layoffs and the 
change of the legal environment as well.
At the beginning of December, 1990 the new regulations concerning benefits 
began to have an dampening impact on the stock of unemployment by causing for the 
first time relatively large outflows from unemployment out of the labour force (flow (8) 
in Figure 4.1).
Group layoffs (Figure 4.3) were rising very slowly at the beginning of the year. 
From April until the end of 1990 they rose steadily at a faster rate than the total stock 
of unemployment (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). At the beginning of 1991 this rise accelerated 
but slowed down again from February on. This acceleration for the month of January 
1991, therefore, does not hint at the beginning of some structural change. At any rate, 
the proportion of group layoffs in the total stock of unemployment still remains at a 
relatively low level, namely 20.0% at the end of the reported period (June 31,1991).
The other apparent influence on the trend of total unemployment is the stock of 
school leavers (Figure 4.6). They started to enter the labour force in July 1990, the 
evidence, however, is available from August There was a big inflow of school leavers 
into unemployment in July and August with the curve flattening out for the rest of the 
year. At the end of 1990 about 28% of the whole stock of school leavers remained 
unemployed. For the first three months of 1991, the monthly overall outflow rates from
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unemployment25 were extremely low and have only increased slightly for the months 
of April and May. If such low overall outflow rates continue for this and the 1991 
cohort, a serious build-up of long-term unemployment among school leavers will take 
place. From October 1990 to May 1991, only 18.4% of the unemployed school leavers 
were able to "escape" from unemployment. In June 1991 we see the first inflows into 
unemployment from the 1991 cohort of school leavers.
It might be of some interest to look at the development of unemployment without 
school leavers (Figure 4.7), without group layoffs (Figure 4.8) and without both groups 
(Figure 4.9).
We now turn to vacancies (Figure 4.10). With the Employment Act from 
December 29, 198926 enterprises are no longer required to report vacancies as they were 
in the past However, the dramatic drop (from 254,500 in December 1989 to 20,100 in 
February 1990) cannot be attributed to this change in the law, but must reflect a sharp 
fall in labour demand. Until the end of October 1990 vacancies steadily rose from this 
level up to 64,000. After that date a consecutive sharp decline occurred for the next four 
months with only a slight recovery in March and April of 1991. This secular fall in 
vacancies over the last eight months can be explained by competing stories. For 
example, it could come from a further fall in demand or from increased matching 
effectiveness in the labour market.
In Figure 4.11 we show the overall U/V ratio and ratios for men and women 
separately.27 There are two interesting phenomena. The overall ratio steadily rose from 
close to zero in January 1990 to 33 in June 1991. This for one clearly shows the switch 
from an excess demand to an excess supply regime in the labour market, but it also 
shows the persistence of the excess supply regime. The other phenomenon worth noting
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are the much higher levels for the female ratio. This could reflect a substantial fall in 
the demand for female labour, which seems to be a phenomenon not unique to the Polish 
transition.28 At least in the medium run this fall in demand could reverse the former 
trend of very high female participation rates.
In Table 4.2 we give a breakdown of employment by sub-sectors and its long and 
short run trends. The information contained there should allow us to say something 
about the likely sources of that part of unemployment which originates in the 
employment sector. We should point out that employment fell throughout the eighties 
and that in 1990 the trend of the previous decade was only accelerated. Our main point, 
however, is that in 1990 employment in the non-budgetary sub-sectors of the socialized 
economy fell quite evenly. This seems to indicate that demand and supply shocks 
experienced across the socialized sector have been mainly responsible for this fall in 
employment.
IV Conclusions
The two most important conclusions which we can draw from our analysis can 
be summarized as follows. In the discussed period, demand and supply shocks were 
experienced across the socialized sector and have been mainly responsible for the rise in 
unemployment, while restructuring, on the other hand, has not been an important source 
of unemployment. Unemployment can, therefore, be expected to rise to much higher 
levels in the near future if restructuring gets under way in earnest.
The analysis of Polish unemployment presented in this chapter utilizes all 
published and unpublished data available. Clearly, the paucity of the data makes it 
impossible to give a full picture of the processes having taken place in the Polish labour
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market the first 18 months after the beginning of the reforms. Nevertheless, we believe 
that combining the analysis of existing stock data with a qualitative analysis of flows into 
and out of unemployment does shed some additional light on the situation in the Polish 
labour market in its first stage of transition.
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Footnotes
* This chapter is a revised version of an article co-written with Marek Gora which 
appeared as Gora and Lehmann (1992).
1. In Western economies the observed quarterly flows are larger than annual flows due 
to "re-tripping" (Brani (1989)). We conjecture, though, that in the initial stage of 
transition there is virtually no "re-tripping". Consequently, if for the reported period we 
could observe flows, the shorter the time interval the smaller the number of people 
changing states.
2. For a description of this environment and its changes in the period January 1990-June 
1991 see Appendix 1.
3. A recent discussion of gross flows in the US labour market and their relation to stocks 
in the three states can be found in Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
4. The term "parallel economy" is not synonymous with the private economy as it is 
shown in official statistics. The "parallel economy" should be understood as a 
complementary sector of the economy, complementary to the socialized sector which in 
the past had no incentive to produce goods which were in high demand.
5. For a theoretical discussion of peculiar features of labour supply in an economy of 
transition see Gora (1991a).
6. There are no aggregate data on voluntary quits. In a not very representative survey 
9.8% of the unemployed had quit voluntarily (Spoleczne, 1991).
7. The number of people belonging to this category is approximately 2 million.
8. One should stress here that even large biases do not make our flow analysis 
problematic. Flow analysis becomes questionable when the behaviour of a large part of 
the pool of the unemployed and of people who are out of the labour force coincide and 
when "re-tripping" occurs between different labour market states during the time interval 
chosen for the analysis (Cf. Clark and Summers, 1979). The fact that e.g. persons 
belonging to agricultural surplus labour are officially not accounted for as unemployed 
job-seekers is irrelevant to our qualitative analysis of flows in the Polish labour market. 
What alone matters is that these persons behave exactly like all those officially registered 
unemployed who are without work and are actively seeking a job, i.e. that they behave 
no differently from those who are legitimately on the register.
9. For the first quarter of 1991 exports reached the following percentage levels of the 
first quarter of 1990: For Bulgaria 28,5; Czechoslovakia 87,7; Yugoslavia 32,5; USSR 
64,5; Rumania 38,1; Hungary 109,5. The corresponding figures for the most important 
hard currency countries were: FRG 142,1; France 125,5; Britain 106,9; Austria 134; 
Switzerland 164,1 (see Biuletyn Statystyczny, 4, Table 53, GUS, 1991).
10. We cannot talk about the economy as a whole since official statistics do no provide 
full information on services.
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11. According to government sources, the prices of 90 per cent of commodities and 
services have been fully liberalized. However, the prices of some commodities and 
services (e.g. energy and housing) which have a large weight in a representative 
consumer’s market basket remain under state control. Though prices of such 
commodities and services have been set at much higher levels than before January 1990, 
they still did not reach market clearing levels (at least not before the fall in demand).
12. For more details see Gora (1991b).
13. A discussion of regional disparities of U/V ratios in Poland covering the same period 
can be found in Lehmann et al. (1991).
14. During the first six months wages were below the norm, during the consecutive four 
months enterprises utilised the accumulated "credit" resulting from lower (below the 
norm) wages in the first half of the year.
15. See Rutkowski (1991) and Schaffer (1991).
16. The latter was the trade union established after the imposition of martial law.
17. At the beginning of 1990, strikes were not a means to exert wage pressure as workers 
would have struck against their "own government".
18. Detailed research of the inner institutional workings of Polish firms is need to gain 
a fuller picture of Polish industrial relations.
19. In the initial phase of transition it is highly unlikely that private Polish firms which 
are not family enterprises hoard labour during a contraction as some Western firms do 
to minimize long-run cost.
20. In the first months of 1991, as unemployment benefits were still open-ended, flows 
from unemployment into the state "out of the labour force" should have been minuscule.
21. One should note that it is possible to flow from socialized to private employment 
without changing the workplace. This occurs for those workers who have been kept on 
after their firm has been privatized.
22. An official government report states that direct foreign investment has so far been 
rather small. Most of foreign investment has occurred in the form of small joint ventures 
with foreign capital of $373,8m committed. (See Rada Ministrow, 1991.)
23. For a thorough discussion of the role of labour market policies in the Polish context 
see Lehmann (1991).
24. We choose this date rather than 30 June 1991 as this is the last data point before the 
1991 cohort of school leavers starts to enter the labour force.
25. We can think of this rate as an estimate of a person’s average exit probability during 
next month if this person finds him/herself in the pool of unemployed school leavers at 
the beginning of the month.
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26. For the source of the Employment Act see Appendix 1.
27. Until the end of 1991 Polish statistics give vacancies separately for men and women.
28. In the Ex-GDR there is ample casual evidence of the "crowding out" of female 
labour. See also the evidence on this point in Chapter 5.
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Appendix 1
Unemployment Legislation through June 1991
In 1989 and 1990 12 legislative acts were passed which concern unemployment 
and the labour market Three of them bear especially upon our analysis:
The Employment Act (passed and becoming law on 29.12.1989), the Act on Group 
Layoffs (passed and becoming law on 28.12.1989) and the Act on the Change of the 
Employment Act (passed on 27.07.1990 and becoming law on 1.09.1990).
At the beginning of 1991, the Minister of Labour and Social Policy presented the 
’Project on the Change of the Employment Act’ to the Sejm. The project foreseeing a 
few important revisions in the up to then existing legislation, especially concerning 
unemployment benefits, was passed by the Sejm after July 1991. In this annex we do not 
take these revisions into account and the description of the unemployment legislation 
presented here is based on the legal regulations being in force as of July 1, 1991.
According to the Employment Act, a person is unemployed if he/she fulfils 7 
criteria, namely: (a) is able to work, (b) is ready to work, (c) is out of work, (d) is 
registered at a local employment office, (e) does not receive a pension, (f) does not own 
his/her own business, (g) does not own his/her own farm with an area of more than 1 ha.
Eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits are as follows. An unemployed person 
is eligible for benefits if: (a) he/she has no offer of an adequate job, i.e. a job 
commensurate with education and skills and within relatively easy commuting distance, 
(b) there is no training or retraining offer, (c) there is no offer of a place on community 
public works and (d) he/she has worked at least 180 days over the last 12 months. 
Regulation (d) became law on September 1, 1990. However, people who had not worked 
but registered before this date could draw benefits until November 30, 1990. Even after 
September 1, 1990, though, many unemployed are exempted from the work requirement 
of regulation (d). So, still many people who never worked are entitled to benefits.
Unemployment benefits are paid as a percentage of the individual’s previous wage 
in the case of prior employment and as a multiple of the minimum wage in the case of 
new entrants to the labour market. Previously employed claimants receive 70% of 
previous pay for the first 3 months, 50% for the next 6 months, and 40% - after 9 
months. However, people who have become unemployed as a result of group layoffs are
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entitled to 75% of their previous pay, if they are older than 55 years (women) or 60 years 
(men). School leavers receive benefits which vary with the level of education of the 
individual and the duration of unemployment (from 95% to 125% of the minimum wage). 
Other unemployed eligible for benefits receive 95% of the minimum wage. Benefits are 
not indexed, but minimum and maximum benefit levels are explicitly set at 95% of the 
minimum wage and the average wage, respectively.
Until the ’Project on the Change of the Employment Act’ was passed by the Sejm 
benefits were open ended. After the newest novelization of the Act on Employment 
benefits are limited to 12 months.
Finally, we want to summarize the two main points of the Act on Group Layoffs. 
It applies to firms which: (a) over a span of 3 months shed at least 10% of their labour 
force (firms with less than 1000 workers) or at least 100 workers (firms with more than 
1000 workers), (b) go bankrupt, and (c) are liquidated.
The act establishes a formula for redundancy pay. Redundancy pay which is 
borne by firms amounts to one monthly wage if the employee has worked in total for less 
than 10 years, to two monthly wages for total work experience between 10 and 19 years 
and to three monthly wages for tenure exceeding 19 years.
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (January 1991).
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Appendix 2
Cost shocks in an administered price regime
Here we describe the reaction of a monopolistically competitive profit maximizing 
firm in an administered price regime. We look at the two cases of constant and rising 
marginal cost. When marginal cost is constant throughout the relevant output range the 
upward shift of marginal cost will not contribute to the reduction in output. Figure 4. A la 
demonstrates this point. Marginal cost is here equal to average variable cost, so as long 
as marginal cost is below the administered price, a profit maximizing firm will produce 
in the short-run. The profit maximizing level of output is in this case completely demand 
determined. Let us represent the demand to the firm by Dj. Consumers at the 
administered price Pa are then willing to buy Q1? consequently, at marginal cost MQ the 
firm maximizes profits with output Qj.1 As long as demand does not fall the equilibrium 
output will remain Qj even if marginal cost rises to MQ.
A monopolistically competitive firm in an administered price regime with a rising 
marginal cost schedule takes its profit maximizing output decision like a perfectly 
competitive firm, i.e. it produces where its marginal cost equals price. On the other 
hand, though, unlike the perfectly competitive firm it faces a downward sloping demand 
curve and cannot sell any quantity it likes at the administered price. So, as long as 
marginal cost intersects the administered price to the left of the demand curve (e.g. at Qj 
with demand being represented by Dx in Figure 4. A lb), the output decision is made by 
the firm. Putting it more generally, if as in Figure 4.Alb we have a fall in demand and 
a rise in marginal cost, the cost shock will only have a bearing on the new equilibrium 
level of output if the fall in demand is not too dramatic. If demand falls from D2 to D2 
and marginal cost rises to M Q the new equilibrium level of output (Q2) is determined 
by the intersection of the new higher marginal cost and the administered price. Demand 
constrains the new equilibrium level of output, however, if demand falls from Dj to D3.
AWith constant marginal, i.e. constant average variable cost, we can neglect the 
presence of fixed cost as average cost is continually declining in the relevant range.
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Table 4.1
Data on unemployment and vacancies: Poland January 1990 - June 1991
Month Unempl. Unempl Group Group U/V U/V U/V Vacancies School
'000 rate Layoffs Layoffs Total Male Female '000 Leavers
{%) '000 (as % of U) '000
1 9 9 0
JAN 55.8 0.3 2.4 4.3 2 1 3 35.2 -
FEBR 152.2 0.8 6.8 4.5 8 6 14 20.1 -
MARCH 266.6 1.5 15.2 5.7 11 8 24 24.1 -
APRIL 351.1 1.9 27.4 7.8 11 8 23 31.7 -
MAY 443.2 2.4 42.1 9.5 12 8 23 37.8 -
JUNE 568.2 3.1 58.0 10.2 13 9 30 42.5 -
JULY 699.3 3.8 79.0 11.3 15 9 36 47.7 -
AUG 820.3 4.5 100.9 12.3 14 9 33 57.3 124.2
SEPT 926.4 5.0 126.0 13.6 15 9 37 61.0 157.4
OCT 1008.0 5.5 147.2 14.6 16 9 45 64.0 164.9
NOV 1089.0 5.9 165.7 15.2 19 13 41 56.1 164.8
DEC 1124.0 6.1 183.2 16.3 21 14 40 54.0 164.3
1 9 9 1
JAN 1195.7 6.6 218.8 18.3 26 18 46 45.3 158.4
FEBR 1258.9 6.8 236.7 18.8 30 20 53 42.2 156.1
MARCH 1322.1 7.1 250.5 18.9 29 19 56 45.8 153.4
APRIL 1370.1 7.3 268.9 19.6 27 18 57 49.9 145.2
MAY 1434.5 7.7 286.2 19.9 31 19 66 47.0 134.5
JUNE 1574.1 8.4 315.3 20.0 33 21 74 47.4 144.2
Source: "Informacja Sygnalna" (twice monthly), Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy.
Informacja Statystyczna" (monthly), GUS.
Notice: Unemployment and vacancies are recorded at the end of the month.
Table 4.2
Employment in the Polish economy*
1980 1989 1990
SECTORS EMPLOYM.
thousands
EMPLOYM.
thousands
EMPLOYM.
thousands
BMPL. 
GROWTH 
from 1980
EMPL. 
GROWTH 
from 1989
TOTAL
Socialized Sector 
Private Sector
17333.7
12717.9
4615.8
17129.8
12054.6
5075.2
16501.3
10927.9
5573.4
-4.8%
-14.1%
20.7%
-3.7%
-9.3%
9.8%
NON-AGRICULT. 
PRIVATE SECTOR 611.7 1515.2 2004.2 227.6% 32.3%
MANUFACTURING 
& MINING
Socialized Sector 
Private Sector
5244.9
4973.2
271.7
4894.3
4176.9
717.4
4610.6
3755.6 
855.0
-12.1% 
-24.5% 
214.7%
-5.8% 
-10.1% 
19.2%
CONSTRUCTION 1336.6 1318.3 1242.0 -7.1% -5.8%
Socialized Sector 1234.2 963.8 829.7 -32.8% -13.9%
Private Sector 102.4 354.5 412.3 302.6% 16.3%
AGRICULTURE 5143.1 4522.9 4424.8 -14.0% -2.2%
Socialized Sector 1139.0 962.9 855.6 -24.9% -11.1%
Private Sector 4004.1 3560.0 3569.2 -10.9% 0.3%
FORESTRY 164.0 148.5 134.0 -18.3% -9.8%
Socialized Sector 155.0 140.0 125.4 -19.1% -10.4%
Private Sector 9.0 8.5 8.6 -4.4% 1.2%
TRANSPORT 959.0 810.3 761.5 -20.6% -6.0%
Socialized Sector 948.2 765.0 695.8 -26.6% -9.0%
Private Sector 10.8 45.3 65.7 508.3% 45.0%
COMMUNICATIONS 160.3 168.3 170.6 6.4% 1.4%
Socialized Sector 160.3 168.1 170.3 6.2% 1.3%
Private Sector - 0.1 0.3 - 200.0%
TRADE 1304.7 1458.7 1388.5 6.4% -4.8%
Socialized Sector 1259.0 1341.7 1073.0 -12.6% -18.0%
Private Sector 45.7 117.0 315.5 590.4% 169.7%
PUBLIC UTILITIES 401.3 432.2 427.4 6.5% -1.1%
Socialized Sector 328.8 321.1 308.3 -6.2% -4.0%
Private Sector 72.5 111.1 119.1 64.3% 7.2%
HOUSING 200.4 210.0 199.3 -0.5% -5.1%
Socialized Sector 197.2 208.4 197.7 0.3% -5.1%
Private Sector 3.2 1.6 1.6 -50.0% 0.0%
RES. & DEVELOP. 148.5 112.1 97.6 -34.3% -12.9%
Socialized Sector 148.5 112.1 96.2 -35.2% -14.2%
Private Sector - - 1.4 - -
EDUCATION 747.4 1077.7 1100.6 47.3% 2.1%
Socialized Sector 747.4 1077.1 1096.8 46.7% 1.8%
Private Sector - 0.6 3.8 - 533.3%
Table 4.2 (continued)
Employment in the Polish economy*
1980 1989 1990
SECTORS EMPLOYM.
thousands
EMPLOYM.
thousands
EMPLOYM.
thousands
EMPL. 
GROWTH 
from 1980
EMPL. 
GROWTH 
from 1989
CULTURE & ARTS 
Socialized Sector 
Private Sector
82.7
82.3
0.4
124.4
116.9
7.5
119.4
108.4 
11.0
44.4%
31.7%
2650.0%
-4.0%
-7.3%
46.7%
HEALTH CARE
& SOC. WELFARE 598.7 872.2 901.3 50.5% 3.3%
Socialized Sector 598.7 869.2 892.9 49.1% 2.7%
Private Sector - 3.0 8.4 - 180.0%
SPORT, TOURISM
& RECREATION 103.8 132.3 112.7 8.6% -14.8%
Socialized Sector 103.2 121.3 94.6 -8.3% -22.0%
Private Sector 0.6 11.0 18.1 2916.7% 64.5%
PUBLIC ADMINISTR. 
& JUSTICE 227.4 260.7 259.7 14.2% -0.4%
Socialized Sector 227.4 260.7 258.5 13.7% -0.8%
Private Sector - - 1.2 - -
FINANCE & INSURAN. 157.1 172.4 181.3 15.4% 5.2%
Socialized Sector 157.1 172.4 179.5 14.3% 4.1%
Private Sector - - 1.8 - -
MATERIAL SPHERE 14828.3 13885.9 13296.4 -10.3% -4.2%
NON-MATER.SPHERE 2505.4 3243.9 3204.9 27.9% -1.2%
* Tearly averages.
Source: "Rocznik Statystyczny 1990", 6US, Warszawa.
Unpublished data provided by 6US. Own calculations.
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Figure 4.1
Labour Flows in an Economy in Transition
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Figure 4.1 (continued)
Explanations
We have 3 general states: employment (E), open unemployment (U) and "out of the 
labour force" (OLF). Any economy (and certainly an economy in transition) does not 
have constant stocks, but in our figure this is assumed for expositional ease.
There are the following stocks:
Es = employment in socialized sector, including employment on government schemes.
Ep = employment in private sector, including employment resulting from schemes which 
help unemployed persons to set up their own business.
The leftward moving broken line represents growing private sector employment in a 
constant pool of employed.
U = Open Unemployment; OLF = Out of the Labour Force.
We have the following 12 flows:
(1) : Transition from socialized to private sector.
(2) : Transition from private to socialized sector.
(3) : Inflow into unemployment from socialized sector.
(4) : Outflow from unemployment into socialized sector.
(5) : Inflow into unemployment from private sector.
(6) : Outflow from unemployment into private sector.
(7) : Inflow into unemployment from outside the labour force.
(8) : Outflow from unemployment out of the labour force.
(9) : Inflow into private employment from outside the labour force.
(10): Outflow from private employment out of the labour force.
(11): Inflow into socialized employment from outside the labour force.
(12): Outflow from socialized employment out of the labour force.
Figure 4.1 shows an already large private sector. It in so far reflects an economy like 
the Polish one where throughout the eighties the private sector was quite large and 
growing. See Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 - Total unemployment: Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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Figure 4.3 - Group layoffs : Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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Figure 4.4 - Total Unemployment and group layoffs 
Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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Figure 4.5 - Group layoffs as a percentage of unemployment 
Poland  (Jan 9 0  - J u n e  91)
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Figure 4.6 - Unemployed school leavers - Poland (Aug 90 -June 91)
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Figure 4 .7  - Unemployment and unemployment w/o school leavers 
Poland (Aug 90 - June 91)
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Figure 4.8 - Unemployment and Unemployment without group layoffs 
Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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Figure 4.9 - Unemployment & Unemp. w/o group layoffs & school leavers 
Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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.^Unemployment w/o group layoffs & school leavers 
For July 1990 we assume 62 000 unemployed school leavers. 
Source: GUS.
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Figure 4.10 - Total Vacancies : Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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Figure 4.11 - U/V Ratios : Poland (Jan 90 - June 91)
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M C , P Figure 4.A1a
Output Adjustment with Constant Marginal Costs
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Figure 4.A1b
Output Adjustment with Rising Marginal Costs
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Chapter 5
The Eastern German Labour Market in Transition:
Gross Flow Estimates from Panel Data*
I Introduction
On July 1 1990 monetary and social union between the GDR and the Federal 
Republic of Germany took place, followed by political union on October 3 1990. Wages, 
salaries and pensions of GDR residents were converted into West German Marks at the 
rate of 1 to 1. At this exchange rate, allied with the political pressure for eastern wages 
to rise, the opening of the East German economy to world markets resulted in a sharp 
fall in economic activity, unprecedented in German history (Emmerich (1991)). The 
process of transition between planned and market economy has been associated with 
sharp falls in output and employment throughout Eastern Europe (see Estrin, Schaffer and 
Singh (1992)). Explanations have pointed to the collapse of the CMEA trading bloc, a 
price-cost squeeze at the enterprise level and a decline in domestic demand associated 
with significantly reduced real wages (Gomulka (1991), Schaffer (1992)). In the case of 
the former East Germany, Akerlof et al. (1991), have also pointed to the ’price-cost 
squeeze’ which enterprises experienced due to monetary union between the Ostmark and 
the Deutschmark at favourable terms for East German consumers, but not producers.
In terms of the labour market, the process of transition is likely to be associated with 
increases in the stock of unemployment, both because of a dramatic increase in outflow 
from employment as firms reduce their labour forces in response to the recession and 
restructuring and from a decline in inflows to employment because the harsher financial
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climate reduces the ability of even potentially profitable firms to recruit new workers1. 
There has been considerable speculation about the likely labour market transition, but to 
date no solid evidence. For example, in Poland, Chapter 4 suggests that labour market 
transitions will be accompanied by moves out of the labour force by certain groups, most 
notably women, associated with changes in the benefits system and the pattern of labour 
demand. Lehmann et al. (1991) also observe pronounced regional differences in U/V 
ratios which are driven by differences in vacancy rather than unemployment rates. This 
can be taken as indirect evidence that while unemployment outflows differ by region, 
flows from employment do not Our aim in this chapter is to provide more formal 
evidence on this important question by using the first available longitudinal panel on 
workers in an economy in transition to quantify and explain the flows between various 
labour market states2.
Transition entails displacement of workers in the socialized sector and ultimate 
absorption of these workers (or some of them) in the private sector. The analysis of 
flows and their determinants strikes us, therefore, as especially useful when discussing 
developments in the labour market of an economy in transition. In the East German case, 
where large sums are being spent on labour market policies, flow analysis might also be 
helpful in the ’fine tuning’ of such policies. Certain sub-pools of the unemployed might 
be characterized by relatively low unemployment outflow rates and should, then, be 
specifically targeted. In other transition economies, very low unemployment outflow 
rates for many sub-pools of the unemployed would, given the lack of funds for passive 
and active labour market policies, imply the need for a slow reform process.
Our objective is to document what happened to certain groups of the labour force 
differentiated by demographic characteristics and by industrial sector, in the first phase
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of economic transformation and what might happen in the near future. In doing so, we 
test whether standard models of the determination of labour market transitions applied 
to Western economies can provide a useful starting point for the investigation of labour 
market flows in a transforming economy.
The next section describes developments in the East German labour market since 
July 1990 using aggregate data, while section ID discusses the micro data and the 
estimation procedures used in the analysis. Section IV presents and interprets the 
estimated labour market transitions and our regression results. The final section, then, 
summarizes the main findings.
II Developments in the Eastern German Labour Market
A general overview of developments in the East German labour market can be 
found in Bosch and Knuth (1991) and Emmerich (1991). Here we confine ourselves to 
a brief analysis of some of the aggregate data which have been collected by East German 
employment offices.
Since the collapse of the former GDR in late 1989, employment fell from 9.2 
million in September of that year to 8 million in November 1990 and to 7.1 million in 
July 1991. This last figure excludes 400,000 employed residents who commute to West 
Germany. There are no certain figures on migration, but estimates speak of about 10,000 
net outward migrants per month in 1991. The true fall in the demand for labour is 
greater than these numbers suggest. As Table 5.1 shows, the introduction of ’short-time 
work’ (’Kurzarbeit’) has been one of the major tools to deal with the output decline. The 
column headed ’fteusw’ in Table 5.1 gives the full-time equivalent of unemployment
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calculated from the stock of ’short-time workers’3. From August 1990 until the middle 
of 1991 this type of unemployment has been persistently higher than open (registered) 
unemployment. People on training and job creation schemes, i.e. active labour market 
policy (ALMP) measures, would in the absence of these schemes be unemployed. These 
two groups, full-time equivalent unemployment connected with short-time working and 
open unemployment sum to the stock of total unemployment4; the number of people 
who would be unemployed if there were no ALMP and no provision for short-time work. 
Participants of early retirement schemes are on purpose excluded from the stock of total 
unemployment, even though they are until retirement age financed by the unemployment 
benefit system5.
While open unemployment appears only to rise for the first year and a half, total 
unemployment on our measure jumped dramatically in August 1990 (caused by a sharp 
rise in short-time work) and showed an upward trend until June 1991 (Table 5.1). Until 
this last date the gap between the two stocks widened and then remained virtually 
constant for the rest of 1991. At the beginning of 1992, with many short-time contracts 
running out, open unemployment rose sharply6. At the end of the period the open 
unemployment rate has reached around 15 per cent from around 3 per cent while the total 
unemployment rate rose over the two year period from 5% to 26% (Figure 5.2).
Additional information can be obtained from aggregate data on flow variables in 
Table 5.27. Inflows into open unemployment originating nearly entirely from the 
employment state were for most of the period higher than outflows. Figure 5.3 points 
to the three months when there were large temporary increases in inflows. In January 
1991 large lay-offs occurred after the first All-German elections, while the second largest
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inflows during the entire period were in July 1991 when short-time work contracts for 
many workers expired. In January 1992 the same occurred on a larger scale. Political 
decisions by the federal government (e.g. not to extend short-time work contracts) rather 
than economic causes underlie the three spikes in these inflow data.
There seem to be quite large outflows from the beginning of 1991, though these 
aggregate outflow figures do not allow us to quantify the transitions between different 
labour market states. Table 5.2 shows that inflows into training schemes are for most of 
1991 nearly as large as outflows from open unemployment. We can conjecture that 
many of the unemployed flowing out of open unemployment move into training schemes. 
In our conception such flows do not reflect a change in labour market state. The same 
holds for job creation schemes. Figure 5.4 brings outflows from open unemployment and 
the sum of the inflows into training and job creation schemes together. From April until 
December 1991, the combined inflows into training and job creation schemes are larger 
than outflows from open unemployment. This can be explained by the modified 
regulations governing the application of ALMP in Eastern Germany. In contrast to 
Western Germany, workers need not be on the unemployment register to qualify for an 
ALMP measure, they can go directly from employment onto a measure if they are laid 
off. We, therefore, have no way of telling how much of the outflow from open 
unemployment is flow out of the labour force, inflow into employment and outflow into 
ALMP measures. Furthermore, there are no aggregate data on the bilateral flows 
between employment and the state out of the labour force. It is therefore impossible to 
calculate the magnitudes of transitions between states using aggregate data.
The EER-Labour Market Monitor data set, on the other hand, can be used to
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estimate gross flows between states and to analyze the determinants of labour turnover. 
We undertake this in the next two sections.
m  Micro-Data and Estimation
The micro-data evidence for a labour market in transition is taken from the EER- 
Labour Market Monitor, a survey of 10,751 randomly selected individuals resident in the 
former German Democratic Republic in November 1990. The study is longitudinal. 
Participants are interviewed at four monthly intervals and it is these responses which 
enable the construction of a transition database. The sample used in this study is not 
entirely random. Attrition between the first two interview dates reduced the sample to 
8,665 valid responses, which subsequently fell further to 7,605 in the third wave and 
6,752 in the fourth. Our analysis is based on the 6,752 who provided responses for all 
four waves of the panel.8 The appendix addresses the attrition problem in more detail 
and offers tentative support to the idea that attrition may not bias the estimated transitions 
substantially. The overwhelming cause of attrition is non-response and not migration. 
Only 0.6% of the original sample left for the West over the period. The reported results 
are nevertheless subject to the omission of non-respondents and migrants.
The underlying analytical approach follows Marston (1976), Toikka (1976) and 
Clark and Summers (1979,1982a, 1982b), among others, in assuming that movements 
between states are governed by a Markov process. Hence the probability of transition 
between labour market states depends only on the state currently occupied. This seems 
appropriate for an economy subject to a sudden structural shock where individual work 
histories will be of lesser importance. The labour market is divided into three states: 
employment (E), unemployment (U) and outside the labour force (N).9 This implies nine
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potential transitions which can be represented by the following matrix, Ph.
EEh EUh ENh 
UEh UUh UNh 
NEh NUh NNh
(5.1)
where UE^ for example, represents the probability that individual h is observed employed 
at time t, conditional upon being unemployed at time t-1. The gross probability of 
transition from state i to state j is given by
P.. -  i j - e yu,n (5.2)
where Fy is the number of individuals in state i in November 1990 and in state j in, say, 
March 1991, while Ss is the origin stock in November 1990. Under Markovian 
assumptions duration of state occupancy is exponentially distributed and given by the 
reciprocal of the outflow rate
1
j*1 (5.3)T.pa
J
Alternatively, average duration is given by
Duration - ---- —  (5.4)
EU + NU
where L=E+U+N .
Construction of gross flows enables the estimation of a vector of steady state, 
(ergodic) proportions, e={ee, eu, en}. The equilibrium condition that all inflows into the 
state equal the sum of the outflows, corresponds to Pe = e, where P is the estimated
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transition matrix. In practice, e is given by the eigenvector corresponding to the unit 
eigenvalue of P, subject to the constraint that the sum of the elements in e equal one. 
Conditional on the continuation of the observed flow pattern throughout the transitionary 
period, such an estimated steady-state distribution provides an indication of the eventual 
composition of the Eastern German labour market following unification.
Individual transition equations are estimated by multinomial logit regression. The 
Markov probability of moving between states of the labour market thus becomes a
function of the personal characteristics and local economic environment observed before
any transition took place. Separate equations for men and women are presented since, 
as the data show, the labour market facing the two groups is quite distinct.
The probability of an individual moving from origin to destination state during 
the sampling interval is given by
EXP(B;Z.) (c cx
Pr[Yr f] = -----------L L J l jjc « 1,2,3 ^
'£EXP(BtZi)
k
where Z is a vector of personal and origin state characteristics.
The log likelihood for the sample is therefore
»-i y - i
3
L n L  Y , Da Ln Pri Yr i \  (5-6)
where Dy equals one if the worker is observed in state j and zero otherwise. The 
interpretation of the regression coefficients is not straightforward and is best thought of 
as capturing the relative likelihood of being in each state. The marginal impact of a
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single explanatory variable, Zj, on the transition probability to state j, Pj5 is given by
dP.  _
- 1  - pp. - y , pt * J (5'7>
i *
where b is the appropriate element of the parameter vector B. Hence the magnitude, and 
even direction, of a variable’s influence depends on the choice of Pj.10 In the 
regressions which follow we present estimates of both coefficients and marginal impact 
evaluated at the sample mean transition probabilities, in order to aid the exposition. No 
attempt is made to model the instantaneous probability of transition, i.e. the hazard rate, 
given the absence of continuous duration data. Estimation of separate four-monthly 
transition probabilities is precluded by the small number of transitions between successive 
waves. Further, not all covariates are present in every wave, preventing pooling of the 
data. Thus we are obliged to conduct longer interval estimation. However, if there are 
few multiple movements over the sample period, the efficiency gain afforded by the 
larger number of transitions obtained when estimating longer interval probabilities should 
outweigh the bias arising from round-tripping11.
IV Results
Table 5.3a presents gross annual transition probabilities of various age and sex 
groups into all three states between November 1990 and November 1991. If the 
transitions were governed by a Pure Markov process (homogeneous, stationary rates) then 
each individual would face transition probabilities given by row 1. The majority of 
individuals have remained in the same state over the sample period, as evidenced by the 
high figures for EE and NN; 84% and 80% respectively. However, Wadsworth (1989) 
estimates an annual EE probability of 93% using annual survey data for Britain during
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the slump of the early eighties. Further, as the appendix indicates, the incidence of 
migration over this period was insufficient to affect these figures to a large extent. The 
magnitude of the shock to employment in the former GDR, (a 16.4% annualised fall), 
appears to have affected a greater proportion of the workforce than in a Western 
economy under recession. There is evidence, (see Wahse et al. (1992)) for those 
workers in establishments under the control of the Treuhand, approximately 50% of 
employment in January 1991, that most of these outflows were a result of labour 
shedding. The existence of severance packages financed by the Treuhand and the state 
may have encouraged early retirement among older workers. Certainly the highest 
employment outflow rates are for older workers, (rows 6 and 9) and the majority of these 
flows are out of the labour force. The magnitude of these flows, 24% for men, is twice 
that observed for Britain in 1983-84. Rates of labour force withdrawal for other age 
groups are comparable with western economies.
The loss of employment is only partially offset by the creation of new jobs, the 
flows UE and NE. The relative magnitudes of employment inflows, the unemployed and 
out of the labour force stocks multiplied by the appropriate inflow probabilities, implies 
a net employment loss of 10.3% over the year, again higher than in the West.12 Higher 
employment outflows contribute principally to this observation. The estimated rate of 
job accessions, UE and NE, are broadly comparable to estimates from the United States 
(Clark and Summers (1979)) and Britain (Wadsworth (1989)), 25.4%, 2% in the former 
and 28.4%, 15.1% in the latter.
The existence of differential labour market experiences between men and women 
is highlighted by rows 2 and 3. Women are more at risk from loss of employment than 
men. At the same time, their chances of obtaining a job, the combined effect of UE and
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NE, are some 5 percentage points lower. In Britain, unemployed women have larger 
unemployment outflow rates than men, mainly because the pattern of job creation, 
principally in service industries, favours the employment of women. As yet, job creation 
in the former GDR does not mirror this pattern (see Table 5.4 below). Rows 4 to 9 
outline the influence of age on transition probabilities. As in the West, prime-age 
workers enjoy greater employment stability and labour force attachment. The duration 
of unemployment for many older workers is shorter due to the increased likelihood of 
labour force exit. Younger workers face preferential hiring rates.
Table 5.3b presents a similar analysis utilising four-monthly flow data derived 
from each successive wave of the panel. The general pattern is similar to the annual 
transitions. The labour market experienced a sharp increase in turnover between the third 
and fourth waves of the survey. The termination of many short-term working 
agreements, introduced one year earlier, around this time underlie this rise in employment 
flows, (see also Figure 5.3). Unemployment accessions also rose, primarily among 
women, though insufficiently to prevent the employment stock falling further. The 
observed four-monthly flows help to confirm that, during this phase of transition, the 
eastern German labour market was not subject to frequent changes of state by its 
workforce. Only 8.6 % of the unemployed stock made multiple moves over the year, of 
which 3.2 percentage points returned to the origin state. This compares with 48.6% who 
made just one move. The potential for underestimating the extent of labour market flows 
when using annual estimates therefore, in this instance, is not large.13
Using either equation (5.3) or (5.4), then the average completed duration of 
unemployment rose from around 11 to 16 months between November and March, but 
declined back to around 11 months, (8 months men, 15 months women) by July 1991.
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The latter fall however, is equally distributed between accessions and labour force 
withdrawals. In Britain the average duration of unemployment was around 9 months 
during the recessionary years of 1983 - 1986 (Layard et al. (1991), p. 224). Bellmann 
and Lehmann (1991) show that the high proportion of long-term unemployed in the total 
stock contributes substantially to estimates of completed duration for Britain. Table 5.4 
outlines the composition of the unemployed stock in November 199114. Only 18% had 
been unemployed for more than one year. Further, duration-specific employment inflow 
rates vary by only 4.4 percentage points between the less than 4 month and greater than 
8 month categories, (8.9, 1.9 points for men and women respectively). Unemployment 
duration in Eastern Germany, already comparatively long, is at this stage of the 
transformation process not a function of the persistence of unemployment, but appears 
to be principally determined by the inability of the labour market to retain and absorb 
workers. However, unless unemployment outflow rates rise above current levels, then 
a build-up of long-term and persistent unemployment seems inevitable.
The steady state distribution implicit in these transition estimates is given in Table 
5.3c. Were this pattern of behaviour to continue then the labour force would shrink from 
81% to 68% of the population of working age, some 1.2 million individuals, and the 
unemployment rate would stabilise at around 10.7% or approximately one million (6.1% 
for men and 16.1% for women). This compares with 71.8% and 4.9% for West Germany 
in 1989. So whilst the labour force becomes broadly comparable with that of the western 
part of the country prior to unification, the steady state unemployment rate in the East 
remains twice as high. When disaggregated by sex, the large male EN and UN flows 
engendered by the transformation process over the sample period result in a higher 
eventual incidence of labour force withdrawal in equilibrium than for women15. This
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is, of course, in stark contrast to West Germany where in 1989 the proportion of women 
not in the labour force was higher by about 28 percentage points. Women may remain 
in the Eastern labour force due to less generous severance packages given to non­
household heads. Over the sample year, Table 5.3c also shows the changing stocks of 
the working age population. The stocks for women display a more rapid convergence, 
commensurate with the disproportionate shock felt by the female labour market after 
unification.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present annual transition probabilities with different 
disaggregations. The employment state is divided into nine or four sectors respectively 
and the unemployed and those on training schemes are categorised separately in an 
attempt to address the role of active labour market policies as the infrastructure of the 
economy is reorganised away from sectors, and their associated bureaucracies, favoured 
under central planning. Those engaged on job creation schemes cannot be identified 
separately and appear as employed. Table 5.5 gives the maximum disaggregation of 
employment which can be recovered from the data. The number of annual transitions 
between some of the employment sectors is, however, quite small and the estimated 
transition probabilities may be subject to sampling error and should be treated as 
somewhat tentative. To reduce sampling error transition probabilities are also calculated 
for an employment state disaggregated into only four sectors.
The estimated annual outflow rates in Table 5.5 are highest for agriculture and 
manufacturing, lowest for transport, finance and other services. Displaced workers in 
agriculture and manufacturing are equally likely to be absorbed by other industries. In 
contrast, workers in the distribution services, primarily retail workers, are twice as likely 
to leave employment than find jobs elsewhere. Only the financial sector, construction
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and other services experienced net employment growth, as inflows exceed outflows over 
the sample period. A large proportion of these inflows were from outside the labour 
force. The high growth rate for the financial industries is symptomatic of a sector which 
was hitherto negligible. Other services are the main recipients of workers from outside 
the labour force and indeed from all sectors.
There are also smaller unemployment outflows into construction and the 
distributive trades. This, despite a large outflow rate from the latter. This is probably 
the result of a rundown of the old state trading agencies and retail outlets and their 
replacement by larger new firms and western-owned stores. Many of these employment 
inflows will be into job creation schemes with finite duration. The majority of these 
sectoral flows occurred after July 1991. The enhancement of the job creation scheme 
programme, the ending of short-time work together with the establishment of 
administrative and legal structures compatible with a market economy around this period 
should have helped stimulate the observed increase in turnover.
The last row of Table 5.5 gives the ergodic distribution of the population of 
working age corresponding to the observed annual transition probabilities. If flows 
continued as in the reported period for the foreseeable future, the Eastern German labour 
market would arrive at this composition in the steady state. The proportions in 
manufacturing, mining and agriculture become strikingly small, while within the 
expanding services sector financial services remain surprisingly low. Calculating ergodic 
distributions on the basis of "one data point" may only be sensible if the assumed 
continuity of flows holds, i.e. if the parameters underlying labour market flows do not 
change dramatically during the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. 
Theory might predict dramatic changes. However, the flows in the Eastern German
labour market in the reported period were above all determined by a rising wage- 
productivity gap, a lack of demand for domestically produced goods (within the country 
and in the former CMEA trade area), a relatively low private investment rate, caused 
mainly by the very slow process of establishing property rights and the immense clean-up 
costs of a polluted environment (Dombusch and Wolf (1992)). Finally, a wide-ranging 
set of passive and active labour market policies also had a great impact on labour market 
flows. Given current information, it is hard to see how a dramatic change in these 
parameters can come about in the near future. Even under a changing economic 
environment the ergodic calculations illustrate the likely direction of the adjustment 
process.
In equilibrium, nearly one third of the population of working age have left the 
labour force, 6.8% are on the unemployment register and 2.8% on training schemes. In 
Table 5.3a the unemployed and those on training schemes are both categorized as 
unemployed, hence the steady state estimates using both classifications are similar16. 
The figure for training scheme participants implies a steady state stock of approximately 
250,000 which seems of the right magnitude given the large further training and 
retraining needs of the Eastern German labour market in the coming years.
Comparing the employment structure at the beginning of the reported period and 
in the steady state we see a tripling of the share of the financial sector and a 25% rise 
in other services. With the exception of construction the shares of all other sectors 
decline with the greatest losses in agriculture, mining (a sector seemingly bound for 
extinction) and metal manufacturing. With the construction sector booming (Dombusch 
and Wolf(1992)), the small rise in its share of employment points to a more efficient use 
of labour.
242
Table 5.6 and Figure 5.5 give distributions of the working age population with 
employment being divided into the sectors agriculture, production, transport and trade and 
services. They show that in equilibrium production will fall by 20.3 percentage points 
while services will rise by 8.2 percentage points. Large movements out of the labour 
force and a rise in the proportion of the unemployed and training schemes imply a sharp 
contraction of employment.
Past employment distributions for West and East Germany and the future 
employment structure of Eastern Germany based on the ergodic distribution of Table 5.6 
are shown in Figure 5.617. The chart for West Germany represents the sectoral division 
of a highly developed market economy. One possible adjustment path of the Eastern 
German labour market is convergence to its West German counterpart. Chart 4 in Figure 
5.6 seems to point to a quite different sectoral division of the future Eastern German 
labour market Our calculations indicate that employment in agriculture will shrink to 
only 2.2% while employment in transport and trade will slightly exceed the West German 
proportion of 19%. Most strikingly, however, the estimated flows imply a very large 
reduction in the production base and a rise in the employment share of services to 52.7%. 
How large these implied changes are can be seen by comparing the experience of two 
European countries with substantial adjustments in their employment structure in the 
eighties. Over the period 1980 to 1990, the British economy underwent restructuring as 
a result of the second oil shock in 1979 and the deep recession of the early eighties. 
Manufacturing in the Northern region of England shrank by around six percentage points, 
(Regional Trends (1991)). In Italy the employment share of industry fell from 42.7% in 
1980 to 35.4% in 1987 (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale (1989)). From 
the previous discussion it is also clear that the implied spectacular rise in the proportion
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of services is above ail a function of massive labour force exit from manufacturing and 
agriculture rather than a sign of a buoyant services sector. Our calculations give 
empirical support to the emergence of a ’German Mezzogiomo\ hitherto mooted by 
Dombusch and Wolf (1992) among others.
The multinomial logistic regressions of Tables 5.7 to 5.9 attempt to identify the 
factors which underlie the flows in Tables 5.3 to 5.6. Table 5.7 presents estimates of 
annual employment transition probabilities separately for men and women. Tables 5.8 
and 9 give estimates of the eight-monthly transition probabilities from unemployment and 
out of the labour force respectively.18 From Table 5.7 it emerges that those workers 
most at risk from loss of employment are similar to those with a marginal employment 
attachment in the West, i.e. at either end of the age spectrum and the unskilled, 
(admittedly those without qualifications form only 5% of the East German labour force). 
The loss of employment amongst men is less selective than for women. The adoption 
of West German ’Sozialplane’ statutes by the East, whereby employees considered to be 
primary household earners in families with dependents are protected against layoff, may 
explain the positive outflow estimates for single men and the insignificant coefficients 
for women. The opposing male/female coefficients for education reflect both effects of 
these statutes and the different career paths taken by the two groups. For example, men 
with Fachschule degrees received specialised training geared toward the sectors favoured 
in a planned economy, whilst many women with the same qualification were employed 
in the service sector where demand has latterly held up (cf. Reuschel and Hensel (1992)). 
The tenuous hold on employment for those on short-time work is confirmed. For men, 
employed in larger establishments, the marginal effects indicate that a worker on short 
time faces an average 50% rise in the likelihood of losing a job over the sample period.
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Men are around 8 percentage points more at risk from loss of employment in plants with 
over 1000 workers. Smaller establishments are evidently more able to adapt to the new 
environment than the large "Kombinate". Private ownership of the firm results in 
significantly higher male outflow rates into unemployment, (but not labour force exit). 
Private employers appear to react to competitive conditions by shedding labour quicker 
than their counterparts under the Treuhand. Western control appears to make little 
difference to this pattern. The findings of Table 5.3 for older workers are confirmed 
here.
Employment outflows vary across regions for men, but not women. As one 
would expect, the male labour market in Berlin, the default category, is more dynamic 
than in other Lander. Women however, are losing work uniformally across the country, 
conditional on industry of employment19.
Age and marital status are the major determinants of outflows from unemployment 
in Tables 5.8a and 5.8b. In addition, for men, the higher the benefit level, the lower the 
likelihood of gaining employment and the lower the likelihood of leaving the labour 
force. The marginal effect suggests that a 100 Mark increase in monthly benefit income 
would reduce the transition probability into employment by 1.5 percentage points. At the 
same time, the labour force exit probability is lowered by .8 percentage points. Eastern 
Germany adopted the West German unemployment compensation system, whereby the 
level of benefit during the initial stage of unemployment, (’ Arbeitslosengeld ’), is a fixed 
proportion of previous earnings, the duration of entitlement depending on past experience 
in the labour force, (Hunt 1991). The former effect could be attributable to the receipt 
of unemployment income reducing job search activity, as outlined by Mortensen (1977). 
Conversely, it may be the result of employer’s preferences for younger workers, who
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under the eamings-related benefit system would typically receive lower state support than 
their older counterparts. The UN effect of benefits may be due to the ’entitlement’ effect 
advocated by Hammermesh (1979), since benefit receipt encourages workers to remain 
active in the labour force. Alternatively, more experienced, high benefit workers might 
be expected to remain within the labour force independently of any benefit effect Other 
personal income appears to reduce male, but not female, outflows. This variable may 
partly be capturing extended search opportunities afforded by savings accumulated under 
a regime of excess demand for goods, and subsequently realised under the Deutschmark 
conversion. Similar supply-side conditions do not appear to influence the female labour 
market, where higher educational attainment is a more significant predictor of a transition 
into employment. Regional differentials, as a probable proxy for the level of local labour 
market activity, are important in determining male labour force exits.
Table 5.9 suggests that, again as in the West, higher levels of income and old age 
discourage labour force entry.20 The likelihood of those over 50 years of age obtaining 
a job is some 45 percentage points lower than that for the prime-age worker, other things 
equal. The presence of children and higher educational qualifications encourage labour 
force entry and the prospect of being hired. The need to expand household income, 
whether caused by unemployment of other household members or the development of a 
consumer good market, seems to have generated an added worker effect.
V Conclusions
Our results confirm that transition in East Germany was associated with a sharp 
rise in unemployment, primarily because of an increase in the flows of workers into the 
unemployment state. If we take account of short-time working and active labour market
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policies, the scale of the emerging unemployment problem is enormous, and provides a 
worrying signal to countries embarking on the path of reform rather later, or more slowly, 
than East Germany. This is particularly so when one reflects that, while the exchange 
rate chosen was unfavourable, the East Germans have the advantage, relative to all other 
countries in transition, of direct access to Western capital, management and know-how. 
The estimated average completed duration of unemployment, already quite long at this 
stage of the transition process, points to the real danger of a large component of long­
term unemployment among the unemployed. Unless there is a strong commitment to 
wage moderation in the other economies of transition, long-term unemployment should 
become an even more serious problem in these countries as expenditures on active labour 
market policies, relative to Germany’s, are and will stay minuscule. Another finding 
worth stressing is that, for men at least, labour market adjustment is significantly affected 
by private ownership. With regard to improved industrial efficiency, this result is 
encouraging for those who favour rapid privatization. However, as Tables 5.3a - 5.3b 
indicate, the labour market is not yet able to absorb the majority of these displaced 
workers. This is unsurprising in an economy which lacks the necessary infrastructure and 
legal framework conducive to large scale private sector job creation.
The lack of predictive power in the regression for women can be interpreted as 
a sign that women experience uniformly bad prospects for continued employment 
irrespective of the economic environment. Steady state calculations point to an eventual 
eastern German labour force of similar proportion to those in the West, but with a twice 
as high unemployment rate of 10%. The composition of employment may also be quite 
different, with an over-reliance on the service industries as the main recipients of labour 
as the manufacturing base of the economy contracts.
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Finally, our regression results show that a standard model of the determination of 
labour market flows has substantial predictive power in the case of Eastern Germany. 
This suggests that standard methodology has a useful role to play in the analysis of 
labour markets in transition.
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Footnotes
* This chapter is based on joint research with Lutz Bellmann, Saul Estrin and Jonathan 
Wadsworth. The bulk of die research was done by me.
1. Jackman and Scott (1992) argue that the rise in unemployment during the initial phase 
of transition is consistent with labour-managed firms becoming the dominant agent in the 
economy. However this is unlikely to hold for Eastern Germany where many existing 
establishments were taken over by the western-led Treuhand, who then exercised control 
over employment.
2. We construct this panel from an East German labour force survey commissioned by 
the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg, (EER-Labour Market Monitor).
3. In the official statistics, short-time workers are partitioned into quartiles according to 
the percentage shortfall of full-time work. For example, workers with between 75% and 
100% of 39.5 hours are in the 0-25% category. Taking the midpoint of the proportions 
in each category and multiplying by the stock gives an estimate of Full-time equivalent 
unemployment associated with each short-time category. Most short-time workers 
categorized as working less than 25% are probably not working at all, consequendy we 
somewhat underestimate the level of full-time equivalent of unemployment by the 
formula used.
4. Table 5.1 defines additional unemployment as the stock of training and job creation 
schemes together with those on short-time work. Hidden unemployment is often used 
in the Western literature to describe the above (eg Calmfors and Forslund, 1990). When 
discussing transition economies, hidden unemployment is better reserved for overmanning 
at the work place.
5. Early retirement arrangements are effective in rapidly reducing the labour force in a 
short period of time. Individuals having taken advantage of such arrangements are meant 
to have permanendy exited the labour market and their average probability of re­
employment is zero.
6. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate that total unemployment has hardly changed at all in 
the last eight months of the reported period. What has dramatically changed is its 
composition, with open unemployment and ALMP participants now making up the great 
bulk of the unemployed. Once the infrastructure enabling the establishment of training 
and job creation schemes was set in place it was possible to give labour market policies 
a much larger active component than immediately after monetary and social union.
7. Movements of stock variables can lead to a wrong assessment of the processes taking 
place in a labour market in transition. For example, according to Table 5.1 in 1991 there 
was an upward trend for both unemployment and vacancies which could erroneously be 
interpreted as the emergence of mismatch. Consulting Table 5.2, however, one can see 
that outflows from unemployment were virtually non-existent in the first months after 
monetary and social union, but reaching multiple levels of this initial period in 1991. 
The simultaneous rise in unemployment and vacancies should, therefore, be attributed to 
a general rise in economic activity. Inflows and outflows of vacancies permit the
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in 1991 this interval either fell or never exceeded the level which it had at the beginning 
of the year; but a falling or constant interval contradicts the emergence of mismatch.
8. The dataset does contain some information on individuals who attrite but return in later 
waves of the survey. No attempt is made to ascertain the validity of the responses in 
each wave.
9. Individuals on training measures are combined with the unemployed. Our data set 
does not allow us to distinguish participants of job creation schemes and regularly 
employed people.
10. The normalisation constraint in our estimation package, (LIMDEP), sets the 
coefficients on the default category to zero. The default category is always chosen as the 
origin state.
11. Coppock commenting on Clark and Summers (1982) shows that in a 3 state world, 
the discrete probability of transition is given by
Pu = Vfcj + r*) * P - exp(-ru - Tik)]
where r  ^ is the instantaneous probability of movement. Hence, every observed discrete 
transition is influenced by the effect of the independent variables on both outflow rates.
12. The sample employment inflows (outflows) are 400 and 918 respectively.
13. The corresponding figures for the employed and inactive were (4.4%, 15.1%) and 
(4.2%, 17.7%) respectively. It is of course conceivable that a fraction of these multiple 
moves may be due to classification error. Nor can we discount the possibility that the 
four month interval between interviews disguise multiple transitions, though given the 
economic circumstances prevailing over the period outlined in section 1, such actions 
would seem unlikely.
14. In the absence of continuous spell data, these figures are constructed from the four- 
monthly flows.
15. The proportion of male economically inactive in the East had already overtaken the 
western equivalent by November 1991.
16. As the sample size underlying the flows in Table 5.3a is different from the sample 
size underlying the flows in Table 5.5 due to missing values in the industry dummies the 
ergodic distributions differ slightly.
17. Whilst the implied direction of these flows is undoubtedly plausible, the absolute 
magnitude of these movements is less precise. For example, the proportion of services 
in chart 4 of Figure 5.6 may be biased upward as our data set cannot distinguish between 
flows into ’proper’ employment and job creation schemes. As most positions on job 
creation schemes are in the service sector, the observed flows bias the steady state
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proportion of services upward. Conversely, around 30% of establishments under 
Treuhand administration were not viable and heavily subsidized (Dombusch and Wolf, 
1992). In the medium term these establishments will be liquidated. Hence, the observed 
flows indirectly bias the steady state proportion of services downward as long as those 
losing their employment in manufacturing and mining due to liquidation cannot all be re- 
employed in production, which seems the most likely outcome.
18. The eight-monthly time interval was chosen to allow the incorporation of non-labour 
income data, available only after the first wave of the survey. The smaller sample size 
and consequent fall in the absolute number of flows between states necessitates a reduced 
parameter set The transition matrices, available from the authors on request, are broadly 
comparable with those, reported.
19. There is little evidence of strong correlation between industries and regions which 
might have accounted for these differences.
20. The relatively small number of outflows from the state necessitates the pooling of the 
sample by sex, acceptable according to the likelihood ratio test, and the combination of 
regional and education variables.
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Appendix
Attrition
Only 6,756 individuals out of an initial sample of 10,751 provided valid responses 
for each wave of the survey. Table 5.A1 outlines the pattern of attrition. It is worth 
noting that migrants (and deaths) account for only 1.6% of attriters, (0.6% of the sample), 
the remainder being attributable to non-response. It is therefore unlikely that the 
estimated flows in Tables 5.4-5.6 are biased by any influence of migration. Whilst no 
attempt is made to explicitly model the attrition process in the discrete environment (see 
Hausman and Wise (1979) for a discussion of attrition bias with continuous data), Tables
5.A2-5.A4 indicates the possible biases caused by non-response. Dummy variables for 
individuals who attrite after March 1991 are included in pooled multinomial logistic 
regressions of the flows between the initial two waves of the panel. The results suggest 
that attrition may not bias the estimated flows substantially (cf. Tables 5.A2-5.A5). Only 
the coefficient on the future attriter dummy for the flow UN is significant, all other future 
attriter variables having no predictive power. This is corroborated by Chi-squared 
independence tests from contingency tables on these flows. The estimated marginal 
effect of attrition on UN suggests that concentration on non-attriters over-estimates the 
average probability of labour force withdrawal by around 9.5 percentage points.
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Data Appendix
Information on individual socio-economic characteristics is taken from a matched 
sample of participants interviewed at four-monthly intervals between November 1990 and 
November 1991.
Age = 1 if age falls in relevant age category, 0 otherwise.
Hochschule = 1 if individuals highest qualification is university or equivalent,
0 otherwise.
Fachschule = 1 if highest qualification is technical college level or equivalent,
0 otherwise.
Meister = 1 if individuals holds skilled manual and supervisory qualification,
0 otherwise.
Lehre = 1 if holds skilled manual qualification, 0 otherwise
Single = 1 if single, divorced or separated, 0 otherwise.
Private = 1 if employee’s firm is privately owned, 0 otherwise
West = 1 if employee’s firm is under Western ownership, 0 otherwise.
Short-Time = 1 if employed on short-time work, 0 otherwise.
Part-Time = 1 if employee reports engaged on part-time work.
Benefits = monthly unemployment benefit income divided by 100
Earnings = monthly income from employment divided by 100.
Other Income = Other monthly income divided by 100.
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Table 5.1
Vacancy and Unemployment Stocks in the East German Labour Market:
July 1990 - May 1992
month U short vac train jcs fteusw adu totu*
In Thousands
7 90 272.0 556.3 27.7 242.4 242.4 514.4
8 90 361.3 1499.9 20.4 — — 653.5 653.5 1014.8
9 90 444.9 1728.0 24.3 — 8.4 752.9 761.3 1206.2
10 90 536.8 1703.8 24.7 14.5 755.0 769.5 1306.3
11 90 589.2 1709.9 23.8 15-0 20.3 793.0 828.3 1417.4
12 90 642.2 1794.0 22.6 29.1 20.0 866.3 953.4 1595.8
1 91 757.2 1840.6 23.0 67.3 34.4 956.3 1058.0 1815.2
2 91 788.0 1947.1 20.8 112.8 47.0 1061.2 1221.0 2009.0
3 91 808.4 1989.8 20.9 167.8 62.5 1104.6 1334.9 2143.4
4 91 836.9 2018.9 22.9 210.4 84.9 1119.1 1414.4 2251.3
5 91 842.3 1968.5 25.3 239.0 113.6 1102.0 1454.6 2296.9
6 91 842.5 1898.9 31.7 272.4 148.2 1078.1 1498.7 2341.2
7 91 1068.6 1610.8 40.3 313.2 209.9 903.1 1426.2 2494.9
8 91 1063.2 1448.8 43.6 324.1 261.8 818.7 1404.6 2467.8
9 91 1028.8 1332.5 43.0 350.5 313.0 758.6 1422.2 2450.9
10 91 1048.5 1199.5 41.1 375.0 348.4 671.4 1394.8 2443.3
11 91 1030.7 1103.4 35.8 410.4 371.1 627.4 1408.9 2439.6
12 91 1037.7 1034.5 35.4 435.2 389.8 594.2 1419.2 2456.9
1 92 1343.4 519.7 39.7 438.0 394.1 297.9 1130.0 2473.5
2 92 1290.3 518.8 34.2 470.9 399.5 285.1 1155.5 2445.9
3 92 1220.1 493.9 33.3 496.9 401.5 263.2 1161.6 2381.7
4 92 1196.0 466.3 31.3 507.3 404.5 246.6 1158.4 2354.3
5 92 1149.1 436.5 30.2 510.3 404.9 230.5 1145.7 2294.8
u - open unemployment;
short - short-time workers;
vac - vacancies;
train - training schemes participants;
jcs - job creation schemes participants;
fteusw - full time equivalent of unemployment for short-time working;
adu - additional unemployment = train + jcs + fteusw;
totu - total unemployment * u + adu;
- not available.
Source: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (BA) and own calculations. 
Note: Stock figures are end-of-month data.
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Table 5.2
Flow Variables in the East German Labour Market: 
July 1990 - May 1992
month infl infl/emp outfl invac outvac place train jcs*
In Thousands
7 90 132.0 118.3 2.1 8.8 22.3 _ _
8 90 107.0 95.9 17.7 10.4 17.7 — — —
9 90 107.1 102.0 23.5 18.6 14.6 — — —
10 90 121.9 119.3 30.0 24.2 23.7 — — 4.8
11 90 94.0 92.1 41.6 23.3 24.3 — — 6.6
12 90 95.4 93.7 42.4 22.2 23.3 — — 7.7
1 91 174.3 172.1 59.3 31.5 31.1 25.9 38.2 14.2
2 91 92.8 90.1 63.0 29.6 31.7 26.2 45.5 14.2
3 91 91.2 88.6 69.8 35.6 35.5 29.9 55.0 16.5
4 91 109.4 107.4 80.8 49.4 47.4 42.8 73.0 24.0
5 91 78.7 77.0 73.3 55.3 52.8 47.4 69.5 30.2
6 91 81.8 79.6 81.6 74.1 67.6 61.1 81.3 40.3
7 91 324.9 318.9 98.7 113.1 104.6 95.9 95.6 68.1
8 91 86.8 83.7 92.2 93.1 89.8 82.6 78.1 56.6
9 91 94.5 90.8 129.0 92.6 93.2 86.9 85.7 58.7
10 91 129.4 127.0 109.7 70.6 72.4 66.2 91.9 40.2
11 91 87.8 85.3 105.6 59.4 64.6 58.5 89.6 32.5
12 91 91.1 87.2 84.1 54.0 54.4 48.4 88.7 26.5
1 92 416.7 413.4 110.9 71.1 66.8 60.6 77.2 30.8
2 92 90.1 85.0 143.1 60.6 66.2 57.7 103.1 29.2
3 92 84.0 78.4 154.2 68.2 69.1 63.3 99.4 30.4
4 92 114.8 107.5 139.0 65.0 67.0 60.7 84.2 28.2
5 92 80.4 73.4 127.3 57.2 58.2 52.3 77.2 _ _
* infl - inflows into open unemployment;
infl/emp - inflows into open unemployment from employment;
outfl - outflows from open unemployment;
invac - inflows of vacancies;
outvac - outflows of vacancies;
place - job placements by employment offices;
train - inflows into training schemes;
jcs - inflows into job creation schemes;
- not available.
Source: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit.
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Table 5.3a
Labour Market Transition Probabilities by Sex and Age: 
November 1990 - November 1991
Sex and Age EE
Probability of Transition 
EU EN UE UU UN NE NU NN
1) Total .836 .093 .071 .350 .373 .277 .160 .041 .799
2) Male
3) Female
.864
.806
.057 .079 
.132 .062
.399 .270 .331 
.315 .448 .237
.135 .016 .849 
.172 .054 .775
Males
4) 16-24 yrs
5) 25-49 yrs
6) 50-64 yrs
.877
.924
.728
.072 .051 
.065 .011 
.033 .239
.667 .278 .055 
.591 .348 .061 
.125 .188 .687
.376 .043 .581 
.261 .043 .696 
.008 -- .992
Females
7) 16-24 yrs
8) 25-49 yrs
9) 50-59 yrs
.734
.843
.717
.181 .084 
.134 .023 
.102 .181
.533 .400 .067 
.405 .535 .060 
.125 .319 .556
.354 .105 .541 
.493 .147 .360 
.012 .008 .980
E=Emp1oyment, U=Unemployment, N=Not in Labour Force. Origin 
state
sample sizes: E=2672, U=148, N=385 men, E=2523, U=203, N=821 
women.
-- indicates no transition observed.
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Table 5.3b
Labour Market Transition Probabilities by Sex and Age: 
November 1990 - March 1991
Sex and Age EE
Probability of Transition 
EU EN UE UU UN NE NU NN
1) Total .936 .043 .021 .182 .658 .160 .057 .021 .922
2) Male
3) Female
.946
.927
.033 .021 
.053 .021
.243
.138
.574
.719
.183
.143
.031 .011 .958 
.069 .026 .905
Males
4) 16-24 yrs
5) 25-49 yrs
6) 50-64 yrs
.953
.962
.907
.043 .004 
.033 .005 
.029 .064
.389
.303
.141
.611
.682
.453
.015
.406
.077 .017 .906 
.087 .087 .826 
.004 -- .996
Females
7) 16-24 yrs
8) 25-49 yrs
9) 50-59 yrs
.928
.944
.869
.055 .017 
.051 .005 
.058 .073
.200
.172
.069
.800
.819
.542
.009
.389
.128 .035 .837 
.200 .087 .713 
.010 .004 .986
Origin state 
U=203, N=821
sample sizes: E=2672, 
women.
U=148, N=385 men, E=2523,
March 1991 - July 1991
Sex and Age EE
Probability of Transition 
EU EN UE UU UN NE NU NN
1) Total .930 .054 .016 .182 .751 .067 .056 .025 .919
2) Male
3) Female
.943
.916
.040 .017 
.069 .015
.281
.123
.657
.807
.062
.070
.044 .024 .932 
.063 .025 .912
Males
4) 16-24 yrs
5) 25-49 yrs
6) 50-64 yrs
.946
.962
.899
.043 .011 
.034 .004 
.052 .049
.360
.343
.118
.560
.647
.725
.080
.010
.157
.131 .028 .841 
.148 .074 .778 
.006 .019 .975
Females
7) 16-24 yrs
8) 25-49 yrs
9) 50-59 yrs
.910
.917
.916
.069 .021 
.075 .008 
.048 .036
.129
.137
.083
.839
.838
.708
.032
.025
.209
.135 .034 .831 
.248 .068 .684 
.005 .014 .981
Origin state sample sizes: E=2575, U=178, N=452 men, E=2422, 
U=300, N=825 women.
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Table 5.3b (continued)
JUly 1991 - November 1991
Sex and Age EE
Probability of Transition 
EU EN UE UU UN NE NU NN
1) Total .917 .044 .038 .222 .657 .121 .079 .015 .906
2) Male
3) Female
.931
.903
.029 .040 
.061 .036
.264 .520 .216 
.200 .730 .070
.069 .013 
.085 .016
.918
.899
Males
4) 16-24 yrs
5) 25-49 yrs
6) 50-64 yrs
.920
.958
.866
.045 .035 
.033 .009 
.011 .122
.448 .483 .069 
.325 .634 .041 
.101 .354 .545
.221 .032 
.286 .036 
.011 .006
.747
.679
.983
Females
7) 16-24 yrs
8) 25-49 yrs
9) 50-59 yrs
.814
.929
.859
.113 .073 
.055 .016 
.054 .087
.167 .729 .104 
.220 .743 .037 
.146 .683 .171
.264 .031 
.300 .070 
.009 .003
.705
.630
.988
Origin state sample sizes: E=2499, U=231, N=475 men, E=2307, 
U=430, N=810 women.
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Table 5.3c
Sample and Ergodic Distributions for Population of Working Age
E U N
Men and Women
Sample
a. November 1990 .769 .052 .179
b. November 1991 .689 .100 .211
Ergodic
a . Annual .555 .105 .340
b. Four-monthly Average .574 .107 .319
West Germany: 1989* .669 .049 .282
Men
Sample
a. November 1990 .833 .046 .120
b. November 1991 .754 .064 .182
Ergodic
a . Annual .548 .052 .400
b. Four-monthly Average .564 .061 .375
West Germany: 1989 .802 .051 .147
Women
Sample
a. November 1990 .711 .057 .231
b. November 1991 .631 .132 .237
Ergodic
a . Annual .531 .157 .312
b. Four-monthly Average .543 .161 .296
West Germany: 1989 .532 .047 .421
‘Source for West Germany: Federal Statistical Office (1992).
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Table 5.4
Unemployment by Duration: November 1991
Total
< 4 months .352
4-8 months .280
8-12 months .188
12 months + .180
Male
< 4 months .399
4-8 months .283
8-12 months .136
12 months + .182
Female
< 4 months .330
4-8 months .279
8-12 months .212
12 months + .179
Table 5.5
Gross Labour Force Transition Probabilities by Sector: November 90 - November 91
Destination State: November 91
Origin agric mine metal other const distr trans f ina other Ei Unemp Schem NLF I,
State man. man. serv.
Employment:
agricult .545 .002 .040 .023 .042 .047 .021 .007 .047 .229 .084 .026 .117 .227
mining .007 .653 .056 .003 .035 .042 .007 .007 .059 .216 .031 .031 .069 .131
metal man .003 .005 .625 .039 .028 .029 .009 .0 1 1 .040 .164 .076 .060 .073 .209
other man .003 .005 .061 .551 .050 .034 .003 .010 .074 .240 .091 .050 .069 .210
construct .007 — .042 .026 .751 .012 .005 .002 .040 .134 .044 .012 .061 .117
distribut .002 .002 .013 .036 .021 .644 .013 .015 .028 .130 .129 .021 .077 .227
transport .005 .014 .016 .008 .019 .789 .005 .051 .118 .022 . 0 1 1 .060 .093
finance .014 .795 .096 .110 .027 .041 .027 .095
other ser . 004 .004 . 003 . 023 . 014 .017 . 013 .006 .786 .084 .047 .018 .067 .132
Unemp 1 oyment .009 .003 .009 .028 .040 .037 .012 .019 .143 .300 .318 .084 .296 .380
Schemes .043 .043 .087 .043 .435 .651 .043 .217 .087 .130
Not in Labour .009 . 003 . 0 1 1 . 010 .014 .025 .007 . 009 .061 .149 .035 .007 .809 .042
Force
Turnover Rate -.380 -.278 -.249 -.228 .100 -.052 -.043 .603 .006 .511 7.609 .023
Sample Distr. .064 .043 .145 .094 .064 .080 .055 .0 1 1 .211 .048 .003 .180
Ergodic Distr. .012 .008 .037 .040 .071 .065 .046 .039 .268 .068 .028 .318
Note: Category 'Schemes' incorporates all participants on government training measures.
Zi(Z2 )=sum of transition probabilities into other employment (out of employment).
—  indicates no transition observed. Turnover Rate is calculated as the change in the respective 
stocks divided by the original stock. Sample Size = 6666; sample distribution is given for origin 
state.
Table 5.6
Gross Labour Force Transition Probabilities by Sector: November 90 - November 91
Destination State: November 91
Origin agric prod trans. services X* Unemp Schem NLF X*
State &trade
Employment:
agricult .545 .107 .068 .054 .229 .084 .026 .117 .227
production .004 .718 .035 .060 .099 .069 .045 .069 .183
trans.&trade .003 .058 .719 .049 .110 .085 .017 .069 .171
services .004 .040 .029 .797 .073 .046 .019 .065 .130
Unempl oyment .009 .081 .050 .162 .302 .318 .084 .296 .380
Schemes — .087 .130 .435 .652 .043 .218 .087 .130
Not in Labour . 009 .038 .032 .070 .149 .035 .007 .809 .042
Force
Turnover Rate -.380 -.182 -.049 .035 .511 7.609 .023
Sample Distr. .064 .347 .135 .222 .048 .003 .180
Ergodic Distr. .013 .144 .115 .304 .069 .028 .326
Note: Category 'Schemes' incorporates all participants on government training 
measures. Xi(X2 )=sum of transition probabilities into other employment 
(out of employment) . -- indicates no transition observed. Turnover Rate is 
calculated as the change in the respective stocks divided by the original stock. 
Sample Size = 6666; sample distribution is given for origin state.
to
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Table 5.7a
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Employment Transitions: 
November 1990 - November 1991 (Men)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
E - 
Estimate
U
dPu/dXi
E
Estimate
- N
dPn/dXi
Constant -2.365** -3.434**
(0.537) (0.594)
Age < 25 0.103 -0.073 0.009 0.990** 0.183
(0.308) (0.426)
Age >= 50 0.280 -0.533** -0.044 3.077** 0.662
(0.262) (0.287)
Single 0.229 0.604** 0.105 0.143 0.001
(0.226) (0.265)
Children 0.455 -0.147 -0.039 -0.528** -0.055
(0.208) (0.265)
Education:
Lehre 0.538 0.184 0.008 -0.522** -0.063
(0.257) (0.237)
Meister 0.115 0.418 0.059 -0.254 -0.043
(0.380) (0.313)
Fachschule 0.142 0.585* 0.058 -0.799** -0.095
(0.351) (0.309)
Hochschule 0.146 0.625** 0.054 -0.953** -0.106
(0.299) (0.338)
Region:
Mecklenburg 0.115 -0.128 -0.006 0.573 0.098
(0.344) (0.397)
Brandenburg 0.154 -0.300 -0.032 0.482 0.087
(0.336) (0.382)
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.173 -0.948** -0.109 0.448 0.099
(0.360) (0.376)
Thueringen 0.173 -0.728** -0.090 0.165 0.043
(0.341) (0.384)
Sachsen 0.308 -0.687** -0.092 0.122 0.037
(0.305) (0.359)
Industry:
Agriculture 0.097 -0.361 -0.047 0.091 0.023
(0.400) (0.321)
Mining 0.074 -0.605 -0.082 -0.257 -0.019
(0.472) (0.382)
Metal 0.254 0.196 0.024 -0.177 -0.028
(0.291) (0.285)
Other Manf. 0.120 -0.102 -0.030 -0.464 -0.051
(0.357) (0.341)
Construction 0.130 -0.394 -0.064 -0.411 -0.039
(0.373) (0.331)
Distribution 0.061 0.533 0.062 -0.613 -0.079
(0.365) (0.445)
Transport 0.091 -0.737 -0.105 -0.646* -0.057
(0.454) (0.382)
Employment:
Part-time 0.025 0.562 0.119 0.663 0.081
(0.465) (0.442)
Short-time 0.212 0.996** 0.193 0.483** 0.031
(0.199) (0.190)
Private 0.050 0.932** 0.144 -0.562 -0.087
(0.351) (0.555)
West 0.091 -0.108 -0.029 -0.416 -0.046
(0.306) (0.363)
263
Table 5.7a (continued)
Establishment Size 
(no. of employees) 
200-1000 0.401
< 200 0.243
-0.052
(0.207)
-0.512*
(0.280)
-0.020
-0.078
-0.386*
(0.202)
-0.315
(0.243)
-0.044
-0.026
Earnings 12.436 -0.025
(0.023)
-0.001 -0.008
(0.022)
0.000
Diagnostics:
Log L 
Log 0
Model Chi3 (54)
% correct
predictions Model 
Zero
Sample Size
-1064.8
-1308.5
490.2**
86.3
86.4 
2672
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, * significant at 10% level. Sample mean transition probabilities 
EU=.057, EN=.079. Likelihood Ratio test for Male-Female sample split gave 
a test statistic of 178.4 (Chi3(54) os=72.2) .
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Table 5.7b
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Employment Transitions:
November 1990 - November 1991 (Women)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
E - 
Estimate
U
dPu/dXi
E
Estimate
- N
dPn/dXi
Constant -1.821** -2.921**
(0.407) (0.603)
Age < 25 0.094 0.405* 0.109 0.919** 0.134
(0.234) (0.345)
Age >= 50 0.213 -0.146 0.013 2.048** 0.452
(0.194) (0.261)
Single 0.249 -0.056 0.005 0.472** 0.077
(0.164) (0.207)
Children 0.503 0.075 0.007 -0.171 -0.024
(0.149) (0.277)
Education:
Lehre 0.491 -0.137 -0.021 0.110 0.021
(0.177) (0.258)
Meister 0.029 -0.496 -0.074 0.193 0.047
(0.389) (0.516)
Fachschule 0.279 -0.941** -0.144 0.302 0.083
(0.233) (0.303)
Hochschule 0.105 -0.900** -0.142 -0.345 -0.018
(0.306) (0.492)
Region:
Mecklenburg 0.131 0.232 0.040 -0.089 -0.020
(0.282) (0.418)
Brandenburg 0.142 -0.309 -0.053 -0.001 0.011
(0.291) (0.399)
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.172 0.127 0.027 0.079 0.006
(0.271) (0.387)
Thueringen 0.156 -0.048 0.005 0.114 0.018
(0.276) (0.392)
Sachsen 0.314 -0.290 -0.055 -0.119 -0.005
(0.258) (0.369)
Industry:
Agriculture 0.070 0.426* 0.103 0.479 0.051
(0.256) (0.343)
Mining 0.036 0.137 0.011 -0.318 -0.043
(0.369) (0.635)
Metal 0.117 0.700** 0.111 -0.522 -0.082
(0.223) (0.402)
Other Manf. 0.122 0.743** 0.162 0.195 -0.008
(0.212) (0.311)
Construction 0.033 0.218 0.030 -0.259 -0.039
(0.382) (0.566)
Distribution 0.149 0.589** 0.138 0.518** 0.048
(0.200) (0.259)
Transport 0.050 -1.270** -0.162 0.097 0.051
(0.531) (0.406)
Employment:
Part-time 0.231 0.196 0.035 -0.035 -0.012
(0.156) ' (0.226)
Short-time 0.189 0.966** 0.208 0.183 -0.020
(0.147) (0.250)
Private 0.043 0.046 -0.010 -0.405 -0.049
(0.332) (0.545)
West 0.065 -0.191 -0.036 -0.088 -0.005
(0.274) (0.422)
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Table 5.7b (continued)
Establishment Size 
(No. of Employees) 
200-1000 0.381
< 200 0.368
-0.015
(0.166)
-0.038
(0.181)
-0.003
-0.012
-0.001
(0.247)
-0.133
(0.258)
0.000
-0.016
Earnings 9.741 -0.022
(0.021)
-0.002 -0.089**
(0.032)
-0.005
Diagnostics:
Log L 
Log 0
Model Chi2 (54)
% correct
predictions Model 
Zero
Sample Size
-1345.9
-1546.8
401.7**
80.6
80.6
2523
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, * significant at 10% level. Sample mean transition probabilities 
EU=.132, EN=.062.
266
Table 5.8a
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Unemployment Transitions
March 1991- November 1991 (Men)
U-E U-N
Independent Sample
Variable Mean Estimate dPe/dxi Estimate dPn/dz1
Constant 1.302 -4.187**
(0.895) (1.913)
Age < 25 0.140 0.175 0.028 0.205 0.016
(0.562) (1.292)
Age >= 50 0.287 -0.909** -0.453 3.828** 0.739
(0.616) (1.026)
Single 0.320 -0.918* -0.165 -0.848 -0.055
(0.477) (0.755)
Children 0.427 0.279 -0.065 -1.800* 0.244
(0.451) (0.923)
Region:
Mecklenburg- 0.129 -0.327 -0.284 2.380* 0.512
Vorpommern (0.755) (1.431)
Brandenburg/ 0.281 -0.064 -0.200 2.187* 0.391
Sachsen-Anhalt (0.652) (0.822)
Thueringen/ 0.489 0.505 -0.017 2.003 0.243
Sachsen (0.609) (1.304)
Education:
Lehre 0.528 -0.259 -0.068 0.078 0.027
(0.473) (0.762)
Meister/ 0.258 -0.719 -0.147 -0.332 -0.002
Fachschule (0.618) (0.827)
Hochschule 0.146 -0.570 -0.085 -0.967 -0.081
(0.580) (0.983)
Income
Unemployment 4.542 -0.095* -0.015 -0.101 -0.008
Benefits/100 (0.056) (0.086)
Other Income/100 1.327 -0.189** -0.033 -0.162 -0.010
(0.073) (0.108)
Diagnostics:
Log L 144.860
Log 0 187.267
Model Chi2 (24) 84.811**
% Correct
Predictions Model 59.0
Zero 41.5
Sample Size 178
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
*(**) denotes 10%(5%) Significance Level.
Sample Mean Transition Probabilities UE=0.415, UN=0.197. 
Likelihood Ratio test for Male-Female sample split gave a 
test statistic of 75.4 (Chi2(24) os=36.4) .
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Table 5.8b
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Unemployment Transitions'
March 1991- November 1991 (Women)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
U-
Estimate
E
dPe/dx1
U-N
Estimate dPn/dxi
Constant -1.355** -2.760**
(0.680) (1.055)
Age < 25 0.103 0.091 0.109 -1.989* --0.221
(0.504) (1.213)
Age >= 50 0.240 0.215 -0.068 1.334** 0.252
(0.440) (0.563)
Single 0.243 0.276 -0.028 1.043** 0.182
(0.375) (0.755)
Children 0.520 0.047 0.105 -1.340** -0.241
(0.352) (0.681)
Region:
Mecklenburg- 0.140 -0.743 -0.122 -0.255 0.002
Vorpommern (0.563) (0.973)
Brandenburg/ 0.230 -0.863 -0.163 -0.053 0.045
Sachsen-Anhalt (0.526) (0.887)
Thueringen/ 0.540 -0.628 -0.139 0.068 0.056
Sachsen (0.475) (0.813)
Education:
Lehre 0.593 0.818* 0.160 0.134 0.032
(0.446) (0.564)
Meister/ 0.200 1.077** 0.181 0.740 0.040
Fachschule (0.522) (0.661)
Hochschule 0.040 1.334* -0.008 2.356** 0.366
(0.782) (1.001)
Income
Unemp loyment 3.453 0.057 0.009 0.067 0.005
Benefits/100 (0.054) (0.089)
Other Income/100 0.843 -0.023 -0.012 0.253 0.027
(0.081) (0.103)
Diagnostics:
Log L -237.351
Log 0 -268.657
Model Chi3 (24) 62.613**
% Correct
Predictions Model 65.7
Zero 62.3
Sample Size 300
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
*(**) denotes 10%(5%) Significance Level.
Sample Mean Transition Probabilities UE=0.260, UN=0.117.
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Table 5.9
Multinomial Logit Estimates of NLF transitions
March 1991- November 1991 (Men and Women)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
N-E
Estimate dPe/dx*
N-U
Estimate dPu/dXj
Constant -2.147** -4.146**
(0.624) (0.992)
Female 0.646 -0.089 -0.012 0.071 0.006
(0.251) (0.500)
Age < 25 0.199 0.622 0.077 0.633 0.039
(0.381) (0.541)
Age >= 50 0.687 -2.743** -0.447 -0.613 0.006
(0.530) (0.710)
Single 0.337 0.461 0.053 0.550 0.034
(0.360) (0.536)
Children 0.137 1.517** 0.094 3.208** 0.415
(0.366) (0.589)
Education:
Lehre 0.392 0.535* 0.060 0.727 0.045
(0.279) (0.533)
Meister/Fachschule 0.183 1.041** 0.154 0.360 0.010
(0.416) (0.707)
Hochschule 0.065 0.999** 0.166 -0.178 -0.023
(0.487) (0.896)
Region:
Mecklenburg 0.111 0.377 0.060 -0.988 -0.050
(0.507) (0.875)
Sachsen-Anhalt/ 0.359 0.151 0.023 -0.417 -0.028
Brandenburg (0.451) (0.682)
Thueringen/ 0.462 -0.162 0.025 -0.792 -0.112
Sachsen (0.442) (0.666)
Income:
Other Income/100 5.159 -0.124** -0.010 -0.248** -0.029
(0.052) (0.113)
Diagnostics:
Log L -364.544
Log 0 -595.586
Model Chi2 (24) 462.084**
% Correct
Predictions Model 88.95
Zero 86.36
Sample Size 1276
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
*(**) denotes 10%(5%) Significance Level.
Sample Mean Transition Probabilities NE=0.109, NU=0.027. 
Likelihood Ratio test for Male-Female sample split gave a 
test statistic of 25.2 (X2(22) .05=33.9) .
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Table 5.A1
Attrition
Frequency (%)
Waves 1,2,3,4 62.9
Waves 1,2,3 8.6
Waves 1,2 5.5
Waves 1 10.9
Fragmented
Participation
11.5
Migrants 0.6
Sample size:10751
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Table 5.A2
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Employment Transitions- 
Including Future Attriters: November 1990 - March 1991 (Men)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
E - 
Estimate
U
dPu/dxt
E
Estimate
- N
dPn/dxx
Constant -3.203** -3.974**
(0.601) (0.960)
Age < 25 0.126 -0.026 -0.018 0.261 0.040
(0.317) (0.669)
Age >= 50 0.251 0.111 0.041 2.203** 0.373
(0.278) (0.400)
Single 0.258 0.529** 0.018 -0.055 0.011
(0.242) (0.408)
Children 0.465 0.362 0.031 -0.179 -0.009
(0.234) (0.394)
Education:
Lehre 0.548 0.288 0.021 0.284 0.018
(0.277) (0.415)
Meister/ 0.247 0.118 -0.013 0.535 0.019
Fachschule (0.349) (0.451)
Hochschule 0.132 0.430 -0.019 -0.234 -0.018
(0.338) (0.594)
Region:
Mecklenburg 0.114 -0.114 0.022 0.400 0.002
(0.407) (0.617)
Brandenburg 0.160 -1.004** -0.059 0.095 -0.001
(0.461) (0.609)
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.176 -0.450 -0.008 0.270 0.027
(0.404) (0.596)
Thueringen 0.168 0.105 0.081 -0.455 -0.017
(0.379) (0.657)
Sachsen 0.305 -0.162 0.017 -0.300 -0.031
(0.365) (0.596)
Industry:
Agriculture 0.098 0.396 0.099 0.601 0.027
(0.337) (0.473)
Mining 0.073 -0.788 -0.022 0.057 0.039
(0.497) (0.587)
Metal 0.248 -1.192** -0.119 0.794 -0.033
(0.362) (0.515)
Other Manf. 0.123 -0.172 0.061 -0.373 -0.017
(0.342) (0.556)
Construction 0.135 -0.133 0.023 -0.467 -0.025
(0.341) (0.568)
Distribution 0.065 0.176 0.075 -0.321 -0.011
(0.367) (0.699)
Transport 0.095 -1.055** -0.094 -0.124 0.002
(0.509) (0.568)
Employment:
Part-time 0.023 0.262 0.014 -0.046 -0.012
(0.490) (0.781)
Short-time 0.208 0.842** 0.166 0.699** 0.020
(0.224) (0.287)
Private 0.053 0.461 0.101 0.107 0.051
(0.358) (0.761)
West 0.094 0.267 0.043 -0.519 -0.034
(0.319) (0.620)
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Table 5.A2 (continued)
Establishment Size 
(no. of employees)
200-1000 0.400 -0.077 0.003 -0.266 0.003
(0.239) (0.321)
< 200 0.243 -0.004 0.015 -0.666 -0.033
(0.273) (0.430)
Earnings 12.323 -0.036 -0.002 -0.085** -0.002
(0.024) (0.039)
Future 0i230 0.233 0.031 -0.123 0.016
Attriters (0.212) (0.352)
Diagnostics:
Log L -768.7
Log 0 -866.6
Model Chi2 (56) 195.7**
% correct
predictions Model 94.5
Zero 94.4
Sample Size 3471
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, * significant at 10% level. Sample mean transition probabilities 
EU=.036, EN=.019.
A Chi2-Independence test for random variables "attrition" and "end state 
in March 91" produced a statistic of 4.018 (Chi2(2) .0S=5.991) .
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Table 5.A3
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Employment Transitions- 
Including Future Attriters: November 1990 - March 1991 (Women)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
E - 
Estimate
U
dPu/dxA
E
Estimate
- N
dPa/dx1
Constant -3.615** -4.610**
(0.591) (0.899)
Age < 25 0.113 0.176 -0.018 0.574 0.040
(0.295) (0.626)
Age >= 50 0.199 0.179 0.041 2.914** 0.373
(0.251) (0.470)
Single 0.263 -0.149 0.018 0.234 0.011
(0.214) (0.306)
Children 0.505 0.314 0.031 0.067 -0.009
( 0 . 2 0 0 ) ( 0 . 4 8 6 )
Education:
Lehre 0.500 -0.033 0.021 0.339 0.018
(0.231) (0.339)
Meister/ 0.296 -0.475* -0.013 -0.070 0.019
Fachschule (0.286) (0.429)
Hochschule 0.097 -1.004** -0.019 -0.012 -0.018
(0.505) (0.690)
Region:
Mecklenburg 0.126 0.427 0.022 0.471 0.002
(0.454) (0.593)
Brandenburg 0.147 -0.004 -0.059 -0.390 -0.001
(0.467) (0.576)
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.170 0.288 -0.008 0.264 0.027
(0.444) (0.513)
Thueringen 0.155 0.983** 0.081 0.150 -0.017
(0.427) (0.528)
Sachsen 0.315 0.517 0.017 -0.423 -0.031
(0.418) (0.512)
Industry:
Agriculture 0.069 0.573* 0.099 0.016 0.027
(0.311) (0.498)
Mining 0.034 0.405 -0.022 0.424 0.039
(0.448) (0.667)
Metal 0.119 -1.005** -0.119 -0.454 -0.033
(0.411) (0.546)
Other Manf. 0.120 0.728** 0.061 0.084 -0.017
(0.259) (0.433)
Construction 0.031 0.574 0.023 0.302 -0.025
(0.441) (0.662)
Distribution 0.153 0.603** 0.075 0.031 -0.011
(0.238) (0.392)
Transport 0.049 0.826 -0.094 -0.239 0.002
(0.614) (0.649)
Employment:
Part-time 0.224 0.021 0.014 -0.206 -0.012
(0.200) (0.319)
Short-time 0.192 0.975** 0.166 0.065 0.020
(0.191) (0.349)
Private 0.042 0.519 0.101 1.167** 0.051
(0.342) (0.529)
West 0.067 0.402 0.043 -0.334 -0.034
(0.324) (0.637)
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Table 5.A3 (continued)
Establishment Size 
(no. of employees)
200-1000 0.380 0.130 0.003 0.393
(0.233) (0.362)
< 200 0.366 0.378 0.015 -0.006
(0.240) (0.396)
Earnings 9.606 -0.048* -0.002 -0.109**
(0.028) (0.046)
Future 0.203 0.154 0.031 0.472
Attriters (0.193) (0.308)
0.003
-0.033
- 0 . 0 0 2
0.016
Diagnostics:
Log L —870.3
Log 0 -1002.3
Model Chi2 (56) 264.0**
% correct
predictions Model 92.3
Zero 92.3
Sample Size 3167
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, * significant at 10% level. Sample mean transition probabilities 
EU=.036, EN=.019.
A Chi2-Independence test for random variables "attrition" and "end state 
in March 91" produced a statistic of 2.063 (Chi2(2) >0S=5.991) .
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Table 5.A4
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Unemployment Transitions- 
Including Future Attriters: November 1990 - March 1991 
(Men and Women)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
U-
Estimate
E
dP./dXi
U-N
Estimate dPn/dxi
Constant -0.955* -4.974**
(0.569) (1.220)
Female 0.580 -0.941** -0.173 -0.235 0.011
(0.266) (0.347)
Age < 25 0.121 0.773** 0.042 1.550 0.235
(0.386) (1.080)
Age >= 50 0.337 -0.255 -0.221 3.403** 0.618
(0.393) (0.794)
Single 0.297 -0.205 -0.009 -0.734 0.089
(0.319) (0.488)
Children 0.410 0.634* 0.200 -1.868 0.271
(0.324) (1.109)
Region:
Mecklenburg- 0.119 -0.608 -0.155 1.213 0.262
Vorpommern (0.480) (0.938)
Brandenburg/ 0.331 -0.327 -0.155 1.911** 0.349
Sachsen-Anhalt (0.385) (0.822)
Thueringen/ 0.434 -0.683* -0.186 1.352* 0.239
Sachsen (0.381) (0.804)
Education:
Lehre 0.550 0.196 0.029 0.188 0.018
(0.366) (0.426)
Meister/ 0.239 0.726* 0.145 0.094 0.023
Fachschule (0.413) (0.477)
Hochschule 0.062 0.342 0.042 0.474 0.157
(0.508) (0.795)
Future Attriters 0.301 -0.348 -0.033 -0.824* -0.095
(0.282) (0.468)
Diagnostics:
Log L -322.488
Log 0 -411.287
Model Chi2 (24) 177.597**
% Correct
Predictions Model 70.9
Zero 69.7
Sample Size 502
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
*(**) denotes 10%(5%) Significance Level.
Sample Mean Transition Probabilities UE=0.175, UN=0.127.
A Chi2-Independence test for random variables "attrition" and 
"end state in March 91" produced a statistic of 12.292 
(Chi2(2).os=5.991) .
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Table 5.A5
Multinomial Logit Estimates of NLF transitions- 
Including Future Attriters: Nov 90- March 91 (Men and Women)
Independent
Variable
Sample
Mean
N-E
Estimate dPe/dx1
N-U
Estimate dPu/dx1
Constant -2.627** -3.946**
(0.577) (1.036)
Female 0.687 0.278 0.031 0.331 0.024
(0.304) (0.535)
Age < 25 0.266 0.121 0.028 -0.867* -0.066
(0.292) (0.505)
Age > = 5 0 0.593 -2.564** -0.330 -2.093** -0.138
(0.473) (0.717)
Single 0.385 0.079 -0.016 0.371 0.035
(0.308) (0.463)
Children 0.191 0.848** 0.088 1.399** 0.144
(0.349) (0.597)
Education:
Lehre 0.379 0.635** 0.083 0.266 0.013
(0.294) (0.494)
Meister/Fachschule 0.157 1.138** 0.192 -0.108 -0.029
(0.380) (0.668)
Hochschule 0.056 0.461 0.083 -1.087 -0.069
(0.490) (1.098)
Region:
Mecklenburg 0.119 -0.581 -0.077 0.864 0.110
(0.497) (0.833)
Sachsen-Anhalt/ 0.337 -0.307 -0.035 -0.282 -0.020
Brandenburg (0.406) (0.850)
Thueringen/ 0.474 -0.465 -0.064 0.232 0.027
Sachsen (0.393) (0.782)
Future Attriters 0.237 0.274 0.041 -0.227 -0.023
(0.250) (0.452)
Diagnostics:
Log L -407.659
Log 0 -524.517
Model Chi2 (24) 233.717**
% Correct
Predictions Model 91.65
Zero 91.71
Sample Size 1581
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
*(**) denotes 10%(5%) Significance Level.
Sample Mean Transition Probabilities NE=0.063, NU=0.020.
A Chi2-Independence test for random variables “attrition" 
and "end state in March 91" produced a statistic of 2.566 
(Chi2 (2) 0S=5.991) .
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Figure 5.1
Unemployment Stocks in Eastern Germany 
September 1990 - May 1992
thousands
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Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.3
Gross Flows into and out of Open Unemployment 
Eastern Germany: July 1990 - May 1992
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Figure 5.4
Unemployment Outflows and Inflows into ALMP 
Measures. Eastern Germany: October 90 - April 92
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Figure 5.5
Past and Future Distributions of Working Age 
Population by Sector. Eastern Germany
November 1990 Sample Ergodic Distribution
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Figure 5.6
Past & Future Employment Distributions by Sector
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C hapter 6
Labour Market Flows and the Evaluation of 
Labour Market Policies in Poland 
I Introduction
This chapter examines three issues concerning the Polish labour market using 
aggregate Voivodship-level panel data. First, for the period February 1991 to December 
1992, we test for the existence of a well defined matching function in the Polish labour 
market which brings together unemployed workers and vacant jobs. Secondly, we 
investigate whether the change in the benefit system at the beginning of 1992 induced 
stronger search efforts by the unemployed resulting in increased levels of hirings. This 
change consisted of a regime switch from eamings-related benefits to a flat rate system 
paying approximately 36% of the average wage to all those unemployed with previous 
work experience . Again, the data set spanning the months February 1991 to December 
1992 is used for this test. Thirdly, for 1992, when stocks of ALMP measures reached 
statistically significant levels, the impact of these measures on hirings of the unemployed 
is analyzed. This chapter can also be thought of as an exercise in the exploration of 
available aggregate Polish labour market data. Not much is known about what these 
data actually mean and our econometric work might help provide a partial answer to this 
question.
The analysis of labour market policies undertaken here is narrow in the following 
sense. Policies which deal with industrial relations, crucial for wage determination and 
dispersion, are not addressed here. Only labour market policies as defined by the OECD 
(see Jackman et al.(1990), page 2) are discussed.
The next section will discuss hirings of the unemployed and outflows from
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unemployment at national level, while section ID gives a brief summary of the most 
pertinent features of Polish passive labour market policies and describes the ALMP 
measures used most in 1992. In Section IV the three above mentioned topics will be 
empirically investigated. To facilitate this investigation, the transition methodology 
employed in chapters 1 and 2 will be adapted to the panel nature of the Polish 
Voivodship-level data. Section V concludes.
n  Monthly Aggregate Flows in 1992 in the Polish Labour Market
Since January 1992, data on new unemployment registrants, i.e. inflows into 
unemployment has become available. Monthly outflows from unemployment into stable 
employment, i.e. hirings from the stock of unemployment have been available since the 
beginning of 1991. For further analysis it is crucial to understand the Polish measure of 
hirings. This measure denotes only those flows from unemployment into employment 
which result in a match between an unemployed person and a "genuine" job, i.e. a job 
which is posted by a private or socialized firm because it thinks it profitable to do so. 
Flows from unemployment into employment slots created by the central government or 
by local authorities do not appear in our measure of hirings. In order to be able to 
compare overall outflows from unemployment1 and hirings the analysis is confined to 
1992. The basic stock and flow data underlying this analysis are given in Table 6.A1.
Monthly flows in the Polish labour market are presented for males and females 
jointly and separately in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. Total unemployment rose from 
2,211,753 at the beginning of the year to 2,509,342 in December 1992. Most of this rise 
can be explained by much larger inflows than outflows in the summer months, when 
school leavers entered the labour force. In the rest of the year, inflows were slightly
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higher than outflows apart from March and October. There was a larger absolute 
increase in female unemployment (178,057) than in male unemployment (119,532), which 
is demonstrated by the larger net sum of "plus - areas" (areas where the upper bound is 
inflows) and "minus - areas" (areas where the upper bound is outflows) in Figure 6.3 
compared to the net sum in Figure 6.2.
It is worth noting that hirings are much lower than outflows from unemployment, 
not only for women but also for men. On average monthly hirings constituted 59% of 
outflows for men, 51% for women and 56% for both men and women.2 In the Polish 
context, outflows from unemployment can have five main destinations: (a) "genuine" 
employment , (b) employment sponsored by the government, (c) employment in the 
underground economy, (d) the state of inactivity and (e) emigration. With a large 
underground economy (cf. Bednarski (1992)) and presumably substantial migratory flows 
out of the country3 the large proportion of outflows not explained by hirings, which after 
all only constitute flows into destination (a), appears less surprising. It is possible that 
some of the unemployed who flow into "genuine" jobs are not taken account of in our 
measure of hirings. This measurement error should, however, not be large given that 
there are four other destinations of outflows from unemployment and that not only flows 
into (d) but also into (c) and (e) can be assumed to be substantial. While our measure 
of hirings is a lower bound of flows from unemployment into "genuine" jobs, it is 
nevertheless the variable which should be chosen as the dependent variable when 
estimating hiring functions in the Polish labour market. Polish overall outflows from 
unemployment have a very large component which is orthogonal to flows into "genuine" 
jobs and should, therefore, not be chosen as the dependent variable in the estimation of 
such functions.
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The relative magnitude of the outflows from unemployment can best be assessed 
by looking at monthly overall outflow rates from unemployment4 (Figure 6.4). The 
yearly averages of monthly outflow rates are 5.2 and 3.5 percentage points for men and 
women respectively and 4.3 for men and women jointly. Thus, the outflow rate for men 
is on average 48% higher than that for women. This different experience in the labour 
market experience is also reflected in the job finding rate of the unemployed5 when 
disaggregated by gender (cf. Figure 6.5). The ratio of the average monthly job finding 
rate for men over the average monthly job fmding rate for women is 3% / 1.7% = 1.72.
Compared to most OECD countries, the Polish average monthly outflow rate from 
unemployment, for men and women combined, is extremely low. For example in 1991 
Austria, Norway and the U.K. had average monthly outflow rates of 25.1, 20.6 and 12.3 
percent respectively. Only France had in 1991 a similarly low outflow rate as Poland, 
namely 5.5%. On the other hand, the 1992 Polish average monthly inflow rate into 
unemployment of 0.72% is lower than in the same four OECD countries with estimated 
inflow rates for 1991 of 1.38% for both Austria and France, 1.65% for Norway and 
1.31% for the U.K.6. Further country comparisons will be made in section IV where we 
look at averages of Voivodship-level data.
Since economic activity picked up in Poland in 1992, we can assume that monthly 
outflow rates in 1990 and 1991 might have been somewhat lower in these years relative 
to 1992. Our conjecture in chapter 4 that for most months between January 1990 and 
June 1991 the steady rise in the stock of unemployment was due to small inflows being 
slightly larger than very small outflows7 seems to be borne out by the data of 1992. In 
general, these data seem to indicate that there were very limited flows between the
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different states of the labour market during the first three years of the reform period in 
Poland.
Ill Changes in the Benefit Structure in the Years 1990 - 1992 
and Active Labour Market Policies in 1992
An extended discussion of Polish active and passive labour market policies in 
1990 and 1991 can be found in Chilosi (1991, 1993) and Lehmann (1991, 1992), while 
some general lessons from western experience for Polish labour market policies have 
been presented in Lehmann and Rutkowski (1991). Here, we focus on changes in 
employment legislation which might have affected the search behaviour of the 
unemployed and describe active labour market policies in 1992.
The initial unemployment benefit system introduced at the end of 1989 was open- 
ended, eamings-related and not contingent on previous work experience. Its details are 
described in Appendix 1 of chapter 4. Three major changes have occurred since the 
inception of this system. In July 1990 the ’Employment Act’ was amended, restricting 
benefit eligibility to persons who had worked at least 180 days in the last 12 months. 
This new provision mainly excluded school leavers, but also spouses of the unemployed. 
In November 1991 President Walesa signed the ’Act on the Change of the Employment 
Act’. Its main provision ended benefits for those individuals with an uninterrupted spell 
of unemployment exceeding 12 months. However, at the same time, the Sejm passed a 
law for all those affected by this provision, extending benefit payments for one more year 
until December 1992. Only since December 1992 have benefits been removed, in 
principal, for those with spells longer than 12 months. On the other hand, the Canadian 
system of flexible benefit payments (cf. Ham and Rea (1987)) continues to be applied 
selectively in employment office districts where unemployment rates exceed a certain
285
specified threshold. Benefits are then paid for a total of 18 months.
The move to limit benefit payments in principal to 12 months was justified on the 
grounds that it would increase search efforts, lower reservation wages and consequently 
drive down the equilibrium unemployment rate. Atkinson and Mickleright (1989) review 
the theoretical and empirical literature on ’disincentive issues’ of unemployment 
compensation systems. They conclude that the above view, postulating an unequivocal 
positive incentive effect of the shortening of benefit payments on the unemployment rate, 
is rather tenuous and depends on restrictive assumptions about movements between 
labour market states. In recent empirical literature from the United States and Britain, 
different conclusions are reached about the effect of benefit entitlements on the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. For the U.S. Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990) 
look at what happens when benefits lapse. They find that hazard rates from 
unemployment are strongly affected by the remaining duration of benefit entitlement. As 
the unemployed reach the point of benefit exhaustion their hazard rates show a dramatic 
upward shift. On the other hand, Wadsworth (1991) investigates the effect of benefit 
entitlement on search effort. He establishes a significant positive link between being a 
benefit recipient and search effort, implying more job offers for those entitled to benefits.
The last important change in employment legislation whose effect on hirings is 
investigated in section IV, is the switch of benefit payment regimes which took place at 
the beginning of 1992. An eamings-related regime which some economists attacked as 
too generous8 was substituted by a flat rate system paying about 36% of the average 
wage, slightly lower than the minimum wage. Because of a ’fiscal squeeze’ which had 
started at the beginning of 1991 and became more serious throughout the year, the 
government in its provisional budget for 1992 imposed the flat rate regime. To our
286
knowledge benefits were already being paid at reduced levels in the first quarter of 1992. 
For the second quarter this regime switch was written into law.
Three ALMP measures which the government mainly employed in 1992 are 
evaluated: Further Training and Retraining, ’Prace Interwencyjne’ (’Intervention Works’) 
and Public Works. Before describing these measures, the pattern of labour market policy 
expenditures as it evolved in the first three years of reform will be briefly discussed.
The percentage share of expenditures on ALMP from the ’Labour Fund’9 
declined from 32.1% of the total in 1990 to 7% in 1991 and fell further to 4.7% in 1992. 
The steady rise in the number of unemployment benefit recipients forced the government 
to allocate an ever greater share of total expenditures for benefit payments. This share 
rose from 51.1% in 1990 to 82% in 1991 and reached 86.3% in 1992. As far as ALMP 
expenditures are concerned there has been a dramatic shift in the composition of the 
measures employed. While in 1990 81% of ALMP expenditures went on loans to set up 
a business and for firms to hire additional workers10, the share of these measures fell 
to 43% and 21% in 1991 and 1992 respectively. The share of Further Training and 
Retraining measures, on the other hand, grew from 1% in 1990 to 10% in 1991 and 
reached 17% in 1992. Trace Interwencyjne’ had a share of 18%, 47% and 45% in the 
first three years of reform, while Public Works were only introduced in 1992 and made 
up 17% of all ALMP expenditures in this year. The last three measures whose combined 
share of total ALMP expenditures rose from 19% in 1990 to 79% in 1992 will now be 
briefly described:
Public Works
Local authorities employ those with uninterrupted unemployment spells of more 
than 6 months on public projects. Most projects are intended to expand or maintain the
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public infrastructure. Some workers find employment on projects of environmental 
protection or amelioration. The duration of these jobs cannot exceed 6  months and it is 
the expressed intention of the government to rotate among the long-term unemployed. 
It is important to note that the nature of Public Works is different from that of pre- 
World-War-Two Public Works which were organised in a quasi-military fashion. 
Today’s Public Works are strongly decentralized and local authorities are encouraged to 
suggest worthwhile projects. There are no nation-wide data on average remuneration, but 
there is some casual evidence from Ministry of Labour officials that people employed on 
Public Works receive wages that are far above the minimum wage.
Prace Interwencyjne (Intervention Works)
This term is somewhat misleading. Firms (private or state-owned) can approach 
the local employment council (Polish: Rada Zatrudnienia) and ask for subsidized 
additional work places. In order to qualify for this scheme the firm has to have more 
than 10 employees and must not have released workers in the last 12 months. Again, 
employment is not to exceed 6  months. The state pays a wage subsidy to the firm equal 
to the level of benefits and often firms or local employment councils pay additional 
wages to these workers. There is casual evidence that some employees on this scheme 
earn more than colleagues employed permanently.
Further Training and Retraining
Private and public agencies are paid a fee to train some of the unemployed who 
in turn are paid an allowance while on the course. As is shown below, many of these 
courses have a very short duration and casual evidence tells us that the human capital 
enhancing content of the majority of such courses might be dubious.
Unemployed persons entering any of these schemes leave the register, i.e. flow
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out of unemployment. However, these outflows and the hiring flows are disjoint sets and 
these measures can only indirectly influence hirings. The indirect impact of these 
measures is discussed in section IV.
Given the small percentage share of ALMP expenditures in 1992, one might 
question the feasibility of statistical impact analysis. However, as Figure 6 .6  reveals, the 
combined inflows of unemployed into Intervention and Public Works schemes were quite 
substantial and their combined stocks (cf. Figure 6.7) were not negligible relative to 
hirings in the last four months of 1992. We will try to exploit this sudden rise in the 
stock data in our evaluation regressions.11 It should also be noted that the stocks were 
much larger than the inflows, indicating quite lengthy steady state mean durations of 
these two measures12. Inflows from unemployment into Further Training and 
Retraining, which also rose sharply in the last 4 months of 1992, were of the same 
magnitude as the inflows of the other two measures (cf. Figures 6 .6  and 6 .8 ). 
Particularly interesting is the fact that monthly inflows and stocks of Further Training and 
Retraining participants (Figure 6.9) were of the same magnitude. This suggests very 
short steady state mean durations for these training measures13.
IV Estimation of Polish Hiring Functions and 
the Evaluation of Passive and Active Labour Market Policies
1. The adaptation of Transition Methodology to Polish Panel Data
When using the notion of a matching function (cf. e.g. Pissarides (1990)), where
a mapping from the stocks of vacancies and unemployment to the flow of hirings is
postulated, we need to modify the approach taken in chapters 1 and 2  if we want to
model the determination of the level of hirings in the Polish labour market. These
modifications need to be made because of severe data limitations but also because of the
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panel nature of our data.
Let Hit be the number of hirings from the stock of unemployment during a certain 
time interval t taking place in Voivodship i. Recall that hirings are flows from 
unemployment into genuine jobs and exclude flows into government sponsored jobs. Let 
Vit and Uit be the stock of notified vacancies and of registered unemployed at the 
beginning of time period t in Voivodship i. Also, let Vpit be the stock of vacancies 
provided through job creation programmes and TMit the stock of training measures slots 
in Voivodship i, again both measured at the beginning of time interval t. Furthermore, 
let
V*t = V. + aV f (6 *1)T it r it it
V*it consists of notified vacancies and the sum of vacancies provided through job creation 
schemes. The two job creation schemes prevalent in Poland are Trace 
Interwencyjne’(’Intervention Works’) and Public Works programmes14. V1^  is pre­
multiplied by the parameter a  to indicate that the stocks of notified vacancies and of 
vacancies provided through job creation schemes might be mapped very differently to the 
flow of hirings. On a priori grounds it is actually not clear whether the space of 
admissible values of a  should be restricted to its non-negative part. Since the Polish 
measure of hirings only gives flows from unemployment into genuine and viable jobs 
many of which might pay wages close to unemployed workers’ reservation wages, it is 
conceivable that an increase in "public" vacancies in Voivodship i will actually increase 
reservation wages of some unemployed and thus lower hirings. Finally, let
c;  = c,(i + p ™ ,), where p> 0  and 0<c*<l (6 *2 )
The average search effectiveness of the stock of unemployment, assumed to be
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Voivodship-specific, is expressed as c*it. Negative values of the parameter P are assumed 
inadmissible as an increase in training measures cannot result in decreased average search 
effectiveness of the unemployed15. We make the strong assumption that this search 
effectiveness varies across Voivodships solely because levels of training measures vary 
across them, while the search effectiveness of the stock of unemployment in the absence 
of such measures, denoted by ct, is only time variant A specification like the one in 
(6.2) is imposed on us by the fact that we have only one data point from the Live 
Register on the duration structure of unemployment at the Voivodship level, which would 
constitute the base for the construction of a search effectiveness index varying across 
Voivodships. On the other hand, the stocks of training measures varying across 
observational units and time are available for 1992. The assumed invariance of ct across 
Voivodships, is, however, not only dictated by data constraints but can be justified to a 
degree by the observation that in 1992 the proportions of long-term unemployment, 
according to the information at our disposal, seem to vary more across time than across 
Voivodships16. The matching function is assumed to have a general Cobb-Douglas 
specification with arguments V* and U. The return to scale properties of the matching 
technology in the Polish labour market after the onset of reforms is an empirical issue 
which will be investigated in this section. "Total factor productivity" of this function (cf. 
Burda (1993b)) is denoted by At and an unobserved Voivodship-specific fixed effect by 
F,
Hence the hiring function of the Polish unemployed is given by:
H = F A c* e%V ^ 'U hl (6.3)11 it 1 v it u it
where i=l,..,49 and t is either an element of{Tj} or {T2}. T1 is the set of monthly data 
points from February 91 to December 92, while T2 spans the period January 1992 to
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December 1992. The error term, entering the hiring function multiplicatively, is assumed 
to be white noise normally distributed . Taking logs and using equations (6.1) and (6.2) 
we get
In H.t = InF. + InA, + ln[c,(l+P7M.)]
a V p e (6.4)
+ S .ln tV .d + .-L )] + 52Int/i( + e„
it
For small values of |3TMit and a(Vitp/Vit) we get the approximation
toff., = InF, + InA, + Inc, + SjlnV.
8 a  V'
+ 52ln Ut  * p™ ,, + -1 — 1  + e„
(6.5)
= InF. + InA, + 6 j In Vit + 52ln/7t.r 
V-p
+ 6, TM. + 5 “ + e3 tt 4 t /  it
it
where 83=p, 64=5ja and In A/ = In A, + In ct is the "augmented total factor productivity" 
of the hiring function. "Total factor productivity" is augmented by the time variant 
average search effectiveness of the stock of unemployment. To control for strong serial 
correlation present in the data we add a lagged dependent variable, while maintaining that 
E is distributed as N(0,c2). In order to eliminate the unobservable fixed effect we take 
first differences and arrive at the specification to be estimated
Ain Hit = A InA,* + yAln Hit_x + SjAlnV, + 8 2AlnC/,
V p (6 .6 )
+ 5,A TM.t + 84A _L + Ae,3 It 4 TT It
it
Since In is correlated with OLS estimation of (6 .6 ) would give 
inconsistent estimates, hence the need to instrument In H ^ . The unrestricted version of 
(6 .6 ) will be estimated for the short sample from January to December 1992 and we will
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employ a General-Methods-of-Moments (GMM) estimator which, under the assumption 
of no autocorrelation in levels, is most efficient in dynamic panel estimation (Arellano 
and Bond (1991)). For the longer sample from February 1991 to December 1992, 83 is 
set equal to 0 as stock data on training measures are not available for 199117. For the 
latter sample, GMM estimation does not produce two-step estimates as the number of 
instruments is larger than the number of observational units. We use, therefore, the 
consistent, but less efficient Amderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator, i.e. we use as instruments 
In Hj t.2 and Ain Hit.2 (cf. Anderson and Hsiao (1982)).
The computer programme used in our estimations is DPD developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1988). One of its attractive features is easy interpretation of the coefficients 
of included time dummies in a differenced equation when the dependent variable is in 
logs. In equation (6 .6 ) the inclusion of time dummies allows us to control for and 
estimate month-to-month growth rates of "augmented factor productivity" of the hiring 
function.
2. Voivodship-level Data
Summary statistics are given for males and females jointly in Table 6.2. The 
administrative unit used is the Voivodship rather than the employment office district as 
the data from the latter unit are presumed to be less reliable18. Since data on inflows 
into unemployment are only available from January 199219, data exclusively for 1992 
are presented. It should be noted that the averages are taken across all i and t.
The mean U/V ratio implied by the figures equals 75.7, with a rough estimate 
the monthly mean overall outflow rate from unemployment is 4.3%. Burda (1993b) has 
presented similar summary statistics for West Germany and the Czech Republic. From 
his figures we can calculate roughly comparable mean U/V ratios and estimates of mean
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overall monthly outflow rates for these labour markets. The mean U/V ratios are 5.5 and 
2.9 for West Germany and the Czech Republic respectively, while the mean monthly 
outflow rate estimates are 17.6% and 19.8%.
The experience in West Germany, taken as representative for a labour market in 
a modem economy, is, according to these statistics, clearly distinct from the experience 
of the Polish labour market even if one accounts for the fact that the figures for West 
Germany are averages taken over a boom period. The Czech mean U/V ratio is an 
average taken over the entire reform period (starting with a value of zero) while the 
Polish mean U/V ratio is an average of the third year into the reform when Voivodship- 
specific U/V ratios were high throughout. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the vast 
discrepancy between the Polish and Czech mean U/V ratios is entirely attributable to 
period-specific variation and not also a sign of a much more severe excess supply regime 
in the Polish labour market. The fact that the estimate of the mean monthly outflow rate 
from unemployment is much lower in Poland than in the Czech Republic can certainly 
be taken as evidence that the experience in the two countries is distinct. Outflow rates 
from unemployment tend to be low at the beginning of the reform period (cf. chapter 5), 
hence, ceteris paribus, the Czech estimate could have a downward bias relative to the 
Polish estimate. The upshot of these inter-country comparisons is that the Polish labour 
market in 1992 is, on average, characterized by extremely low vacancy rates relative to 
unemployment rates and relatively low outflow rates from unemployment. Both these 
facts can be taken as an expression of a much weaker demand for labour in the Polish 
labour market relative to the labour markets of e.g. West Germany and the Czech 
Republic.
Two more points need to be made about Table 6.2. First, as was the case with
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nation-wide data, a large part of the outflows from unemployment (appr. 46%) is not 
explained by hirings. Secondly, the total mean stock of ALMP measures is very small 
relative to the mean stock of registered unemployment, but roughly 65% larger than the 
mean stock of registered vacancies. One interpretation of the latter would be that much 
of the outflow from unemployment into employment can be attributed to government 
sponsored schemes and that in this sense, at least in the last months of 1992, ALMP have 
not been negligible in Poland.
In Tables 6.3 and 6.4 some summary statistics are given by gender. The data 
show a clear difference in the labour market experience for men and women. The mean 
stock of unemployment is higher for women and, given lower participation rates, the 
mean unemployment rate much higher for women than men. Also, the dispersion of 
unemployment stocks is much greater for women. Apart from unemployment and 
training, the averages of all other variables are substantially smaller for women than men. 
Thus, the estimation of disaggregated (by gender) hiring functions seems to be warranted.
3. Issues related to specification and small sample bias
Before presenting our results, some econometric issues related to specification and 
small sample bias in instrumental variables panel estimation need to be discussed.
When the number of observational units (N) is small, as is the case here where 
N=49, the standard errors of two-step estimates of coefficients and time dummies might 
have a small sample downward bias, thus generating spurious increased efficiency of the 
two-step estimator. A comparison of robust (to heteroscedasticity) one-step and two-step 
estimates in all estimations for both sample sizes pointed to the existence of such a 
downward bias. The presented results always show the robust one-step estimates of 
coefficients as the estimates of their standard errors have no small sample bias. On the
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other hand, the statistics testing for first and second order serial correlation are unbiased 
and most efficient with two-step estimation, while the Sargan test, establishing the 
validity of instruments used, is not available with one-step estimation (cf. Arellano and 
Bond (1991)). Hence the two-step estimates of the diagnostics statistics are always 
shown.
The diagnostic statistics in Tables 6.5 to 6.7 and Tables 6.9 to 6.11 allow us to 
conclude that (6.6) is an acceptable specification of the hiring function no matter which 
sample we use. For both the longer and shorter sample (Tj and TJ, whether we look at 
the aggregated hirings or the (by gender) disaggregated hirings, the test statistic of first 
order serial correlation which is distributed as asymptotically standard normal is negative 
and highly significant, while the test statistic for second order serial correlation, also 
distributed as asymptotically standard normal, is always insignificant at conventional 
levels. The results with respect to first order serial correlation can be taken as strong 
evidence that in the levels equation the error term is not generated by a random walk 
process20. If, furthermore, the error term were generated by an AR(1) process in the 
levels equation, the second order test statitistics for the differenced equation would be 
significant. The evidence makes it difficult to reject the hypothesis that in the levels 
equation (6.5) eit is a white noise variable. On the other hand, neither a random walk 
process nor an autoregressive process generating the error term seem likely.
Given that white noise e-lt is an appropriate assumption for the levels equation, 
the existence of Voivodship-specific fixed effects and time variant determinants of the 
levels of hirings common to all Voivodships can now be easily discussed. We estimated 
equation (6.5) for male, female and total hirings imposing the restriction In F—0 for all
i. The results which are not shown here21 show highly significant first and second order
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serial correlation test statistics, strongly rejecting the imposed restriction. Therefore, the 
hirings equation (6.5) needs to be differenced in order to eliminate the unobservable 
Voivodship-specific effects which give biased coefficient estimates in the levels equation. 
Finally, in the differenced equation the hypothesis was tested that Ain At*=0 for all t by 
estimating the equation without time dummies but with a trend variable. The 
inadmissibility of such restrictions was shown22 by significant second order serial 
correlation and by Sargan test statistics rejecting the validity of the set of instruments 
which did not include time dummies. Thus, a set of time dummies tracking 
developments common to all Voivodships (what we call "augmented total factor 
productivity") and Voivodship-specific fixed effects seem to be important determinants 
of hirings in the Polish labour market and equation (6 .6 ) strikes us as an appropriate 
specification of (6.3).
4. Results
For the period February 1991 - December 199223 we estimated equation (6 .6 ) 
for females and males jointly and for males and females seperately, imposing the 
restriction 6 3 = 0  for the reasons given above. In all these regressions, the estimate of 8 4 
was very insignificant, so that we re-estimated (6 .6 ) for the three sets imposing the 
further restriction S4=0. As far as the longer sample is concerned we are not able to 
detect a statistically significant effect of active labour market policies on the level of 
hirings.
The results of the estimation of the restricted equation (6 .6 ), presented in Tables 
6.5 - 6.7, do not seem to point to the existence of a well behaved matching function in 
the Polish labour market. In all three regressions, the coefficient on vacancies is 
completely insignificant and in two out of three cases it has the wrong sign. In the
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regressions for males and females jointly and for males only the coefficient on 
unemployment is significant at the 10% or 5% level respectively24, while the level of 
female hirings seems to be solely determined by the lagged level of hirings itself. This 
is further evidence that the experience for unemployed men and women is different in 
the Polish labour market.
In those regressions where unemployment has some predictive power, the hiring 
functions seem to exhibit increasing returns to scale in the steady state. The hiring 
function for males has a steady state coefficient of 2.29 on the log of unemployment, 
while this coefficient takes the value 1.75 in the hiring function for males and females 
combined25. Below, the null hypothesis that this latter function exhibits CRS will be 
formally tested.
The main result of these regressions is, however, that, at least for males, the stock 
of registered unemployment is an important predictor of the level of hirings while the 
stock of notified vacancies plays no role whatsoever. The interpretation of this result 
is not necessarily straightforward. One way to approach this result is to take account of 
the vast discrepancy between the total number of registered unemployed and the total 
number of notified vacancies at a given point in time and to perform two different 
transformations of a variant of equation (6.3). Without loss of generality we can 
substitute Vit for Vit* and A/ for AtCit*. Imposing CRS on equation (6.3), the hiring rate, 
H/V, and the job finding rate, H/U, can then be easily derived:
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(6.3’)
(6.3” )
If Y is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, the condition of CRS in a 
dynamic specification becomes 51+82 = 1-y, and estimable transformed versions of 
equation (6.6) are
Table 6.8 shows the estimates of these two equations. While all the diagnostic 
statistics are satisfactory, the null hypothesis of CRS is clearly rejected by the F-test 
The results are thus discussed for heuristic purposes only.
Assuming for the moment the validity of CRS in the hiring function, the 
asymmetric situation in the Polish labour market is well demonstrated by the two 
regressions in Table 6.8. The U/V ratio is a highly significant positive predictor of the 
hiring rate (H/V), which, in our context, one can think of as an index of the ease with 
which a firm is able to fill a vacancy from the pool of the unemployed26. On the other 
hand, the V/U ratio is not correlated in a statistically significant way with the job finding 
rate (H/U), which one can think of as an unemployed worker’s average probability of 
becoming employed. The first relationship implies that for the given number of 
vacancies (which is very small relative to the number of unemployed) an increase in the 
number of unemployed makes it easier for a firm to fill one vacancy from the pool of
A(lnHit -InV, ) = AinA/ + yA(lntf -In V, ) 
+ 52 A(lnf/, -InV ,) + Ae,
(6.6’)
A(lnHit -Inf/, ) = AinA,m + yM hiH ^-lnU ,  ) 
+ 8j A(lnV, -Inf/, ) + Ae,
(6.6” )
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the unemployed. The second relationship says that for the given large number of 
unemployed an increase in the number of vacancies does not in any significant way 
increase an unemployed worker’s chance of finding employment. This asymmetric 
experience of firms and unemployed workers is not very surprising if we look at the 
mean hiring and job finding rates implied by Table 6.2. Assuming that the mean levels 
of hirings and unemployment are accurately given and that the true mean level of 
vacancies registered with employment offices is reflected in the official figures, the 
estimated mean hiring rate is 1.767 and the estimated mean job finding rate is 0.02327. 
The extreme asymmetry in these numbers makes it, in our opinion, inappropriate to call 
the underlying process a matching process. As far as unemployed workers are concerned 
they have no bargaining power, hence the term hiring process seems more to the point.28
If we are to believe our estimates, different scenarios of this hiring process can 
be played out which might explain the predictive power of unemployment and the 
statistical insignificance of vacancies. One scenario could be skill mismatch. The stock 
of notified vacancies consists of job slots which are hard to fill from the existing pool 
of the unemployed and only an increase in the stock of the unemployed makes it possible 
to fill some of these slots. However, two things run against this scenario. First, in the 
unrestricted estimates of the hiring function for males and females and males jointly, the 
hiring process exhibits increasing returns to scale. Secondly, the vast majority of notified 
vacancies are in Polish statistical terminology "blue collar vacancies"29 making it rather 
unlikely that we are considering vacancies firms cannot fill because of skill mismatch. 
Another scenario is that firms offer a small number of low productivity job slots to the 
unemployed at wages below or around the unemployed workers’ reservation wages. At 
already very high levels of unemployment, further increases in unemployment can have
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a sobering effect on some of the unemployed, who might harbour misperceptions about 
their future job prospects, triggering a substantial enough fall in reservation wages to 
generate increasing returns in the hiring technology. The evidence which is available on 
the kind of vacancies registered with employment offices30 could support this scenario.
Of course, the results we get when estimating (6.6) could also be driven by the 
fact that many of the vacancies for which unemployed persons are considered are not 
registered with employment offices. While the data on hiring and the registered 
unemployed might be relatively reliable, the data on notified vacancies might not reflect 
the true number of vacancies which Polish firms might like to fill from the pool of 
unemployed. So, there might exist a well functioning matching technology in the Polish 
labour market and the data at our disposal are just not able to pick up this stable 
relationship between the stocks of unemployment and vacancies and the flow of 
hirings.31
At any rate, the data analysis undertaken does produce well specified hiring 
functions which will be used to explore empirically the other two topics of interest 
mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Tables 6.5 to 6.7 are now revisited to examine whether the introduction of a new 
regime of benefit payments at the beginning of 1992 had an impact on the level of 
hirings which showed consecutive increases, at least for men, in February, March and 
April of 1992, a growth pattern which we do not observe in the same months of the 
previous year (cf. Table 6.A1). Because of a "fiscal squeeze" the government abolished 
the existing eamings-related benefit system (cf. appendix 1, ch.4) and introduced a 
uniform flat rate approximately equal to the minimum wage. This resulted in a sharp fall 
in the average replacement ratio (cf. OECD (1993), chapter 2) which might have caused
a lowering of the reservation wage of some workers thus possibly enabling more hirings.
An ideal way to investigate whether this regime switch had an impact on hirings 
would consist of the inclusion of a benefit dummy (with values of 0 for 1991 and of 1 
for 1992) into the set of regressors also containing time dummies. In this way the effect 
of the benefit regime switch could be netted out of the change in "augmented total factor 
productivity" of the hiring function. Since both benefit dummy and time dummies model 
aggregate determinants of the hiring function, the former is perfectly collinear with the 
latter and the matrix z’x is singular. Alternative specifications of the matrix of regressors 
which included a time trend or the aggregate U/V ratio and the benefit dummy but 
excluded time dummies produced, as seen, unsatisfactory diagnostic statistics. Thus the 
empirical implementation of the evaluation of the benefit regime switch must include 
time dummies and exclude the benefit dummy.
In Tables 6.5 - 6.7 the constant term gives the growth rate of "augmented total 
factor productivity" in the base month, May 1991, while the coefficients on the time 
dummies give the deviations from this base month growth rate. By adding the constant 
term to each time dummy coefficient we get an estimate of the absolute growth rate of 
"augmented total factor productivity" for each month of interest. The pattern of these 
growth rates over time is taken as evidence of the impact of the benefit regime switch 
on the level of hirings. In Figures 6.10 - 6.12 the estimated absolute monthly growth 
rates of "augmented total factor productivity" are plotted for the period May 1991 to 
December 1992. These data show a clear seasonal pattern.32 However, for the first four 
months in 1992 the pattern is somewhat different. Especially in Figure 6.11 which gives 
the estimates for males, the period January 1992 - April 1992 displays four consecutive 
positive absolute growth rates (17.1%, 8.2%, 2.7% and 25.9%). Inspection of Table 6.6
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shows that all these growth rates are highly significant. For women separately (Figure 
6.12) and for men and women combined (Figure 6.10) this deviation in the pattern is not 
that strong, again pointing to different experiences for men and women in the Polish 
labour market.
In Poland the first four months of 1992 cannot be characterized as a time when 
economic activity picked up dramatically compared with the preceding months. 
Seasonally unadjusted aggregate data on e.g. industrial production, investment outlays and 
average employment in the six sectors of the national economy do not produce any sign 
of a substantive economic upturn in this period33. There are no data available on the 
duration structure of unemployment in 1991 and in the first half of 1992. Given the low 
monthly outflow rates from unemployment throughout 1992 (cf. Figure 6.4) it is highly 
unlikely that the duration structure of unemployment could in this period have changed 
drammatically towards a distribution with more mass in shorter duration categories, thus 
boosting the average search effectiveness of the unemployed. The only experience 
common to all voivodships at the beginning of 1992 which could have a positive impact 
on the level of hirings is the regime switch in benefit payments. Let us assume that the 
jobs offered to the unemployed are low productivity jobs which pay wages around their 
reservation wages. Then the regime switch which took place in Poland at the beginning 
of 1992 could have lowered the reservation wage of many unemployed and the four 
consecutive positive absolute growth rates of "augmented total factor productivity" could 
be taken as indirect evidence that introducing a flat rate of benefit payments had, at least 
for men, a significant positive impact on the level of hirings.34
The final issue to be tackled in this section is the evaluation of active labour 
market policies in 1992. As Figures 6.7 and 6.9 show the stocks of Community and
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Public Works vacancies and the stocks of Retraining and Further Training participants 
increased drammatically in the last four months of 1992. We are interested in whether 
these changes had an impact on the level of hirings. As was previously discussed, 
training schemes have only an indirect impact on our measure of hirings via increased 
average search effectiveness of the stock of unemployed. This indirect impact can in our 
specific case only be picked up by the data if many of the Polish training measures are 
short-term, which we define as lasting up to one month. The available flow data on 
training measures allow us to estimate steady state mean durations of a training measure. 
For the last four months of 1992 the estimated mean duration was between 1 and 2 
months for males and females alike35. Thus many training measures must be of a very 
short-term nature and evaluation of such measures within the present framework seems 
appropriate.
Tables 6.9 - 6.11 present estimates of equation (6.6) for the shorter sample T2. 
Comparison of these results with the estimates of Tables 6.5 - 6.7 shows that the various 
hiring functions are "structurally stable" over the period 1991-1992. In all regressions 
with sample T2 the coefficient on vacancies is close to 0 and insignificant, while in those 
regressions where the unemployment variable has predictive power the steady state values 
of its coefficient are very similar to those of the regressions with sample T^ This can 
be taken as informal evidence of structural stability of the hiring functions36.
The effect of ALMP on the level of hirings should be discussed seperately for 
men and women as even a superficial analysis of Tables 6.10 and 6.11 makes clear. In 
the regression for males with both ALMP measures included, the coefficient on the stock 
of training participants is positive and significant at the 5% level while the ratio V^/Vt 
has no predictive power. When the latter measure is excluded the coefficient on the
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training measure rises by 13.5 per cent. The steady state value of the coefficient on the 
stock of male training participants (appr. 0.089) implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase 
of this stock by 100 will raise the level of hirings by about 9 per cent. In the regression 
for women with all regressors included the coefficient on / Vt is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. There is some (negative) correlation between this ratio and 
vacancies and the stock of training participants. However, the regression with only 
training as an ALMP measure included, though raising the estimate of the coefficient on 
training, did not produce significance at conventional levels. On the other hand, 
excluding the stock of female training participants from the regression resulted in a very 
well defined negative coefficient on V1^ / Vt. The steady state value of this coefficient 
(-0.076) implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the ratio of "public vacancies" for 
women relative to the total of notified vacancies by one will lower the level of female 
hirings into genuine jobs by about 7.3 per cent
The magnitudes of these results are not too striking if we consider the sharp 
increase in the number of training participants and in the VyVt ratio in the last four 
months of 1992. What is very interesting is the fact that, although unemployed women 
have higher participation rates in training measures, this higher participation does not 
have an effect on hirings while training measures for men seem to boost hirings. The 
ineffectiveness of female training measures and the fact that, ceteris paribus, an increase 
in "public vacancies" lowers female hirings can be considered reasonable results if the 
most jobs on offer for unemployed women pay extremely low wages. So, as "public 
vacancies" are increased in a Voivodship, many unemployed women might revise their 
reservation wages upward and female hirings are decreased. Alternatively, some of the 
unemployed women whose probability of finding a genuine job at any wage rate is very
low37 might wait for a slot on the ’Intervention Works’ or Public Works scheme. This 
can be a rational decision given that the probability of being taken on a scheme is only 
slightly lower than that of finding a genuine job38 and given that remuneration on a 
scheme can be substantially higher than that in a genuine job. The same reasoning could 
apply to men whose average monthly job finding rate and whose monthly probability of 
being employed on a scheme are similar (3% and 2.36%, cf. Table 6.4). The fact that 
"public vacancies" do not impact negatively on male hirings might then have two 
alternative explanations. Either there is more social pressure on men to take up 
permanent jobs even at very low wage rates, or there exist some job offers for men at 
employment offices which pay a wage rate far above the minimum wage39.
Training measures boost male hirings but have no effect on female hirings. One 
explanation of this result could be that training courses for men have a human capital 
enhancing element, increasing the average search effectiveness of male unemployment, 
which is lacking in the training courses for women. However, there is no evidence for 
this assertion. A better explanation could be that even if the average search effectiveness 
of unemployed women is raised by these training measures, virtually all jobs on offer for 
them are low productivity, minimum wage jobs unacceptable to most of them40.
V Conclusions
The descriptive analysis of the available flow data shows that in 1992 Polish 
flows between the different states of the labour market were small compared to most 
OECD countries. It also indicates that the labour market experience was different for men 
and women, as shown by lower female outflow rates and job finding rates.
The econometric results do not establish a well behaved matching function, as
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vacancies have no predictive power in any of the regressions. This is explained by the 
asymmetry in the Polish labour market of very high levels of unemployment and 
negligible levels of vacancies. However, well specified hiring functions can be estimated. 
The results of these estimations confirm that men and women have different experiences 
in the labour market. The hirings of women seem be determined, apart from lagged 
hirings, by unobservable Voivodship-specific fixed effects and aggregate variables 
common to all Voivodships. The level of male hirings, on the other hand, is not only 
determined by these variables but also by the stock of male unemployment. The 
estimates of the coefficient on the unemployment variable indicate an increasing returns 
to scale hiring technology for men. At very high levels of unemployment, increasing 
returns to scale might imply that, as unemployment rises even further, many male 
unemployed revise their reservation wages downward, thus boosting hirings. There is 
also some evidence that the benefit regime switch at the beginning of 1992 and the 
introduction of training measures in the latter part of 1992 have raised male hirings. The 
only statistically significant impact on female hirings comes from the introduction of 
"public vacancies" and is negative. Some women revise their reservation wages upward, 
others wait to be taken on a government sponsored scheme which normally pays a higher 
wage than the genuine jobs on offer for unemployed women.
The different experience for men and women, as seen in the raw data and the 
estimation results, is driven by two things. There are a lot more jobs on offer for 
unemployed men than unemployed women, but also the distribution of reservation wages 
and wages for jobs on offer for unemployed men overlap considerably while for women 
these distributions hardly overlap at all.
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Footnotes
1. We compute these overall outflows using the same stock-flow identity as in chapters
1, 2 and 4:
\  = AUttl .
2. Hirings as a percentage fraction of outflows from unemployment in 1992 were as 
follows:
Month Total Female Male
Jan 55 56 55
Feb 69 61 77
Mar 40 34 44
Apr 60 58 61
May 59 51 65
Jun 51 42 58
Jul 57 54 60
Aug 64 59 68
Sep 60 60 60
Oct 54 48 58
Nov 53 49 56
Dec 44 40 47
3. There is no hard evidence on the magnitude of these flows, but casual evidence 
suggests that these flows are not negligible.
4. If we denote outflows from unemployment during month t as At and the stock of 
unemployment at the beginning of month t as Ut, then the overall outflow rate is defined 
as
5. If hirings during month t are denoted as H  and the stock at the beginning of month 
t as Ut, then we define the job finding rate of the unemployed as
H,
U, '
6. These outflow and inflow rates can be found in OECD (1993), chapter2.
7. Only in the summer months (June, July and August) did we assume relative large 
inflows of school leavers into the pool of the unemployed. Furthermore, in November 
1990 when many registered unemployed without prior work experience lost their benefit 
eligibility there might have been larger outflows than usual.
308
8. For a description of this system see Appendix 1 in chapter 4. Layard (1990a) believes 
that the replacement ratio was very high in Poland in 1990. However, at least during this 
year, for many workers non-wage income was still a substantial part of their income. 
Thus unemployment benefits of say 70% meant less than 70% of an employed worker’s 
income in 1990.
9. A fund set up by the Mazowiecki government in 1989 to finance expenditures of 
passive and active labour market policies. A mandatory contribution from employers 
(until the end of 1992 2% of the wage bill, from the beginning of 1993 3% of the wage 
bill) and transfers from the central budget make up the bulk of the income of the Labour 
Fund. Transfers from the central budget were 70.2% of total income in 1990, 57.2% in 
1991 and 68.2% in 1992. Employers’ contributions amounted to 23.7% in 1990, 31.6% 
in 1991 and 26% in 1992. The given figures and the figures which follow are taken 
from Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (April 1991 and April 1993).
10. The first type of loan is comparable to the British Enterprise Allowance Scheme (cf. 
chapter 1) while the second type is a subsidy for additional workers. Most loans in 1990 
(but also in 1991 and 1992) went to individuals to set up their own business and only 
very few additional work places were generated by these loans to firms. In Lehmann 
(1991) both types of loans are critically discussed, no serious evaluation of both measures 
has been, however, undertaken thus far.
11. It is important to note that there is no endogeneity problem with the ALMP measures. 
The government did not react to low hiring flows (they were low throughout 1991 and 
1992) by boosting these measures. The Ministry of Finance finally released funds in 
August 1992, earmarked much earlier for ALMP.
12. For September to December 1992 we have the following estimates of steady state 
mean durations of Intervention and Public Works:
Duration in months
month total female male
Sep 3.57 3.87 3.43
Oct 2.64 3.07 2.49
Nov 3.75 3.41 3.95
Dec 5.79 5.05 6.32
13. For September to December 1992 we have the following estimates of steady state 
mean durations of training measures:
Duration in months
month total female male
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Sep 1.07
Oct 1.34
Nov 2.21
Dec 1.97
1.08
1.32
2.12
1.83
1.06
1.36
2.35
2.22
14. For a description of these programmes, see the previous section.
15. Of course, we could get P < 0 if we had the very unlikely scenario that such 
measures trained people systematically and predominantly in skills not required by firms.
16. In Table 6.1 the duration structure of unemployment is given for May and December 
1992, while Table 6.A2 shows this structure at the end of December 1992 for males and 
females at the Voivodship level. The unbiased estimate of the variance is given by
and t= {May 92, Dec 92} and i=l,...,49. S2 estimated across time ,i.e. S2 of 24.5 and 
45.2 (the two percentage proportions of long-term unemployment for males and females 
in May and December 1992) equals 214.245, while S2 of those proportions estimated 
across Voivodships in December 1992 is only 67.742. One may note that even if we use 
S2*=S2(k-l)/k as our measure of variation, S2* estimated across time equals 107.125, but 
66.359 when estimated across Voivodships.
17. One should note that in 1991 and for most of 1992 expenditures on training measures 
too minuscule to be evaluated with this methodology. When estimating a hiring function 
for the longer sample we, therefore, do not have the problem of an omitted variable 
which would bias the coefficients of some of the regressors.
18. According to officials in the Central Statistical Office (GUS) who deal with labour 
market data on a daily basis.
19. Outflows for the i-th Voivodship are calculated using the stock-flow identity
20. If eit was generated by a random walk, the test statistics for first and second order 
serial correlation would be both insignificant.
21. They are available from the author upon request
22. Again, these results are not shown here but are available upon request.
23. DPD sets the first three observations aside as instruments, so that the shown period 
is May 91 - December 1992.
24. As hirings seem to depend on unemployment the lagged difference and the lagged 
level of unemployment were included in the set of instruments, thus generating a more 
efficient AH estimator.
,where k-t or k-i
k - 1
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25. Burda (1993b) who regresses the stocks of unemployment and vacancies on gross 
outflows from unemployment stresses that the coefficient on unemployment has an 
upward bias in a differenced equation. This upward bias exists in his differenced 
regression because there is positive correlation between AUit and Aeit since (in our 
notation) Uit=Ui t_1+Ii t_1-Ai t_1 and contains ei t.j. In our regressions, however, this bias 
is not present as our dependent variable is not derived via the stock-flow identity but 
given exogenously. It is also worth mentioning that this bias in differenced gross outflow 
regressions can easily be eliminated by instrumenting AUit using a GMM or an AH 
estimator.
26. On should not speak of a probability as estimates of H/V can exceed 1.
27. These numbers imply that in the steady state the average duration of a notified 
vacancy is 0.56 months and the average duration of an unemployment spell ending in 
"genuine" employment is 43.47 months (!).
28. Burda (1993a) finds a well behaved matching function for the Czech Republic (but 
also for Czechoslovakia). Given the very different data underlying the experience in the 
Czech labour market cited above, our different findings for the Polish labour market are 
not that surprising.
29. In Polish "Oferty Pracy Robotnicze". On average in 1992 "blue collar vacancies" 
constituted 84% of all notified vacancies.
30. There is no good evidence on notified vacancies nationwide. We inquired, however, 
about vacancies with the employment office in Warsaw, where we would expect more 
and better paid job offers than in most districts in the country. In April 1993, the vast 
majority of offered jobs (around 80%) were paying the minimum wage and apart from 
two outliers all other jobs on offer paid below the average wage.
31. It is also possible that in future when using aggregate time series a well behaved 
matching function can be found in the Polish labour market and that when using regional 
panel data such a function cannot be established even with correctly measured data. Such 
a possibility is e.g. discussed by Borsch-Supan (1991) who demonstrates that a stable 
German Beveridge curve, well established with aggregate time series data, cannot be 
found with regional panel data.
32. One should note, however, that time dummies in DPD do not control for seasonality.
33. We need to look at seasonally unadjusted aggregates as the time dummies track, but 
do not control for seasonal variation. Seasonally unadjusted industrial production was 
in the first four months of 1992 on average 84.4% of average industrial production in 
1990, while in the last four months of 1991 industrial production averaged 83.3% of the 
1990 number (GUS (December, 1992), page 20). Average employment in the six sectors 
of the economy declined in the first 4 months of 1992 over the last 4 months of 1991 
from 86.3% to 83.7% of the monthly mean value of 1990 (Ibidem, page 14). Investment 
outlays increased by only 4.7% in real terms in the period January - June 1992 over the 
same period in 1991 (Ibidem, Tables 29 (page 88) and 22 (page 80).
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34. This evidence is somewhat weak since we cannot compare the pattern of January - 
April 1992 to the pattern of the same time interval for another year. Once the data 
become available for the first 4 months in 1993, the growth rate pattern of these latter 
months can be inspected. If it is substantially different from that of January - April 
1992, then we would have stronger evidence for our assertion.
35. See footnote 13.
36. A formal test was also performed with the longer sample by augmenting the regressor 
matrix with 2 columns where we put zeroes for 1991 and the values of the vacancy and 
unemployment variables for the subsample 1992. The Wald statistic testing for the joint 
significance of these 2 columns turned out to be insignificant.
37. According to Table 6.3 an estimate of the average monthly job finding rate for 
women is 1.74%.
38. An estimate of the former probability is 1.22% (cf. Table 6.3).
39. Even though vacancies are no longer given by gender, casual evidence from the 
Warsaw employment office tells us that job offers exist explicitly for women (e.g. in 
retail) most of which have a wage rate close to the minimum wage. On the other hand 
there are some job offers for men with better remuneration. Clearly, data need to be 
collected on the distribution of notified vacancies (by job content, skill, payment level 
etc.) before one can go beyond conjecture.
40. While there is no representative information on the payment structure of vacancies, 
firm evidence on the structure of reservation wages exists. The following table, based 
on the November 1992 Polish Labour Force Survey, demonstrates that most women have 
reservation wages above the minimum wage.
Distribution of Reservation Wages in Per Cent 
November 1992
Reservation Wage Band Men Women
(in million of Zloty)
< 1.0 0.8 1.3
1.0 - 1.5 28.1 45.1
1.5 - 2.0 37.2 39.3
2.0 - 2.5 15.3 8.1
2.5 - 3.0 12.9 4.4
>3.0 5.7 1.8
Minimum Wage in November 1992: appr. 1,150,000 Zloty. 
Source: GUS (February 1993)
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Data Sources:
Data Appendix
For 1991, all Voivodship-level data used in the regressions were taken from the data base 
of the Polish labour market developed by Jan Rutkowski and Hartmut Lehmann at the 
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
For 1992, the following unpublished tables provided by GUS were exploited:
Table 6: Stocks of unemployment*, inflows into unemployment and hirings from 
unemployment at Voivodship level;
Table 12: Stocks of vacancies at Voivodship level;
Table 15: Further Training and Retraining participants at Voivodship level;
Table 17: Intervention Works and Public Works participants at Voivodship level;
Table 33: Registered Unemployment according to duration at Voivodship level**.
* All stocks are end-of-month data.
** Table 33 is for the reported period of 1992 only available in December, while all 
other mentioned tables are given monthly.
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Table 6.1
The distribution (in per cent) of incomplete 
unemployment spells (s) in Poland
May 1992:*
Total
stock duration in months
0<s<l l<s<3 3<s<6 6<s<12
Male &
Female
2228000 7.5
Male 
1112000  8 . 8
Female
1116000 6.3
1 2 . 6
12.7
12.4
19.5
2 0 . 1
18.9
35.9
33.9
37.9
s>12
24.5
24.5
24.5
* Estimates from Polish LFS 
Source: GUS (October 1992).
December 1992:*
Total
stock duration in months
0<s<l l<s<3 3<s<6 6<s<9 9<s<12 s>12
Male &
Female
2509342 4.7
Male
1170533 6
Female
1338809 3.6
12.5
14.4
1 0 . 8
15.7
15.9
15.4
11.9
12.4
11.5
10
1 0 . 6
45.2
40.6
9.5 49.2
* Actual numbers from Polish Live Register.
Source: Unpublished register data provided by GUS.
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Table 6.2
Monthly Summary Statistics on Voivodship Level 
Males and Females - January-December 1992
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Hirings 1114.7 650.0 167 3954
Outflows* 2079.8 1803.6 162 15557
Unemployment 47746.5 21716.5 11556 150641
Vacancies 630.6 1001.5 4 6615
Training 185.1 385.1 0 4351
Interv. Works 685.6 523.1 16 2985
Pub.Works 170.5 294.6 0 1953
* 5 negative values were deleted out of 588 observations.
Table 6.3
Monthly Summary Statistics on Voivodship Level 
Females - January-December 1992
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Hirings 441.5 307.1 55 2037
Outflows* 919.2 887.0 6 6829
Unemployment 25356.9 13349.7 6669 102134
Training 105.9 236.4 0 2396
Interv. Works 299.2 242.3 10 1462
Pub.Works 9.6 24.6 0 411
*12 negative values were deleted out of 588 observations.
Table 6.4
Monthly Summary Statistics on Voivodship Level 
Males - January-December 1992
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Hirings 673.2 370.7 85 1976
Outflows* 1175.6 968.0 109 8728
Unemployment 22389.6 9141.9 4828 55676
Training 79.2 160.3 0 2039
Interv. Works 386.5 305.5 1 1648
Pub.Works 160.9 278.5 0 1854
* 5 negative values were deleted out of 588 observations.
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Table 6.5 Panel data estimate of hiring function
Poland 1991 - 1992 (males and females)
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV
Number of Voivodships: 49 Sample period:May 91 - Dec 92
Observations: 980 Degrees of freedom: 957
Dependent variable is:In H,.
Instruments used are (Anderson-Hsiao Estimator):
CONST dht(-2) ht(-2) dut dut(-l) ut(-l) dvt
time dummies
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS
Wald test of joint significance: 66.077358 df = 3
Wald test - jt sig of time dums: 713.099253 df = 20
VARIABLES <COEFFICIENTS Std. Error T-Stat P-Value
constant -0.149619 0.046323 -3.229925 0.001238
In IM-1) 0.569237 0.075933 7.496540 0.000000
In Ut 0.769462 0.425260 1.809390 0.070390
In Vt -0.007247 0.037186 -0.194874 0.845491
TIME DUMMIES
6/91 0.151028 0.068688 2.198763 0.027895
7/91 -0.014268 0.053256 -0.267921 0.788760
8/91 0.152486 0.063125 2.415631 0.015708
9/91 0.474111 0.059778 7.931209 0.000000
10/91 -0.023969 0.054892 -0.436666 0.662353
11/91 -0.179665 0.065555 -2.740675 0.006131
12/91 0.030279 0.056028 0.540429 0.588901
1/92 0.347023 0.104813 3.310887 0.000930
2/92 0.200652 0.064075 3.131516 0.001739
3/15 0.147504 0.068432 2.155491 0.031123
4/92 0.358860 0.056287 6.375570 0.000000
5/92 -0.029028 0.064907 -0.447221 0.654715
6/92 0.112280 0.063955 1.755600 0.079157
7/92 0.015826 0.057485 0.275309 0.783079
8/92 0.146178 0.050508 2.894148 0.003802
9/92 0.547231 0.054442 10.051694 0.000000
10/92 0.178833 0.054428 3.285667 0.001017
11/92 -0.236585 0.046379 -5.101146 0.000000
12/92 -0.083621 0.072166 -1.158730 0.246566
TWO-STEP ESTIMATES
Wald test of joint significance: 80.624662 df = 3
Wald test - jt sig of time dums: 777.989056 df = 20
Sargan test: 3.010905 df = 3
(probvalue=0.390)
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -4.499
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 0.210
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Table 6.6 Panel data estimate of hiring function
Poland 1991 - 1992 (males)
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV
Number of Voivodships: 49 Sample period: May 91 - Dec 92
Observations: 980 Degrees of freedom: 955
Dependent variable is: In H,
Instruments used are (Anderson-Hsiao Estimator):
CONST dhm(-2) hm(-2) dum dum(-l) um(-l) dvt
time dummies
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS
VARIABLES COEFFCIENTS Std. Error T-Stat P-Value
constant -0.175519 0.048871 -3.591437 0.000329
In H^ (-1) 0.539130 0.060547 8.904345 0.000000
In U, 1.076382 0.369801 2.910707 0.003606
In Vt -0.005816 0.036004 -0.161535 0.871672
TIME DUMMIES 
6/91 0.155045 0.076501 2.026696 0.042694
7/91 -0.020344 0.059791 -0.340249 0.733669
8/91 0.159702 0.067865 2.353217 0.018612
9/91 0.394038 0.064347 6.123661 0.000000
10/91 0.128520 0.052242 2.460090 0.013890
11/91 -0.226723 0.078728 -2.879842 0.003979
12/91 0.032760 0.060290 0.543373 0.586873
1/92 0.346754 0.105364 3.291016 0.000998
2/92 0.257197 0.068067 3.778603 0.000158
3/92 0.202642 0.077801 2.604612 0.009198
4/92 0.434381 0.057765 7.519749 0.000000
5/92 -0.020670 0.069995 -0.295304 0.767762
6/92 0.095979 0.064657 1.484423 0.137697
7/92 0.059105 0.058579 1.008986 0.312981
8/92 0.144076 0.052828 2.727287 0.006386
9/92 0.460071 0.062070 7.412159 0.000000
10/92 0.427348 0.062270 6.862785 0.000000
11/92 -0.376085 0.055252 -6.806696 0.000000
12/92 -0.076145 0.072023 -1.057228 0.290408
TWO-STEP ESTIMATES
Wald test of joint significance: 98.287281 df = 3
Wald test - jt sig of time dums: 740.592940 df = 20
Sargan test: 1.833730 df = 3
Robust test for first-order
(probvalue=0.607) 
serial correlation: -4.694
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -0.308
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Table 6.7 Panel data estimate of hiring function
Poland 1991 -1992 (females)
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV
Number of Voivodships: 49 Sample period: May 91 - Dec 92
Observations: 980 Degrees of freedom: 957
Dependent variable is: In H£
Instruments used are (Anderson-Hsiao estimator):
CONST dhf(-2) hf(-2) duf duf(-l) uf(-l) dvt
time dummies
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS Std. Error T-Stat P-Value
constant -0.099562 0.051525 -1.932311 0.053321
In Hf(-1) 0.472272 0.084648 5.579213 0.000000
In Uf 0.375574 0.538152 0.697895 0.485243
In Vt 0.013032 0.043103 0.302335 0.762397
TIME DUMMIES
6/91 0.135663 0.079642 1.703415 0.088490
7/91 -0.008252 0.057871 -0.142593 0.886612
8/91 0.100116 0.071313 1.403882 0.160354
9/91 0.591140 0.068696 8.605140 0.000000
10/91 -0.200054 0.072996 -2.740622 0.006132
11/91 -0.105534 0.060785 -1.736190 0.082530
12/91 -0.020646 0.060915 -0.338938 0.734657
1/92 0.302885 0.105097 2.881952 0.003952
2/92 0.115192 0.073986 1.556948 0.119483
3/92 0.059051 0.062307 0.947747 0.343258
4/92 0.219663 0.080677 2.722737 0.006474
5/92 -0.016985 0.066600 -0.255028 0.798702
6/92 0.131462 0.071067 1.849816 0.064340
7/92 -0.049823 0.069388 -0.718029 0.472739
8/92 0.112100 0.056408 1.987294 0.046890
9/92 0.661221 0.073232 9.029136 0.000000
10/92 -0.150783 0.067360 -2.238478 0.025190
11/92 0.034262 0.065645 0.521930 0.601719
12/92 -0.161289 0.077978 -2.068403 0.038602
TWO STEP ESTIMATES
Sargan test: 5.174002 df = 3
(probvaluesO.159)
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -4.916
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 1.634
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Table 6.8 Panel data estimates of hiring and
job finding rate: CRS imposed on hiring function
Poland 1991-1992 (males and females)
Number of Voivodships: 49 Sample period: Nay 91 - December 92 
Observations: 980 Degrees of freedom: 958
1. Dependent variable is: In (H/V)t; First differences and IV
Instruments used are:
CONST dhvt(-2) hvt(-2) duvt dut(-l)
Restricted RSS = 102.061 Uhrestricted RSS
F-Test: H0: 5X + 52 = 1 - y ; F(l,955) = 25.5 .
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS
ut(-l) time dummies 
99.409
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS Std. Error T-Stat P-Value
constant -0.136956
In (H/V)t 0.561577
In (U/V)t' 0.449607
TWO-STEP ESTIMATES
0.038395
0.072616
0.066367
-3.567044
7.733571
6.774541
0.000361
0.000000
0.000000
Sargan test: 3.033711 df = 3
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -4.633
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 0.130
2. Dependent variable is: In (H/U)t; First differences and IV
Instruments used are:
CONST dhut(-2) hut(-2) dvut dut(-l) ut(-l) time dummies
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS
Std. Error
0.038395
0.072616
0.039219
T-Stat
-3.567044
7.733571
-0.285166
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS
constant -0.136956 
In (H/U)^ 0.561577
In (V/U)t' -0.011184
TWO-STEP ESTIMATES
Sargan test: 3.033711 df s 3
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -4.633
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 0.130
P-Value
0.000361
0.000000
0.775517
Time dummies were included into the regressions.
319
Table 6.9 - Panel estimates of hiring functions
Poland: April - December 1992 (females and males)
-Estimation in first differences and IV-
Dependent Variable: 
Observational units:
ESTIMATES*
Regressors
const
In Ht(-1)
In Ut
In Vt
(V ^ /V t
TM,./100
DIAGNOSTICS**
Sargan Test
1st order ser. corr. 
2nd order ser. corr.
In Ht 
49 Voivodships; Observations: 441
0.225**
(0.046)
0.590**
(0.076)
0.795**
(0.397)
-0.040
(0.055)
-0.009
(0.006)
0 . 0 1 0
(0.007)
Chi3 (27) =22. 09 
(probval=0.733)
ANt = -4.764
AN2 = -0.946
0.225**
(0.047)
0.588**
(0.079)
0.883**
(0.398)
-0.039
(0.055)
- 0 . 01 1 *
(0.006)
Coefficients
0 . 222**
(0.046)
0.556**
(0.071)
0.839**
(0.413)
0 . 0 0 1
(0.041)
0.013*
(0.007)
Chi3 (27) =23.52 
(probval=0.657)
ANX = -5.001
ANa = -0.919
Chi3 (27) =24.04 
(probval=0.628)
ANt = -4.867
AN3 = -1.004
0 . 2 2 2 **
(0.046)
0.540**
(0.085)
0.967**
(0.418)
0.016
(0.039)
Chi3 (27) =23.02 
(probval=0.578)
ANj = -4.875
AN2 = -1.166
Standard Errors in brackets. AN=Asymptotically Normal. ** (*) = significant at 5% (10%) significance level. ‘Estimates
are robust to heteroscedasticity. “ Diagnostic statistics are two-step estimates.
Instruments used are In Ht(-2), In Ht(-3), In Ht(-4), In Ut(-1), Ain Ut(-1). Time dummies included in the regression.
U)
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Table 6.10 - Panel estimates of hiring functions
Poland: April - December 1992 (males)
-Estimation in first differences and IV-
Dependent Variable: 
Observational units:
ESTIMATES*
Regressors
const
In HJ-1)
In Un
In Vt
( V ^ /V t
TMm/100
DIAGNOSTICS**
Sargan Test
1st order ser. corr. 
2nd order ser. corr.
In H*
49 Voivodships; Observations: 441
Coefficients
0.277**
(0.049)
0.555**
(0.069)
1.067**
(0.339)
-0.042
(0.053)
- 0 . 0 1 0
(0.007)
0.037**
(0.017)
Chi2 (27) =26.50 
(probval=0.491)
ANt = -5.388
AN, = -0.689
0.276**
(0.049)
0.533**
(0.069)
1.091**
(0.345)
-0.014
(0.042)
0.042**
(0.017)
Chia(27)=27.25
(probval=0.450)
ANt = -5.299
AN2 = -0.913
0.276**
(0.049)
0.516**
(0.071)
1.195**
(0.353)
0 . 0 0 1
(0.040)
Chi2 (27) =27.97 
(probval=0.413)
ANX = -5.306
AN2 = -1.013
Standard Errors in brackets. AN=Asymptotically Normal. ** (*) ■ significant at 5% (10%) significance level. *Estimates
are robust to heteroscedasticity. **Diagnostic statistics are two-step estimates.
Instruments used are In Hn(-2),ln ^(-3),In H„(-4)fln UB(-1) and Ain Ua(-1) . Time dummies included in the regression.
u>to
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Table 6.11 - Panel estimates of hiring functions
Poland: April - December 1992 (females)
-Estimation in first differences and IV-
Dependent Variable: In Hc
Observational units: 49 Voivodships; Observations: 441
ESTIMATES*
Regressors Coefficients
const 0.127** 0.129** 0.122** 0.122**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
In Hf(-1) 0.448** 0.460** 0.420** 0.416**
(0.079) (0.080) (0.071) (0.085)
In U£ 0.457 0.543 0.591 0.718
(0.602) (0.599) (0.625) (0.623)
In Vt -0.004 -0.008 0.052 0.060
(0.070) (0.071) (0.056) (0.053)
(V^j/V, -0.037* -0.041** - -
(0.020) (0.019)
TMf/100 0.003 0. 012 --
(0.011) (0.011)
DIAGNOSTICS**
Sargan Test Chi2(27) =26.04 Chi2(27)=24.63 Chi2(27)=26.03 Chi2(27) =24.94
(probval=0.516) (probval=0.595) (probval=0.517) (probval=0.578)
1st order ser. AN, = -4.280 AN, = -4.467 AN2 » -4.224 AN, = -4.505
correlation
2nd order ser. AN2 = 0.211 AN2 = 0.332 AN2 = 0.288 AN2 = 0.408
correlation
Standard Errors in brackets. AN=Asymptotically Normal. ** (*) = significant at 5% (10%) significance level. *Estimates
are robust to heteroscedasticity. **Diagnostic statistics are two-step estimates.
Instruments used are In Hf(-2),ln Hc(-3),ln Hf(-4),ln Uf(-1) and Ain Uf(-1). Time dummies included in the regression.
Table 6.A1 Basic stock and flow data of the Polish Labour Market 
January 1991 - December 1992
Month Unemployment stocks vacancies Inflows Hirings
total female male total female male total female male
Jan 91 1195656 611337 584319 45349 35101 15292 19809
Feb 91 1258928 644508 614412 42222 32511 14942 17569
Mar 91 1322105 679025 643080 45794 35383 15778 19605
Apr 91 1370128 707869 662251 49917 39175 15777 23398
May 91 1434508 742902 691606 47031 38236 15499 22737
Jun 91 1574099 819722 754377 47367 38465 15477 22988
Jul 91 1749867 911995 837872 48900 37636 15329 22307
Aug 91 1853959 972243 881716 51371 37667 15280 22387
Sep 91 1970854 1033698 937156 48037 53607 24095 29512
Oct 91 2040427 1077542 962885 40206 61007 25217 35790
Nov 91 2108294 1113568 994726 35349 49864 21180 28684
Dec 91 2155573 1134124 1021449 29101 42259 18746 23513
Jan 92 2211753 1160752 1051001 29869 132281 59986 72295 41883 18561 23322
Feb 92 2245643 1174244 1071399 24892 102016 46624 55392 47202 20196 27006
Mar 92 2216370 1161521 1054849 26831 96394 45645 50749 49975 20059 29916
Apr 92 2218422 1165906 1052516 27651 101884 41112 60772 59763 21142 38621
May 92 2228632 1171566 1057066 31517 106565 45008 61557 57323 20065 37258
Jun 92 2296733 1220424 1076309 31690 171260 94514 76746 52497 19088 33409
Jul 92 2409109 1286251 1122858 36164 192363 97527 94836 45928 17181 28747
Aug 92 2457052 1314301 1142751 36981 117116 56700 60416 44362 16913 27449
Sep 92 2498481 1341919 1156562 40475 147363 75416 71947 63428 28514 34914
Oct 92 2477326 1341195 1136131 34202 128639 59336 69303 80553 28728 51825
Nov 92 2490067 1341312 1148755 29367 136061 56640 79421 65332 27802 37530
Dec 92 2509342 1338809 1170533 22926 127708 50562 77146 47198 21326 25872
Source: Unpublished data provided by GUS.
Note: Stocks are measured at the end of given month.
Table 6.A2 Registered unemployed according to length of 
continuous unemployment spell by voivodship 
in per cent for december 1992: Males and Females
continuous unemployment spell (s) in months
0 < s <-111 < s <=3|3 < s <=6|6 < s <=9 9 <s<=12 s > 12 1
1
Whole Country 
4.7 I 12.5 |
| — 
15.7 1 11.9 10.0 45.2 1
Warszawa
6.5 1 15.3 | 19.6 1 12.9 12.2 33.5 I
Biala Podlaska 
5.2 1 15.5 I 18.4 1 8.5 6.4 46.0 I
Bialystock
4.4 I 11.9 | 16.8 I 13.8 7.3 45.8 1
Bielsko-Biala 
6.1 | 21.8 I 21.5 I 14.7 11.1 24.9 1
Bydgosc
4.3 | 11.4 I 15.9 1 13.6 13.3 41.5 I
Chelm
7.7 I 16.2 I 18.4 I 15.6 9.6 32.6 I
Ciechanow
3.4 I 6.6 | 10.8 | 11.7 6.5 60.9 1
Czestochowa 
4.8 I 10.5 | 12.0 I 8.4 9.9 54.5 1
Elbl?g
3.6 | 8.7 I 14.1 1 13.8 9.9 49.9 I
Gdansk
6.3 | 12.5 | 18.9 I 13.0 11.2 38.1 I
Gorzow
4.6 I 15.2 I 16.3 I 11.2 9.6 43.0 I
Jeleniogora 
4.9 I 12.1 I 16.8 | 12.1 10.5 43.6 I
Kalisz
4.2 I 9.5 | 13.5 I 11.9 7.9 53.1 I
Katowice
4.5 I 17.8 I 17.9 I 9.3 8.4 42.1 1
Kielce
4.2 I 14.5 | 16.8 I 8.8 8.8 46.8 I
Konih
2.9 I 15.7 I 15.9 I 11.4 9.8 44.3 1
Koszalin
4.1 I 14.4 I 13.4 I 8.2 5.5 54.3 1
Krakow
5.9 I 17.2 I 16.7 1 10.7 11.2 38.3 1
Krosno
5.2 I 8.4 I 14.3 I 11.3 6.8 54.0 |
Legnica
4.8 I 10.0 | 15.3 I 13.1 10.1 46.6 I
Leszno
6.9 I 13.1 | 16.1 I 11.6 7.7 44.7 1
Lublin
4.1 I 15.5 | 19.0 | 11.8 9.5 40.1 I
Lomza
3.2 I 9.8 | 14.0 | 10.0 9.3 53.6 |
Lodz
5.3 I 13.7 I 16.8 | 18.0 19.1 27.1 1
Nowy S§tcz
3.8 I 9.4 | 13.2 I 13.7 7.2 52.6 I
Olsztyh
2.9 I 13.5 | 14.2 I 9.9 9.3 50.3 |
Opole
6.1 I 11.7 I 16.2 I 16.4 13.9 35.6 |
Ostrol$ka
5.7 I 9.2 I 14.4 I 11.8 7.8 51.2 1
Pila
4.2 I 10.3 I 15.1 I 10.7 7.7 52.0 I
Table 6.A2 (cont.) Registered unemployed according to length of 
continuous unemployment spell by voivodship 
in per cent for december 1992: Males and Females
continuous unemp1oyment spell
i
(s) in months
i ______ ____ I
H 
1
HIIVaV 
o
< s <=3|3 <
________ i____
s <=6|6 
_____ ■ _
o\iiVuV 9 <s<=12 s > 12 I__________I
Piotrkdw
2.9 1 8.3 I 12.5 I 10.6 8.6 57.0 |
Plock
3.9 I 12.6 I 14.6 | 13.6 11.7 43.7 1
Poznan
7.5 I 20.4 1 18.9 I 11.1 10.7 31.3 I
Przemysl
3.6 I 8.7 I 13.1 I 14.0 9.9 50.7 1
Radom
4.0 I 14.4 I 20.0 I 11.7 9.2 40.7 I
Rzeszow
5.5 I 9.9 1 13.3 I 8.0 6.4 56.9 I
Siedlce
4.0 | 8.0 I 11.6 | 10.1 7.5 58.8 I
Sieradz
4.3 I 9.4 I 13.9 I 13.8 8.9 49.7 I
Skierniewice 
5.0 I 10.3 | 17.0 | 14.4 13.0 40.4 I
Slupsk
4.6 I 11.4 1 14.8 | 11.7 10.5 47.1 I
Suwalki
4.4 I 9.6 I 12.4 I 11.2 10.0 52.4 1
Szczecin
5.4 1 12.4 | 17.8 | 12.3 9.8 42.3 I
Tarnobrzeg
3.1 I 7.9 I 12.3 | 11.6 7.2 57.9 I
Tarnow
4.5 I 13.5 I 18.4 I 7.5 5.2 50.8 I
Torun
5.7 I 12.1 I 14.0 I 12.0 10.7 45.5 I
Walbrzych
4.0 | 10.7 I 13.2 I 16.1 17.8 38.1 |
Wloclawek
5.9 I 12.1 I 16.1 I 10.9 12.1 42.9 I
Wroclaw
6.4 I 14.2 I 16.8 | 12.2 9.7 40.8 I
Zamosc
3.3 I 7.2 I 13.0 | 13.7 8.3 54.5 I
Zielona Gora 
5.7 I 11.7 I 16.4 I 13.0 9.8 43.5 I
Source: Unpublished data provided by GUS.
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Figure 6.2 Monthly flows in the Polish labour market 
January 1992 - December 1992 (male)
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Figure 6.3 Monthly flows in the Polish labour market 
January 1992 - December 1992 (female)
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Figure 6.1 Monthly flows in the Polish labour market
January 1992 - December 1992 (male and female)
Figure 6.4
Monthly Outflow Rates from Unemployment - A/U
The Polish labour market: January 1992 - December 1992
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Figure 6.5 
Job finding rates of the unemployed - H/U 
The Polish labour market: February 1991 - Decem ber 1992
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Figure 6.6
Inflows from unemployment into Intervention and Public Works 
The Polish labour market: January 1991 - December 1992
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Figure 6.7
Stocks of Intervention and Public Works participants 
T h e  Polish labour market: January 1991 - D ecem ber 1992
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Note: the term Intervention Works is explained in the text 328
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Figure 6.8
Inflows from unemployment into Further Training and Retraining
The Polish labour market: Decem ber 1991 - D ecem ber 1992
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Figure 6.9
Stocks of Retraining and Further Training participants 
The Polish labour market: January 1992 - Decem ber 1992
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Figure 6.10 "Augmented total factor productivity" of Polish hiring function 
Absolute monthly growth rates (males and females)
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Figure 6.11 "Augmented total factor productivity" of Polish hiring function
Absolute monthly growth rates (males)
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Figure 6.12 Augmented total factor productivity" of Polish hiring function 
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Conclusions
This study has utilized transition methodology to assess the effectiveness of labour 
market policies in Britain, Ireland and Poland. In the British case our regression results 
showed that Restart was an important determinant of the overall outflow rate from male 
unemployment. This can be taken as evidence that the Restart programme played an 
important role in the cure of the partial hysteresis of unemployment. Steady state 
simulations, based on SUR estimates of duration-specific outflow rates, showed that 
approximately 35% of the fall in long-term unemployment between 1985 and 1990 can 
be attributed to the introduction of Restart. A strong substitution effect acting on the 
very short-term unemployed dampened this result. The Enterprise Allowance Scheme, 
while having no predictive power in the estimation of the overall outflow rate, seemed 
a well defined determinant of the outflow rates for unemployed with continuous spells 
of between two and three and more than four quarters. However, earlier evidence in the 
literature of some deadweight loss caused by EAS seems to be confirmed by our impact 
regression of EAS on duration-specific outflow rates.
Even though Ireland spends a larger fraction of GDP on active labour market 
policies than most OECD countries, the results in chapter 2 showed that the sum of the 
five employment schemes analyzed actually had a negative impact on the overall outflow 
rate from unemployment arising from the many distortive effects on the age-by-duration 
outflow rates. In an economy which has been depressed for long periods, choosing all 
the long-term unemployed as the disadvantaged group to be reintegrated into the effective 
labour supply might lead to "creaming off' effects leaving the "worst" in each targeted 
group behind. Very refined selection criteria need to be developed in an economy like 
Ireland’s to ensure that the truly disadvantaged group is targeted.
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Transition methodology was modified in chapter 6 to estimate hiring functions 
using regional panel data. The estimates suggested two stylized facts about the Polish 
labour market in the years 1991 and 1992. First, the labour market experience was 
different for men and women. Secondly, a well behaved matching technology could not 
be found. For women neither the stock of registered unemployment nor the stock of 
notified vacancies was a statistically significant determinant of the level of hirings, while 
for men hirings exhibited increasing returns to scale in unemployment, with vacancies 
having no predictive power. At the very high levels of unemployment, which the Polish 
labour market experienced in 1991 and 1992, increasing returns to scale might imply that, 
as unemployment rises even further, many male unemployed revise their reservation 
wages downward, thus boosting hirings.
The evaluation of passive and active labour market policies also showed different 
outcomes for men and women. Four consecutive positive absolute growth rates of 
"augmented total factor productivity" of male hirings in the first 4 months of 1992 was 
taken as evidence that the switch from an eamings-related to a flat rate benefit system 
increased search efforts by men. The pattern of the corresponding female growth rates 
of "augmented total factor productivity" lead us to conclude that search efforts of women 
were not influenced by the regime switch. Finally, the measures for training and public 
and ’intervention’ works schemes impacted differently on male and female hirings. 
Training seemed to increase male hirings and had no effect on female hirings. The 
measure of public and ’intervention’ works had no predictive power for male hirings, but 
was a statistically significant, negative determinant of female hirings. As many of the 
slots on public and ’intervention’ works are known to have a much higher remuneration 
than the genuine jobs on offer to unemployed women, one explanation of this result
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could be that in those regions where the stock of "public" vacancies is high, women wait 
to be taken on a scheme and are not interested in taking up "private" jobs.
The different experience for men and women in the Polish labour market, which 
comes through in all regression results, seems to be driven by two things. Most job 
offers for the unemployed are "men’s jobs", but also the distribution of reservation wages 
and wages for jobs on offer for unemployed men overlap considerably, while for women 
these distributions hardly overlap at all.
In chapter 3 we investigated annual net labour flows using a panel of Polish 
industrial firms over the period 1984-1988. A production function was estimated and the 
dynamics of labour adjustment examined. Using a simple neoclassical model of labour 
demand our major finding goes against the hypothesis that after the decentralizing 
reforms of the early eighties Polish state owned enterprises behaved like profit- 
maximizers. Firms whose wages exceed their marginal products of labour do not adjust 
their employment as predicted by this simple model. Additionally, the marginal products 
of materials of most firms were less than one, pointing to the inefficient use of inputs so 
common in firms in centrally planned economies and not consistent with profit- 
maximization.
Gross flows in two labour markets in transition were discussed in chapters 4 and 
5. Chapter 4 described in detail the institutional environment which affected labour 
market transitions during the initial phase of the transformation of the Polish economy. 
The main findings were that in the period discussed demand and supply shocks, 
experienced across the socialized sector, were mainly responsible for the rapid rise in 
unemployment, while restructuring was not an important source of unemployment.
The introduction of Social and Monetary Union between the Federal Republic of
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Germany and the GDR in July 1990 caused a contraction of employment in the Eastern 
German labour market unprecedented in German history. Chapter 5 documents the 
transitions between labour market states and between sectors within employment. Based 
on the estimated transition probabilities, steady state calculations point to an eventual 
Eastern German labour force of similar proportion of those in the West, but with a twice 
as high unemployment rate of 10%. The predicted composition of employment is also 
quite different, with an over-reliance on the service industries. Both the estimated 
transition probabilities and the logistic regression which are undertaken show, like in the 
Polish labour market, that the experiences for men and women were different in this 
initial phase of the transformation. This difference manifested itself especially in lower 
female flows from unemployment into employment. A further finding from the logistic 
regressions is that demographic characteristics are the most powerful predictors of 
transition probabilities, while the economic variables are for the most part insignificant 
in the determination of these probabilities.
Both transition methodology and Markovian flow analysis are tools which can be 
applied to labour markets in transition. The results from chapters 5 and 6 indicate that 
standard Western models of labour market transitions and hiring processes are at least 
a good starting point for the analysis of labour markets in transforming economies.
To the extent that the effectiveness of the sort of labour market policies examined in 
chapters 1 and 2 can be readily evaluated using flow analysis, then the prospect seems 
good for using similar techniques to examine and evaluate Active Labour Market Policies 
in the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe.
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